The policy of non-alignment had a pro-West tilt in the initial years (1947-48 and 1951) because Nehru was wary of the Soviet Union not least because of the activities of the Communist Party of India. However, subsequently it emerged as a policy of equidistance from the super powers. After the outbreak of the Korean War, he was concerned over the spread of the Cold War to Asia and advocated China’s admission to the UN that would hopefully facilitate a settlement of the Korean conflict. The proposal was opposed by America. Nevertheless, India played a successful mediatory role in breaking the stalemate that had developed in the negotiations on the issue of repatriation of the Prisoners-of-War that brought to an end the conflict in Korea. For this, it was made the Chairman of the Neutral Nations’ Repatriation Commission in Korea (1953-54).
Equally significant was India’s role in bringing to an end the conflict in Indo-China. At the four-power Geneva conference, Krishna Menon and Lester Pearson of Canada worked closely (during February-July 1954) to ensure its success, although India was not formally a member of the conference. In recognition of its role, India was made the Co-Chairman of the International Control Commission for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, along with Canada. Within six months, however, the Geneva settlement started to collapse; the collaboration with Canada also began to decline.
India’s influence in international affairs reached its peak during the mid-1950’s as the policy of non-alignment came to acquire a positive value particularly in the context of its mediatory role in conflicts involving the major powers. India’s support was sought on important international issues. Nehru’s policy did make India proud. In 1955 India played a major role in the Bandung Conference, and was also instrumental in the “package deal” that facilitated the entry of 16 newly-independent States to the UN. India’s new-found influence as a non-aligned State maintaining equidistance from the Super powers was, however, short-lived as the credibility of India’s non-alignment policy came to be questioned in the West in the context of two events ~ the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. “Both of these were clearly invasions”, wrote Brecher later, “without getting into the legal technicalities of aggression or non-aggression”, as both involved invasion by alien forces. He accused India of invoking “a double-standard in responding to the two crises” (1963). To New Delhi, the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt appeared to be an attempt by the two imperialist powers to coerce Egypt to submission. It was viewed as an imperialist war and condemnation was, therefore, spontaneous; but when the Soviet forces invaded Hungary, India’s response was ambiguous because, as Brecher commented, “India stressed what it called the broader implications of the problem”.
The Indian response to the Hungarian crisis was certainly influenced by Cold War considerations, though Nehru regretted the Soviet Union’s atrocities in Hungary. Another factor influencing Nehru’s decision was the lack of proper information from the Indian Embassy in Budapest. This is evident from the account of the events given later by KPS Menon, who was then Ambassador to Moscow and concurrently accredited to Budapest. Matters were made worse by Krishna Menon’s speech in the UN General Assembly explaining India’s decision to abstain from voting on a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary as it amounted to a virtual defence of the Soviet Union, although he did not have the prior clearance either from Nehru or the MEA, for the stand he had taken in the General Assembly. That Nehru was not too happy with the Soviet Union’s actions later became clear from his letter to Eisenhower (7 November) in which he wrote that there was nothing to choose between Suez and Hungary, but in the absence of adequate information he was unwilling to come out against the Soviet Union publicly. However, India’s actions ~ Menon’s in particular ~ damaged its reputation as a non-aligned State. In the post-Suez years, it could never recover the prestige that it came to acquire during 1954-55 by playing the role of a successful mediator in conflicts involving the great powers, partly because of certain changes in the international environment ~ the beginnings of a rapprochement in US-Soviet relations and the emergence of militant anti-colonialism in the newly-independent States in Asia and Africa ~ and more specifically, because of the deterioration in India’s relations with China since 1959 and especially after the India-China border war of 1962.
India’s humiliating defeat tarnished her image, and Nehru left a legacy of conflict with China which has not yet been resolved. He himself was largely responsible for this. An opportunity to resolve the border conflict was lost in 1960, when Zhou en Lai visited India and proposed a “package deal” under which China would recognise the McMahon Line alignments as constituting the border in the eastern sector in return of India’s recognition of Chinese “legitimate interests” for determining the boundary in the western sector. This proposal certainly merited serious consideration, but because of fear of parliamentary criticism, it was rejected by Nehru. He also missed another opportunity to avert the war in July 1962, when Krishna Menon had informal negotiations with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi in Geneva. An arrangement for the forward posts had been suggested which “implied that both sides would claim obsession of some of the Aksai Chin, and that the territory would have to be divided, leaving the (Aksai Chin) road on the Chinese side”.
Another legacy that Nehru had left for posterity was the unresolved Kashmir dispute which has been the most important factor in souring India-Pakistan relations since independence. It can be nobody’s case to argue that Nehru was responsible for the origin of the conflict; it was the dithering Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir who was responsible because of his prevarication over the issue of accession of his state to either India or Pakistan, before independence. Another area where Nehru’s policy was deficient was his failure to pay attention to India’s relations with the neighbouring States. This is reflected in the fact that during 1947-57 he did not find time to visit any of the countries in South Asia to reaffirm their friendship, a deficiency which the present government is trying to correct.
