Bill stuck so cannot create DNA data bank: Centre to SC

The Centre has informed the Supreme Court that the Human DNA Profiling Bill was currently held up and hence it was not in a position to create a national DNA data bank. It cited privacy concerns, lack of experts and handful laboratories as the prime reasons for not being able to push the Bill aimed at profiling the accused of serious crimes, and unidentified dead.
“DNA Profiling Bill is at present held up because privacy concerns have been raised by certain experts and NGOs. These concerns are being addressed by an Expert Committee set up by the Department of Biotechnology,” the Ministry of Science and Technology stated in a recent affidavit, adding the Committee was awaiting relevant inputs on the matter.
The apex court had in July suggested the Centre to create a DNA data bank, while agreeing with a plea by NGO Lokniti Foundation that establishment of identity was an essential feature of individual dignity and the government must resort to modern scientific methods.
The proposal to create a national DNA data bank was originally mooted in 2007, but it was dropped to factor in ethical, moral and legal issues on the sensitive matter. Crafted by the Department of Biotechnology, the Bill allows Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiling to help national law enforcement agencies and others in crime investigation and civil proceedings.
The government said DNA profiling was a complex technology, and that these activities needed appropriate regulation to prevent the misuse of the samples and DNA profiles, which could be achieved by the provisions in the draft Human DNA Profiling Bill.
The government stated that the proposed framework required “large number of trained personnel, which the country does not have at the moment.” It said that as per the international standards, one DNA examiner can undertake 100 cases per year and hence, only for the purpose of identifying 40,000 unidentified dead bodies, India would need at least 400 examiners.
However, the government said, the country had only 30 to 40 DNA experts against an estimated requirement of around 800 technical examiners for its 1,200 million population. “Therefore, it is necessary to set up large number of DNA testing units with skilled personnel who are capable of handling forensic DNA testing for identification of unidentified dead bodies,” it said.
Further, the process is resource-intensive as Rs 20,000 is the average cost of each test and the estimated cost of identifying 40,000 bodies would be Rs 80 crore every year, in addition to the remuneration of the examiners and support staff.

Silk route to Beijing

China’s decision to postpone President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan has got much attention in New Delhi. But this in no way marks a major change in Beijing’s policy towards Islamabad. President Xi is likely to travel to Islamabad sooner rather than later and reaffirm the depth of Beijing’s commitment to Islamabad. Delhi, however, is in danger of missing the significance of a more important change in Xi’s itinerary for the subcontinent. Instead of Pakistan, Xi has gone to the Maldives and also keeps his original date with Sri Lanka.

Thanks to its preoccupation with the defence of the contested northern frontiers with Pakistan and China, Delhi does not pay adequate attention to the emerging maritime dynamic to the south of the subcontinent. China’s interest in the island states of the Indian Ocean is relatively new and could turn out to be rather consequential.

As China’s economic interests in the Indian Ocean expanded rapidly in recent decades, Beijing’s naval interest and profile in the littoral also grew steadily. Sceptics say China’s naval priority is the western Pacific, where it is locked in intensifying territorial disputes with its Asian neighbours. They note Beijing’s determination to contest America’s longstanding naval primacy on its eastern sea board.

Others insist that Beijing is pursuing a two-ocean strategy rather than limiting itself to the western Pacific. Since the end of 2008, the Chinese navy has deployed its naval units on a continuous basis for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. This has provided the Chinese navy with valuable experience in conducting “far sea operations”.

Beijing sees the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which move massive amounts of energy and mineral resources from the Middle East and Africa to China through the Indian Ocean, as vital lifelines. Securing these SLOCs has emerged as a major justification for China’s growing naval activity in the Indian Ocean.

Over the last decade, Beijing has also focused on building maritime infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. Its investment in the development of new ports at Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, has generated much concern in India about China’s long-term intentions in the Indian Ocean.

Although these are all civilian ports for now, Delhi worries that they may portend a permanent Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Beijing has also cultivated special political relationships with key countries in the region and has stepped up its maritime diplomacy in the littoral. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited Seychelles and Mauritius during his tenure as president (2003-13). Now, Xi becomes the first Chinese president to visit Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Xi would certainly want to makethese visits memorable. Spread across the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles are exceptional vantage points to monitor and secure them, ensure valuable access for navies and project maritime power. In all these island states, which have long been associated with India, Chinese influence has begun to rise. Xi has elevated China’s intense outreach to the Indian Ocean island states with a new proposal for a “21st century maritime silk road” that will connect China’s coastline with critical locations in Southeast Asia, the subcontinent, the Gulf, the Mediterranean and the east coast of Africa. The Chinese president wants to develop ports across the littoral, build special export processing zones around them, and promote economic and financial interdependence with China. Xi’s invitation to Sri Lanka and the Maldives to join the “maritime silk road” has been accepted with alacrity by Colombo and Male. Xi’s visit to these two nations is likely to help China consolidate the emerging maritime partnership with Sri Lanka and lay the foundation for building one with the Maldives. Xi has also invited Delhi to join both the maritime silk route as well as the overland trade corridor connecting south-western China with the eastern subcontinent through Myanmar. After prolonged hesitation, India has begun formal discussions with officials from China, Myanmar and Bangladesh on developing the so-called BCIM corridor or the “southern silk road”. Yet there are many reservations in the Indian establishment on both the overland and maritime silk road proposals. Xi Jinping’s visit to India this week gives Prime Minister Narendra Modi the chance to weigh in on the issue and develop a new approach that takes into account India’s long-term economic, political and strategic interests. India can’t stop its neighbours from cooperating with China on infrastructure development at a moment when Delhi is doing exactly the same with Beijing. Instead of blocking China’s silk road initiatives in the region, Delhi must actively participate and shape the agenda. At the same time, it must leave its neighbours in no doubt that there are certain red lines regarding India’s security that can’t be transgressed in their collaboration with China on mega projects. Putting in place a strategy to modernise India’s internal connectivity and strengthen its maritime infrastructure is critical for any effective Indian response to China’s silk road initiative. Modi must also find ways to overcome one of India’s biggest weaknesses in promoting transborder corridors, which is project implementation at home and in the neighbouring countries. India needs to develop a vigorous framework for maritime economic activism in the Indian Ocean and beyond. It must include collaboration with powers like Japan who are eager to develop transfrontier corridors through the region. The question is no longer about keeping China out of the subcontinent. India must collaborate with whoever it can in reconnecting the subcontinent with itself and the neighbouring regions. -

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Build it green

The ministry of power and the ministry of petroleum and natural gas jointly released three new energy-efficiency initiatives, which are now part of various programmes to advance energy saving in buildings across the country. These include programmes for rating energy usage of diesel generators and hospital buildings, and design guidelines for energy efficiency in multi-storey residential buildings. Despite this, however, the country is without a clear strategy that links building energy use, which already accounts for more than 30 per cent of the economy’s electricity consumption, with its larger development, energy and climate change plan.

There is little ambiguity about the unprecedented growth expected in real estate and infrastructure in the next two decades. The initiatives, which were unveiled in early September, point to the increasing part that buildings play in India’s energy consumption. As calculated in 2010, a staggering two-thirds of commercial and high-rise residential buildings that will exist in 2030 are yet to be built. Such development is juxtaposed with two looming and inter-related questions: what will India’s energy strategy be in light of the extraordinary power demand and urbanisation; and what will its response be to the considerable threat of climate change to its development agenda? Within this context, how India strategises, develops and implements its position on energy efficiency in buildings could be pivotal in responding to these questions. So far, there is little evidence that such a strategy is being considered. What exists, instead, is a narrative that disguises some of the deeper structural issues at play.

The dominant reasoning for the slow pace of building efficiency adoption is considered to be the high upfront investment and a misalignment of incentives. All of this is true. Energy efficiency costs more at the time of purchase. It also pays for itself over the operational lifetime of the building, with paybacks largely accruing less than five years after construction. However, for non-owner-occupied buildings, while the developer invests in the efficiency measures, it is the tenant who reaps the economic savings, taking away the incentive for the initial investment.

The story, however, is not just about who benefits from energy saving. Rather, it is embedded in the larger political, technical and institutional arrangements within which building energy efficiency operates. Technical expertise is housed within different institutional arrangements countrywide and traverses a range of issues, such as building technologies, energy-management systems, materials, ratings, codes and incentives. However, there is no mechanism to link expertise, which resides in individuals, projects, and disconnected institutions, to macro-level national policymaking and then further to the international context.

The asymmetry of knowledge has resulted in low levels of awareness across stakeholders. Real estate developers are largely unaware about market advantagesor regulatory incentives that promote efficiency. End users are unfamiliar with the monetary and environmental benefits from an efficient space. There is also a deficit in skilled professionals who are trained to design for, implement and monitor the performance of efficiency measures. On the financial side, banks have a limited understanding of this new market for efficient technologies and energy-service companies and instead associate financial risk with investments. This attitude permeates to developers and end users, making them reluctant to invest or change behaviour patterns. Lastly, state and regulatory actors have a notion of energy efficiency that is divorced from macro-level co-benefits of energy security and greenhouse gas reductions. A complex relationship between energy and real estate thus exists, which manifests itself as a gridlock for energy efficiency, in spite of the latter being a win-win strategy for all. Such a crisis in the knowledge infrastructure is coupled with a lack of political will to ascertain efficiency goals at the national and state levels, and the actual capability of implementing them. Institutional arrangements have also led to a fragmentation of responsibility. Since buildings come under the purview of India’s concurrent list, the Centre determines the regulatory framework for building energy code notification. But its enforcement takes place under local municipal laws. Further, since India is a federal polity, the Centre does not have the power to mandate states to implement energy-efficiency targets. Laying the foundation for a buildings efficiency strategy will involve rethinking the approach taken so far. Our planning hitherto has followed a top-down technocratic and economic approach to increasing efficiency adoption. Taking a deeper look at existing narratives and underlying structures is essential to transform how one of India’s most important power consuming and rapidly growing sectors uses energy. Without doing so, we will fail to bridge and further our development, energy and climate change debate. - 

India uses ancient texts to foil US bid to patent lotus to treat obesity

The claim made by a US company on the usefulness of lotus and cowhage (a herb) for treatment of obesity and hunger at the European Patent Office (EPO) has been foiled by India, largely because of submission of prior art evidence from ancient Hindu texts that refutes the claim of novelty.

The US based company Somalab had filed a patent publication no EP2419508 at the European Patent Office (EPO) in 2010. The patent titled ‘Method for the induction of a reward response by modulation of dopaminergic systems in the central nervous system ‘ had claimed the usefulness of lotus and cowhage in the treatment of obesity and hunger control as novel. The patent was ‘deemed to have been withdrawn’ through a communication by EPO on August 13, 2014.



The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL), a unit of Council of Scientific & Industrial Research had submitted prior art evidence in the form of references from ancient books and texts citing evidence that the plants have been used alone or in combination along with few other ingredients for the treatment for the treatment of obesity, polyphagia/excessive hunger and for satiating in the traditional Indian system of medicine.



Confirming that the patent has been deemed to have been withdrawn, an EPO spokesperson said: “The exact reason for the applicant losing interest in their patent application cannot be known for certain. It is true that evidence provided by TKDL was used by the EPO examiner in their examination report, objecting to aspects of the Somalab’s patent application and subsequently Somalab’s application was deemed withdrawn for failure to respond. They have a few weeks to react, but if we do not get a response, the application will be terminated.”



Former TKDL director VK Gupta had on his last day in office submitted all evidence which specifies that these plants were used traditionally for treatment of obesity and hunger control.



“The claims of the usefulness of a combination of plants — sacred lotus and cowhage for treatment of obesity, polyphagia/excessive hunger and for satiating when the therapeutic effects of claimed plants are already known as traditional knowledge cannot be considered as inventive,” Dr Gupta had said in his letter to EPO.

ISRO advances GSAT-16

National space agency ISRO has decided to launch one of its upcoming communication satellites, GSAT-16, six months earlier than planned.
The 3,100-kg spacecraft, meant to support public and private television and radio services, large-scale Internet and telephone operations, was originally planned to be flown up around June 2015 on a European Ariane-5 launcher.
The decision to advance GSAT-16 launch came after the older INSAT-3E expired in March this year, according to ISRO Chairman K. Radhakrishnan.
The plan to move an ISRO mission ahead is almost unprecedented. “GSAT-16 will replace INSAT-3E [in the same space orbit at 55 degrees East longitude]. It was planned to be launched in the middle of 2015. After 3E was decommissioned in April, we advanced GSAT-16, which will now go in December this year,” he told The Hindu recently.
The assembly venue in Bangalore, the ISRO Satellite Centre or ISAC, is ready with the spacecraft. “Advancing a satellite by five to six months is a difficult job, but we did it. We also got a slot from Arianespace (launch company) and as of now, we are talking of a launch (around) December 6,” he said. An earliest launch would otherwise have been April 2015.
GSAT-16 will offer 24 transponders in the C-band, 12 in the extended C-band and another 12 in the Ku band.
Transponder shortfall
Over the last couple of years, the space agency has been trying hard to augment transponder capacity — which is about 190 on its own fleet — to meet increasing demand from commercial and public service users. It also had to lease 90 transponders on foreign satellites to meet its shortfall.
Last year, the government approved an allocation of Rs. 865.5 crore towards building GSAT-16, the fee for its foreign launch and insurance; the latter is taken when ISRO uses a foreign launch.
ISRO had to opt for an outside launch as Indian rockets PSLV and the present GSLV cannot lift satellites weighing above 2,000 kg. ISRO is developing the next big launcher, GSLV-MkIII, which can put satellites of up to 4 tonnes in orbit.
The first test flight of MkIII is to be taken up after the ongoing Mars Orbiter Mission reaches its crucial milestone, that of orbiting Mars, on September 24.

A to Z of Scottish independence referendum

As Scots prepare to vote for or against independence on Thursday, here is an A to Z of the referendum, including some of the key issues at stake:
A for ANTHEM: Scotland has no official national anthem. The pro-independence prospectus says one would be established following public consultation. Candidates would likely include "Flower of Scotland", "Scots Wha Hae" and "Scotland the Brave".
B for BORDERS: Scottish nationalists want Scotland to remain within the British Isles' passport-free Common Travel Area, but London has raised the possibility of border checks if an independent Scotland pursues a looser immigration policy.
C for CURRENCY: Nationalists want to retain the pound in an Anglo-Scots currency union. London rejects this idea. Scotland could keep using the pound regardless, just as some countries use the dollar, though it would have to put up with monetary policy set for the remaining UK and have no lender of last resort.
D for DEBT: The pro-independence campaign say Scotland would have to agree a per capita share of the UK national debt, but also a share of UK assets. This would amount to around ?130 billion debt for Scotland.
E for EUROPEAN UNION: Brussels insists an independent Scotland would have to apply for membership, though the Scottish government asserts it would not come to that.
F for FLAG: The white-on-blue saltire of Saint Andrew would remain the Scottish flag post-independence. What remains of the United Kingdom may decide to change the famous British flag, erasing the saltire, if Scotland leaves.
G for GDP: Nationalists claim Scotland has a higher gross domestic product than the UK and would per capita be the eighth-richest country in the OECD, a group of leading world economies.
H for HOLYROOD: Shorthand for the Scottish Parliament, based at Holyrood in Edinburgh, seat of the devolved assembly, which would become the seat of government in an independent Scotland.
I for INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Nationalists want an independent Scotland to remain in the EU, NATO, the UN, OECD, WTO and the Commonwealth. They plan for 70 to 90 "international offices", demanding a share of the UK's embassy network.
J for J. K. ROWLING: The millionaire author of the Harry Potter books is English, but lives in Edinburgh. She is one of several celebrities, including Mick Jagger and Stephen Hawking, backing the union. Sean Connery and Irvine Welsh support independence.
K for KINGDOM: An independent Scotland would retain the monarchy with Queen Elizabeth II as the head of state. The 1603 Union of the Crowns -- where Scotland's king James VI became England's king James I -- pre-dates the 1707 union of the English and Scottish parliaments.
L for LEFT OF CENTRE: A key nationalist argument is that Scotland doesn't get the UK government it voted for. Since 1964 when Scotland began consistently voting Labour, it has got a Labour UK government seven times out of 13.
M for MILITARY: Salmond envisages an independent army, navy and air force 15,000 strong, carved from British military assets. Scotland would seek continuing NATO membership, with an emphasis on North Atlantic maritime patrol.
N for NUCLEAR: Nationalists want a nuclear weapons-free Scotland. Britain's submarine-borne nuclear deterrent, based in Scotland, would have to move.
O for OIL: Some 90 percent of North Sea oil and gas revenues would come from Scotland's part of the UK continental shelf. Nationalists would look to set up a sovereign wealth fund, like Norway's, from the income.
P for PASSPORTS: All British citizens born or habitually resident in Scotland would be entitled to acquire a Scottish passport post-independence.
Q for QUESTION: Scottish residents will on Thursday be asked: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" The question was set by the independent Electoral Commission.
R for REFERENDUM: Brought about after SNP won a majority of seats in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections. First Scottish referendum since the one in 1997 that established a devolved Scottish parliament.
S for SALMOND: Scottish National Party leader Salmond is driving the pro-independence campaign and wants to become the first prime minister post-secession.
T for TAX: The SNP says there would be no need to increase taxes to fund current spending levels. It would lower corporation tax by up to three percent and increase personal tax allowances. British political parties have promised greater tax powers for Scotland if it stays in the UK.
U for UNIONIST: Prime Minister David Cameron's Conservatives, their Liberal Democrat junior partners in the British government, and the Labour opposition all support retaining the union. They make up the "No" campaign.
V for VOTING: Voters go to the polls on September 18. The vote has been extended to 16- and 17-year-olds. The polls are open from 7:00am (0600 GMT) till 10:00pm (2100 GMT).
W for WHISKY: At ?4.26 billion last year, represents around 85% of all Scottish food and drink exports, making it an economic jewel in the crown for a possible independent Scotland. However, the Scottish Whisky Association says producers need the backing of a large diplomatic network with global reach, expertise and influence to prosper.
X for X: Voters must mark their ballot papers with a simple cross. Spoiled ballots will not be counted.
Y: for YES: The "Yes" campaign is backed by the Scottish Nationalists, Greens and Socialists.
Z for ZOO: Salmond regularly likes to taunt Cameron by saying there are more pandas in Scotland (two) than Conservative MPs (one).

India identifies 15 weapon systems for export

The Defence Research and Development Organisation, which is struggling to meet deadlines for delivering key military projects, is working on an elaborate weapons export plan to make inroads in the lucrative global arms market. 
Backed by a government that seeks to transform India from the world's biggest weapons importer into an export powerhouse, the DRDO has identified 15 weapon systems that could help the country get its foot in the door in the international arms bazaar, DRDO chief Avinash Chander told HT in an exclusive interview.
The country’s top military scientist said the transformation was within reach, despite the organisation being saddled with delayed projects worth nearly Rs. 20,000 crore.
“There is a huge potential for export. The DRDO is more challenged by lack of trust in its capabilities rather than lack of capability,” said Chander, the man credited with shaping India’s strategic missile programme.
Home-built missiles would form the centerpiece of India’s arms exports, within the framework of the missile technology control regime that bans exporting missiles with ranges above 300 km.
The military hardware shortlisted for export includes Astra beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, Prahar surface-to-surface missile, Akash missiles, light combat aircraft (LCA), supersonic cruise missile Brahmos, sonars, Arjun Mk-2 tanks, airborne early warning and control system, a variety of unmanned systems and battlefield radars.
“The new government is placing premium on defence indigenisation and exports. We hope to turn over a new leaf,” he said.
But some of these platforms such as the LCA and Arjun Mk-2 aren’t operational yet. The DRDO had in August come in for some sharp criticism from PM Narendra Modi over delays and cost overruns in key programmes.
The DRDO chief said, “On an average, we are delivering products in a cycle of eight to 10 years from project sanction, which is only two to three years behind global players. In many cases, we had to develop technology from scratch.”
He said several projects had missed many deadlines due to technology denial regimes, extremely demanding qualitative requirements and a shrinking talent pool.
Modi had said India had the potential to be a world leader in the defence sector but was being held back by a “chalta hai” attitude