National Renewable Energy Bill, 2015

Draft National Renewable Energy Bill, 2015 released
The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy released the draft National Renewable Energy Bill, 2015 on July 14, 2015.20 Presently, the Electricity Act, 2003 regulates the renewable energy sector.
 The draft Bill provides for a framework to facilitate and promote the use of renewable energy. In addition, the draft Bill aims to address issues that are not adequately covered in the Electricity Act, 2003, such as principles of grid planning and operation.
Key features of the draft Bill include:
 Creation of the National Renewable Energy Fund and State Green fund: These funds will be operated by the central and state governments respectively. The National Renewable Energy Fund will obtain revenue from the National Clean Energy Fund. The Bill does not mention the percentage of annual proceeds which will be routed to this fund. The State Green Fund will obtain a corpus from the National Renewable Energy Fund. Both of these funds would provide for meeting the expenses of implementing the National Renewable Energy Policy and National Renewable Energy Plan.
 Licenses and Accreditation: Under the Electricity Act, 2003 supply of electricity requires a license. However, under the draft Bill, no license would be required to supply electricity from a renewable energy source. The Ministry will be responsible for setting up an accreditation program for renewable energy manufacturers, system integrators and others.
 Committees: The draft Bill provides for the creation of the National Renewable Energy Committee. The Committee would review the implementation of the National Renewable Energy Policy and National Renewable Energy Plan.
The Committee would also enable inter ministerial coordination and coordinate matters on grid integration of renewable energy. A grid is a high voltage backbone system of interconnecting transmission lines, sub-stations and generating plants. The National Renewable Energy Advisory Group is also established under the draft Bill. The group would keep track of the latest developments in technology. The group would also advise the central government on the utilisation of the National Renewable Energy Fund. 

High Level Committee Report on the Status of Women in India released

High Level Committee Report on the Status of Women in India released

A High Level Committee constituted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development in May 2013 submitted its report on the status of women in India in July 2015.17 The recommendations of the Committee ranged across parameters such as socio-economic status, violence against women, health and education, etc. Key recommendations include:  Implementation of existing Acts: Laws such as the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, Dowry Prohibition Act, Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, Prevention of Child Marriage Act, Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Workplace, etc, should be effectively implemented and monitored.
 Criminal laws: The budget for the implementation of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is insufficient for effective implementation. This allocation needs to be increased.
 Marital rape should be made an offence and age of consent, which is currently 18 years, should be revised.
 Other laws: Under the Hindu law, irretrievable breakdown of marriage should not be a ground for divorce, as it is at present. Under the Muslim law, a complete ban should be imposed on oral, unilateral and triple divorce (talaq). The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 should be amended to make it illegal to preferentially employ women based on marital status and pregnancy. Specific provisions regarding women workers should be included in the Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008.
 A national level monitoring agency should be set up to collect data on gender every five years. A national policy

Department of Telecom invites comments on Committee report on net neutrality

Department of Telecom invites comments on Committee report on net neutrality
The Department of Telecommunications constituted a committee chaired by Mr. A. K. Bhargava (member of Telecom Commission) on January 19, 2015 to examine the issue of net neutrality. The Committee submitted its report in May 2015 and has invited comments on it till August 15, 2015.16 Net neutrality relates to equal and non-discriminatory access to the internet, for consumers. Some of the key recommendations of the Committee are:  The core principles of net neutrality should be adhered to. International best practices need to be considered while formulating an India specific net neutrality approach. OTT services enhance consumer welfare and increase productivity. These services should be actively encouraged.  There should be a separation of the application layer (OTT services) from the network layer (Telecom Service Providers or TSPs) as application services are delivered over a licensed framework. Regulatory instruments should not be used to interfere with specific OTT communication services which deal with messaging.  A liberal approach may be adopted regarding international voice-over-internet telephony (VoIP) calling services. However, in case of domestic calls, TSP and OTT communication services may be treated similarly for regulatory purposes. For other OTT services there is no case for prescribing regulatory oversight.  Legitimate traffic management by TSPs should be allowed but tested against the core principles of net neutrality. Applicationagnostic congestion control cannot be considered to be against net neutrality.  The core principles of net neutrality should be made part of license conditions. Tariff will be regulated by TRAI and a cell in the Department of Telecom should be set up to deal with net neutrality related issues. 

Expert Committee on Railways restructuring submits final report

The Committee for Mobilization of Resources for Major Railway Projects and Restructuring of Railway Ministry and Railway Board (Chairperson: Mr. Bibek Debroy) submitted its report in June 2015.13 The Committee was constituted in September 2014 to make recommendations for the mobilization of resources for major railway projects and restructuring of the Railway Ministry and Board.
The Committee had submitted an interim report in March 2015.14 Key recommendations of the Committee include:  The Committee recommends setting up an independent regulator, the Railways Regulatory Authority of India. The authority will regulate tariff, safety, provide for licensing, and set technical standards.  Indian Railways also undertakes other peripheral activities such as running hospitals and schools, manufacturing locomotives, catering, etc. Railways should not conduct these peripheral activities and instead focus on its core function, which is of running trains.
 The Railway divisions must be treated as independent business units. Decision making powers must be decentralised from the level of the general manager down to the division level.
  Railways accounting practices are not in the same band of commercial accounting as followed by other international railway systems. A responsive and transparent accounting system must be established.
  Employee costs including pension constitute the largest component of the railways expenses and hence it must rationalise its manpower. A performance assessment system should be implemented to rationally differentiate between the performance and aptitude of employees

Revised draft Indian Financial Code released ,Black Money Rules, 2015 in relation to one time compliance opportunity notified,RBI constitutes a Committee on Financial Inclusion

Revised draft Indian Financial Code released Vatsal Khullar The Ministry of Finance released the revised draft of the Indian Financial Code (IFC), 2015 on July 23, 2015.5 Comments have been invited on the revised draft by August 8, 2015. An earlier draft Code, along with the report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC) was released for comments and suggestions in March 2013. 6 , The draft Code seeks to move away from the current sector-wise regulation to a system where the RBI regulates the banking and payments system and the proposed Financial Agency subsumes the roles of existing regulators like SEBI, IRDA and PFRDA to regulate the rest of the financial sector. It also proposes an appellate tribunal and agencies for consumer protection, resolution of unviable entities, public debt management and ensuring systemic stability. Consequently, it proposes repeal of 19 existing Acts. Table 1 highlights the proposed regulatory framework.
Table 1: IFC's regulatory framework Present Proposed Functions
RBI RBI Monetary policy; regulation of banks and payments system.
SEBI; FMC; IRDA; PFRDA Financial Authority Regulation of nonbank and payments related markets. Securities Appellate Tribunal Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal Hear appeals against RBI, the Financial Authority and FRA. Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Resolution Corporation Resolution work across the system. Financial Stability Development Council (FSDC) FSDC Statutory agency for systemic risk and development. New entities Public Debt Management Agency Independent debt management agency. Financial Redress Agency (FRA) Consumer Complaints Sources: FSLRC Report; PRS. Other important guidelines outlined in the Code are:  Consumer protection: Establish certain basic rights for all consumers, and create a unified Financial Redress Agency (FRA) to serve aggrieved consumers across the sector.  Prudential regulation: Outline a framework for the regulators to follow, in order to monitor and reduce the failure probability of a financial firm.  Contracts, trading and market abuse: Establish the legal framework for regulating contracts, property and securities, and  Capital controls: Entrust the Central Government and the RBI to formulate rules and regulations, in order to control the capital inflow and outflow from the country. More information about the 2013 draft Code can be found in the PRS Monthly Policy Review for March 2013, here.

Black Money Rules, 2015 in relation to one time compliance opportunity notified 

The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Rules, 2015 were notified on July 2, 2015.7 The Rules were notified under the Foreign Income and Assets (Imposition of Tax) Bill, 2015 which was passed by Parliament on May 13, 2015.8
 The Act (i) imposes a 30% tax rate on undisclosed foreign income and assets, and (ii) provides for a one- time compliance opportunity to declare previously undisclosed foreign income. Availing of such one-time compliance opportunity would attract a lower penalty (100% of the value of the asset as opposed to 300%) and no criminal prosecution.
Primarily, the Rules provide for: (i) the manner of determination of the fair market value of an undisclosed foreign asset; and (ii) the time period of the one-time compliance opportunity for declaring previously undisclosed foreign assets.
The procedure to be followed in relation to the one time compliance opportunity is as follows9 :  The Act states that any person would be permitted to make a declaration in relation to previously undisclosed foreign assets (prior to the assessment year beginning April 2016), on or before a date to be notified by the central government. The Rules specify that this date would be September 30, 2015.  The Rules also specify that the Commission of Income Tax is required to inform the declarant of any information related to that asset, currently available to them by October 31, 2015.  The declarant is permitted to submit a revised declaration within 15 days of receiving such information.  The tax and penalty on the value of undisclosed foreign assets declared is required to be paid by December 31, 2015.

RBI constitutes a Committee on Financial Inclusion 

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) constituted a Committee on Financial Inclusion on July 15, 2015.10 The Committee will formulate a five year measurable action plan for financial inclusion. It will be chaired by an executive director of the RBI and will have 13 other members who will include, among others, representatives from the RBI, private and public sector banks, and research institutes. Terms of Reference of the Committee include:  Review the existing policy of financial inclusion and recommendations made by various committees,  Formulate the underlying policy and institutional framework covering consumer protection, financial literacy and delivery mechanism of financial inclusion, especially in rural areas,  Study cross country financial inclusion experiences to identify key learnings, especially in the field of technology-based delivery models, and  Suggest an action plan for financial inclusion whose components can be monitored. These include payments, deposit, credit, social security transfers and pension and insurance. The Committee is expected to submit its report within four months after its first meeting

Modi in the Gulf

Few parts of the world are more important for India than the Gulf. Yet, India’s political engagement with the region has rarely matched its significance. That Narendra Modi’s two-day trip to the UAE this weekend is the first prime ministerial visit since 1981 underlines the story of New Delhi’s neglect of a country and region that is so proximate in all senses of the term. Although the modern political evolution of the Gulf was intimately tied to the rise of the British Raj on the subcontinent, independent India’s approach to the Gulf steadily became less strategic. India’s tendency to see the region through an ideological lens, letting its domestic politics define the strategy and allowing the Pakistan factor to limit the prospects for partnership, have long distorted its relationship with the Gulf. The prime minister now has an opportunity to help India discard its economic mercantilism and political diffidence in the Gulf and replace them with a comprehensive strategy. The factors shaping such a strategy are difficult to miss. The oil-rich Gulf remains the main source of India’s growing hydrocarbon imports. It is home to more than six million Indian expatriate workers. They send remittances worth nearly $50 billion every year. With its large foreign currency reserves, the Gulf kingdoms are also potentially a big source of investment in India’s infrastructure. Within the Gulf, the UAE looms large. It hosts about 2.6 million Indian workers. Bilateral trade with the UAE peaked at $73 billion in 2013 but has since declined to around $60 billion. Even with the lower figure, the UAE is India’s third largest trading partner after the US and China. Like Singapore in the east, Dubai is India’s entrepôt to the west. 

The UAE airlines move India’s mobile millions to far corners of the world. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh did indeed make plans to visit the country but could not make it. In any case, the Middle East was not at the top of Singh’s travel plans. He barely showed India’s flag in the region. Of the few trips he made, two were to attend non-aligned summits — Iran (2012) and Egypt (2009). He visited Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar once. If the UPA government seemed to neglect the Gulf, there has been some concern that the NDA might do the same. Neither the Gulf nor the larger Middle East figured on Modi’s itinerary during his first year in office. Worse still, the NDA government’s enthusiasm for strengthening ties with Israel was widely interpreted in Delhi as coming at the expense of its historic ties to the Arabs. That the debate was being framed in these terms suggested how out of touch the Indian political class is with the new geopolitics of the Middle East. 

No major power, whether it is the US, China or Russia, views ties to the region as a zero-sum game between the Arabs and Israel. No one in the Middle East is asking India to choose between multiple rivals in the region. All want India to show more political interest and greater economic purpose. Second, the divide between Israel and the Arabs has long ceased to be the primary contradiction in the region. Ever since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Gulf countries have been deeply troubled by the ideology and policies of the new republic in Tehran. Those Arab-Persian and Shia-Sunni contradictions have become so sharp in recent years that many observers now talk of a de facto alliance between some Arab states and Israel to counter the growing power and influence of Iran in the region. The Gulf Arabs, who have long looked at the US as their main security provider since the British retrenched their historic role east of the Suez in the late 1960s, are now deeply troubled by the nuclear deal between Washington and Tehran and its political consequences. 

Meanwhile, the rise of violent religious extremism threatens all the states in the region, republics and monarchies as well as the Sunni and Shia. The dramatic rise of the Islamic State is compelling the consideration of utterly unexpected alliances. These developments demand that Delhi take a fresh strategic look at the Gulf. If the PM is ready to inject some strategic content to its engagement with the Gulf, the UAE is a good place to start. While the large diaspora, energy security, trade and investments are all of great importance to Modi’s foreign policy agenda, it is the arena of strategic cooperation that demands serious attention from the PM. This would include not only counter-terrorism, intelligence exchanges, military exercises, and maritime security, but also a close and sustained consultation on the construction of a stable balance of power system in the Gulf and preventing the destabilisation of Afghanistan. The writer is a consulting editor on foreign affairs for ‘The Indian Express’ and a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Delhi. 

A pseudo peace

The signing of the agreement between the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah), or the NSCN-IM, and the Central government had all the drama of a reconciliation ceremony. But the details remain shrouded in secrecy. There appears to be much less to it than meets the eye. The ceremony had the telltale signs of a pseudo-event. Pseudo-events are occurrences designed to generate press coverage. Their relationship to reality is uncertain. But it is their inherent ambiguity that explains public interest in them. Ambiguity has marked all official pronouncements about the ceremony. The Press Information Bureau headlined it as the prime minister having witnessed the signing of a “historic peace accord.” However, it referred to it later as a “framework agreement”. The news took key stakeholders by surprise. Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh of Manipur said that he did not know what the agreement says and reiterated his government’s position that it will not accept any accord that disturbs Manipur’s territorial integrity. The demand for the integration of all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas has been a highly contentious subject, nowhere more so than in Manipur. But the protracted Assam-Nagaland border dispute is also part of the same faultline. 

The structural flaws in the design of the Naga peace process have been obvious for a while. The format — bilateral and secret meetings between NSCN-IM leaders and the government’s interlocutor — leaves out critical stakeholders. It is unlikely to produce a durable settlement. NSCN-IM leaders have said from time to time that they are not asking for greater or smaller Nagaland, but only for the integration of areas where Nagas live. The formulation is clever, but it does not resolve the fundamental contradiction. The Central government is expected to make territorial concessions that evoke intense emotions in neighbouring states over the heads of popularly elected state governments. However, there has been significant movement in this area in the course of the negotiations. Public statements that both parties recognise each other’s “compulsions” and talk of a solution that accepts “contemporary realities” point in that direction. But the structural flaw of the peace process becomes painfully apparent in what an unnamed official source told The Hindu about the procedures that will be followed. Apparently, the interlocutor to the Naga talks will prepare a draft note for the home ministry. The views of relevant Central government ministries and state governments will be elicited. Following that exercise, a draft bill will be presented to the Central cabinet. Once the cabinet approves it, the bill will be submitted to Parliament. Whatever the merits of these procedures, they raise serious questions about the meaning of the ceremony. Of course, the design of the process is not of this government’s own making. Key elements have been in place for a long time. Negotiating with leaders of particular insurgent groups and marginalising their rivals has been a key element of the Indian approach to conflict management in the region. It is difficult to alter the design of any peace process once it is set on a particular course. It becomes path-dependent — past decisions constrain options. It may have been obvious that negotiations that leave out neighbouring states carry significant risks. 

But it has been hard even to think of these states as stakeholders. What then justifies the optimism displayed by the NSCN-IM leaders and the government? The government seems to be counting on potential shifts in the public mood in Manipur and Assam as a result of a number of major decisions it is considering, not all of them directly connected to the Naga issue. In Assam, conceding to the longstanding demand of six communities for ST status would mean a radical increase in the number of reserved seats in the state assembly. It would impact Assam’s parliamentary representation as well. But it will have an adverse impact on significant communities. The process of updating the National Register of Citizens is also likely to satisfy key constituencies. Significantly, these two issues now feature in the dialogue between the Centre and the pro-talks faction of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). However, it is too soon to say whether all of this would make the potential effects of the agreed terms of the Naga settlement on the disputed Assam-Nagaland border more acceptable in Assam. Some version of an alternative arrangement for the Nagas of Manipur — perhaps the creation of autonomous councils — is clearly under consideration. 

But the crucial issue is the umbrella under which it gets linked to the Nagas of Nagaland. Even if it is only a symbolic gesture, it is far from obvious that it would be acceptable to Manipuris — Nagas and non-Nagas alike. However, what happens to the issue of the Inner Line Permit in Manipur will be very significant. Even a partial acceptance of this demand would mean that, for the first time since the late 19th century, a colonial-era institution would be extended to a new region. It would undoubtedly soothe Manipuri public opinion. But will it really prepare the ground for the acceptance of an otherwise unpopular Naga accord? Acceptance of the agreement by the Naga public in general is also far from certain. The NSCN-IM leaders sitting as equals with India’s PM and the country’s top political leadership was an important symbolic gesture. So were some of the PM’s words. But are the agreement’s provisions substantive enough for the Nagas to justify the sacrifices they made during their long struggle for independence? These are significant hurdles yet to be crossed. What then accounts for the timing of the signing ceremony? Many rumours are making their rounds. However, one piece of speculation seems most plausible. The poor health of Isak Chisi Swu — one of the two Naga leaders negotiating with the government — may have prompted the decision to hold the ceremony. It is feared that if Swu does not survive, rumours that he may not have been a party to the agreement would fatally undermine it. But was this a good reason for the PM to tell the world that “a historic peace accord” has already been signed? -