India has reserves of thorium in sufficient quantity as compared to other parts of world.
The Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), a constituent unit of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), has so far established 11.93 million tonnes of in situ resources Monazite (Thorium bearing mineral) in the country, which contains about 1.07 million tonnes of thorium. The state-wise resources of in situ monazite established by AMD as of September 2014 are as follows:
Both Uranium and Thorium have got distinctive characteristics governing their utilisation in nuclear reactors. Unlike uranium, thorium alone cannot be directly used as nuclear fuel in a reactor. Utilisation of Thorium with either uranium or plutonium, without going through the second stage of Fast Breeder Reactors, to build sufficient inventory of plutonium first, will be counter-productive by limiting thorium utilisation to a very small fraction of the total available resources in the country. Utilisation of Thorium in the third stage makes it available as a sustainable energy resource for centuries. With this mode of utilisation, Thorium offers not only a sustainable energy resource, but also excellent fuel performance characteristic in a reactor, better than Uranium with respect to lower inventory of long lived nuclear waste.
The three stage Indian nuclear programme was formulated at the inception of the DAE and has as its main stay objective of utilisation of large resources of Thorium in a sustainable manner. As explained above, Thorium cannot be used for overcoming power crisis in the short term.
The resources of xenotime, another rare-earth bearing mineral, are negligible in India. AMD has established about 2000 tonnes of xenotime-bearing heavy mineral concentrate containing 2% xenotime in the riverine heavy mineral placer deposits of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
Monazite is a mineral mainly containing rare earths and thorium-a prescribed substance to be handled by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). Accordingly, Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IREL) wholly owned by the Govt. of India, under the administrative control of the Dept. of Atomic Energy (DAE) utilises monazite mainly for production of rare earth compounds, and thorium, as needed in the Department of Atomic Energy. Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD), a constitute unit of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has estimated the presence of 11.93 million tonnes of monazite resources in the beach sand mineral placer deposits along the coastal tracts of India. Monazite in general, contains about 55 – 60% total Rare Earth Oxide
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28 November 2014
Thorium Reserves in Country
Power Generation Through Atomic Energy
| There are 20 Nuclear Power Reactors in the country with a total installed capacity of 4780 MW. In addition, Unit-1 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project, in Tamil Nadu with a capacity of 1000 MW was connected to grid in October 2013. It has so far generated 2825 Million Units (MUs) of electricity. The generation of electricity by the nuclear power reactors in the country was 35333 MUs in the year 2013-14, including 1106 Million units from Kudankulam-1. The details are as follows: (i) Additional Protocol with regard to safeguards. (ii) Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with 21 countries in the Asia Pacific Region and the International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for collaboration in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (iii) Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) of Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) - for collaboration between IAEA and GCNEP for furthering the objectives of GCNEP. Government plans/proposes to develop and carry forward the nuclear programme in the country. The resources of xenotime, another rare-earth bearing mineral, are negligible in India. AMD has established about 2000 tonnes of xenotime-bearing heavy mineral concentrate containing 2% xenotime in the riverine heavy mineral placer deposits of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Monazite is a mineral mainly containing rare earths and thorium-a prescribed substance to be handled by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). Accordingly, Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IREL) wholly owned by the Govt. of India, under the administrative control of the Dept. of Atomic Energy (DAE) utilises monazite mainly for production of rare earth compounds, and thorium, as needed in the Department of Atomic Energy. |
New Atomic Power Plants
The XII Five Year Plan proposals envisage start of work of nineteen new nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 17400 MW. The details are as under:
In respect of the reactors to be set up in the future with international cooperation, necessary provisions will be made in the commercial contracts to ensure fuel supply for the entire lifetime of the reactors. In respect of indigenous reactors, the fuel supply will be ensured from indigenous and imported sources (for reactors to be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards). Decisions on use of indigenous/ imported fuel (after placing them under IAEA Safeguards) in respect of new indigenous reactors will be taken by the government at an appropriate time.
This information was given by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions and in the Prime Minister’s Office Dr. Jitendra Singh in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.
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27 November 2014
Defence (procurement) minister
Going by the public statements made so far by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, one could be forgiven for mistaking him as minister for defence procurement. In practically every statement he promises "transparency and speed in defence procurement". To be fair, he admits it will take him time to grasp issues relating to national defence. Even so, if he continues promising only faster procurement, it might well become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would be worrying to have a defence minister who measures his success in capital rupees spent. Instead, Mr Parrikar must focus on adding capability. This can be done at relatively nominal cost.
A striking example has been reported in this newspaper on Tuesday ("Sonar contract provides major boost to navy"). Over the last two decades, the navy has built up a powerful and enormously expensive fleet of capital warships - the aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes that control the seas in war. Yet these warships, each costing several thousand crore rupees and crewed by a couple of hundred sailors, have remained desperately vulnerable to enemy submarines. This is simply because they lack "advanced towed array sonar", or ATAS, which the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had promised to deliver but did not. By now procuring ATAS from the global market - each worth a piffling Rs 50 crore - tens of thousands of crores worth of naval warships have become combat-capable.
Such examples abound within the military. Yet the ill-informed public narrative on defence procurement centres on enormously expensive weapons platforms that, in many cases, are operationally ineffective even after lavishing billions because smaller systemic or structural drawbacks restrict their full employment. In militaries like that of Pakistan, where money is short even after unfairly burdening the national exchequer, there is awareness of the need to obtain bang for the buck. India's relative wealth has not nearly been translated into commensurate capability.
Remaining with the navy (ironically the most cost conscious service), there is constant breast-beating over the submarine shortfall and China's growing lead in submarine numbers. The media constantly harps on how India has just 13 submarines compared to China's 53 conventional and five nuclear attack submarines, though that lead could increase this afternoon, giving how fast China is building more. Everyone's solution, predictably, is to throw more money at the problem, by quickly sanctioning (quickly and transparently, as Mr Parrikar would say!) Project 75I, which envisages building six new submarines for a mind-numbing Rs 50,000 crore.
Yet if one were to scrutinise the ongoing Project 75, under which Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai, is building six Scorpene submarines, a sane planner would be aghast to discover that these submarines - which have been in the works for more than a decade - will be operationally hamstrung when they finally roll off the line. The submarine's key weapon is the heavyweight torpedo and, incredibly, the defence ministry has omitted to buy any for the Scorpene. In 2011, Finmeccanica subsidiary WASS had been selected to supply 98 torpedoes for some Rs 1,850 crore. Since that contract remains unsigned, the Scorpenes will join the fleet without their key weapon.
Yet nobody in the military, the ministry, the government or the media is called to account for allowing a Rs 1,850-crore procurement to stall the battle-readiness of Rs 24,000 crore worth of submarines. One can forgive the ministry, manned as it is by generalists for whom torpedo sounds like a variety of libido. The Prime Minister's Office, with so many ministries to meddle in, can only focus on big-bang procurements - and that means those that are regularly reported on, or those that the military is pressing for. The media, especially top editors, choose not to waste mindspace on the nitty-gritty of defence economics, and instead, focus their collective gaze on high-voltage procurement contracts that can be easily remembered by the billions they cost.
Take the media fanfare over the selection of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), an apparently fixed match that was won by the French Rafale fighter, the least expensive of the two most expensive fighters on offer, which were predictably ushered into the final selection. Currently, this $20-billion tender remains the single-most reported defence story, with uncounted column inches speculating on the imminent signature of the Rafale contract. This newspaper has been practically alone in carrying cost-benefit analyses on the Rafale proposal, and in debating whether the opportunity cost of buying this fighter is too high.
In contrast, there is little mindspace for the little things that would improve operational capability at little cost. Maintenance, that boring process that can put a hundred additional Sukhoi-30MKIs into the sky just by better inventory control and technician training. Light fighters, especially the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which should be the pride of India, but is sadly the bastard child of the laughably named Indian Air Force. Force multipliers, like airborne refuelling aircraft and airborne early-warning and control systems, can be wisely procured and deployed to make each squadrons as effective as two. But this is humdrum stuff. So are issues like night-blindness that dramatically reduces combat capability across the three services, especially the army.
It is these mundane essentials that Mr Parrikar must focus on. Appointing a tri-service chief would spare him the confusion of having to navigate the tri-service jockeying for funds and resources. He must institute a detailed capability audit, in which each service presents a plan for optimising their existing weapons and platforms rather than just stretching out their palms for newer, better and, of course, more expensive toys. It is militarily prudent to get our existing kit working optimally - the military equivalent of fixing the Indian Railways before building fancy new bullet train lines.
A striking example has been reported in this newspaper on Tuesday ("Sonar contract provides major boost to navy"). Over the last two decades, the navy has built up a powerful and enormously expensive fleet of capital warships - the aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes that control the seas in war. Yet these warships, each costing several thousand crore rupees and crewed by a couple of hundred sailors, have remained desperately vulnerable to enemy submarines. This is simply because they lack "advanced towed array sonar", or ATAS, which the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had promised to deliver but did not. By now procuring ATAS from the global market - each worth a piffling Rs 50 crore - tens of thousands of crores worth of naval warships have become combat-capable.
Such examples abound within the military. Yet the ill-informed public narrative on defence procurement centres on enormously expensive weapons platforms that, in many cases, are operationally ineffective even after lavishing billions because smaller systemic or structural drawbacks restrict their full employment. In militaries like that of Pakistan, where money is short even after unfairly burdening the national exchequer, there is awareness of the need to obtain bang for the buck. India's relative wealth has not nearly been translated into commensurate capability.
Remaining with the navy (ironically the most cost conscious service), there is constant breast-beating over the submarine shortfall and China's growing lead in submarine numbers. The media constantly harps on how India has just 13 submarines compared to China's 53 conventional and five nuclear attack submarines, though that lead could increase this afternoon, giving how fast China is building more. Everyone's solution, predictably, is to throw more money at the problem, by quickly sanctioning (quickly and transparently, as Mr Parrikar would say!) Project 75I, which envisages building six new submarines for a mind-numbing Rs 50,000 crore.
Yet if one were to scrutinise the ongoing Project 75, under which Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai, is building six Scorpene submarines, a sane planner would be aghast to discover that these submarines - which have been in the works for more than a decade - will be operationally hamstrung when they finally roll off the line. The submarine's key weapon is the heavyweight torpedo and, incredibly, the defence ministry has omitted to buy any for the Scorpene. In 2011, Finmeccanica subsidiary WASS had been selected to supply 98 torpedoes for some Rs 1,850 crore. Since that contract remains unsigned, the Scorpenes will join the fleet without their key weapon.
Yet nobody in the military, the ministry, the government or the media is called to account for allowing a Rs 1,850-crore procurement to stall the battle-readiness of Rs 24,000 crore worth of submarines. One can forgive the ministry, manned as it is by generalists for whom torpedo sounds like a variety of libido. The Prime Minister's Office, with so many ministries to meddle in, can only focus on big-bang procurements - and that means those that are regularly reported on, or those that the military is pressing for. The media, especially top editors, choose not to waste mindspace on the nitty-gritty of defence economics, and instead, focus their collective gaze on high-voltage procurement contracts that can be easily remembered by the billions they cost.
Take the media fanfare over the selection of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), an apparently fixed match that was won by the French Rafale fighter, the least expensive of the two most expensive fighters on offer, which were predictably ushered into the final selection. Currently, this $20-billion tender remains the single-most reported defence story, with uncounted column inches speculating on the imminent signature of the Rafale contract. This newspaper has been practically alone in carrying cost-benefit analyses on the Rafale proposal, and in debating whether the opportunity cost of buying this fighter is too high.
In contrast, there is little mindspace for the little things that would improve operational capability at little cost. Maintenance, that boring process that can put a hundred additional Sukhoi-30MKIs into the sky just by better inventory control and technician training. Light fighters, especially the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which should be the pride of India, but is sadly the bastard child of the laughably named Indian Air Force. Force multipliers, like airborne refuelling aircraft and airborne early-warning and control systems, can be wisely procured and deployed to make each squadrons as effective as two. But this is humdrum stuff. So are issues like night-blindness that dramatically reduces combat capability across the three services, especially the army.
It is these mundane essentials that Mr Parrikar must focus on. Appointing a tri-service chief would spare him the confusion of having to navigate the tri-service jockeying for funds and resources. He must institute a detailed capability audit, in which each service presents a plan for optimising their existing weapons and platforms rather than just stretching out their palms for newer, better and, of course, more expensive toys. It is militarily prudent to get our existing kit working optimally - the military equivalent of fixing the Indian Railways before building fancy new bullet train lines.
Breaking through the climate chakravyuh
On November 12, China and the United States issued a joint statement: the United States would seek to reduce carbon emissions by 26-28 per cent by 2025 (against 2005); China would peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 with an "intention to try to" peak sooner. The declaration has been applauded for injecting "momentum" in global climate negotiations. It has been also criticised for not going far enough. The Council on Energy, Environment and Water(CEEW)'s calculations find that both the United States and Chinese targets are lower than if their earlier 2020 targets were extrapolated. What should be India's response?
The deal amounts to a pincer attack on India's climate negotiation strategy. From one flank, the United States and China have effectively signalled that they are in a league of their own in terms of carbon emissions, industrial structure and political weight, and would not let distinctions between countries within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) get in the way of self-interested actions. Consequently, negotiation blocs such as BASIC(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) would risk being undermined, if not entirely abandoned.
From the other flank, the deal allows the rest of the world to pressure India. Whatever India announces now (as its intended nationally determined contributions) would be compared against the United States-China deal and, a few weeks earlier, by the European Union (EU). India is different: low per capita emissions (1.7 tonnes against China's 6.2 tonnes in 2010); aggregate emissions six per cent of the total (against China's 23 per cent, US' 16 per cent and the EU's 11 per cent in 2010). But in this battle of perceptions, India is unlikely to win. It is after all the world's third largest emitter of greenhouse gases. It is also perhaps the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given their own vulnerabilities, smaller developing countries would also evaluate India on a nebulous scale of "climate leadership".
When encircled in battle, there are three options: surrender, fight from within, or have allies open up an escape route from outside. India will have to dispassionately develop a climate-negotiation strategy that combines all three.
First, which issues make little sense for India to oppose? A global phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), greenhouse gases much more potent than carbon dioxide and widely used as refrigerants, would be a good place to start. India has previously resisted discussing the issue under the Montreal Protocol, insisting that any deal on the HFCs should be part of a comprehensive package under the UNFCCC. The CEEW's first-of-its-kind modelling of India's HFC emissions found that 33-39 per cent of warming from the residential air-conditioning sector during 2010-2050 could be reduced by a shift to alternative (and more energy-efficient) chemicals. Indian appliance and automobile firms are innovating with alternatives, but receive no multilateral support yet (Chinese manufacturers already do).
Last week, India shifted its stand at the Montreal Protocol and asked for a detailed report on the HFC production and consumption by country. India should now insist on a policy framework that is technology-agnostic, promotes energy efficiency, ensures no adverse impacts on the ozone layer, and sends a long-term signal to firms and innovators with support from the Protocol's Multilateral Fund.
Secondly, how should India keep up the fight on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)? India could be bold: reducing emissions intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) by up to 50 per cent by 2030; increasing the share of renewable energy in electricity generation to 20 per cent by 2030 (with hydropower, 25 per cent). These aggressive targets would, of course, be contingent on available financing, appropriate technology learning curves and dissemination, and a global carbon price; all of which India should demand. Moreover, India should promote differentiated responsibility within countries (say, higher carbon tax on large point sources or on luxury emissions, such as purchase of diesel sports utility vehicles). This would be more equitable than the already pioneering coal cess, which India applies. It would demonstrate that India was willing to consider alternative ways to categorise countries and citizens without abandoning the principle of differentiated responsibilities.
In the Mahabharata, Abhimanyu was trapped within the chakravyuh because he had not learnt how to escape the formation and others were not available for help. India needs to think of climate leadership not simply as announcements from within but about finding allies outside. Where could India lead with others following?
One, an "energy access prize" would set a target for lowering the cost of decentralised renewable energy to a specified level or lower than a certain share of household income. India already has significant capabilities in this sector, and could partner with countries, firms and investors to promote technologies and business models.
Two, a "global partnership on energy efficiency" would showcase India's efforts (efficient appliances, building standards, perform-achieve-trade scheme) and establish strategic ties with countries such as Germany, Japan and the United States.
Three, a "partnership on energy storage R&D, enterprise and deployment" (PES-RED) would bring together innovators, firms and countries developing storage technologies and grid-management practices to balance intermittent electricity supply from renewables.
Four, an "international coalition for low-carbon rural development" would focus on agriculture, water, climate adaptation and livelihoods facing imminent climate-related risks.
The above strategies are core to India's interests, in line with its climate-action plan, and would secure supporters among both poor and rich countries. The chakravyuh might just be breached.
The deal amounts to a pincer attack on India's climate negotiation strategy. From one flank, the United States and China have effectively signalled that they are in a league of their own in terms of carbon emissions, industrial structure and political weight, and would not let distinctions between countries within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) get in the way of self-interested actions. Consequently, negotiation blocs such as BASIC(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) would risk being undermined, if not entirely abandoned.
From the other flank, the deal allows the rest of the world to pressure India. Whatever India announces now (as its intended nationally determined contributions) would be compared against the United States-China deal and, a few weeks earlier, by the European Union (EU). India is different: low per capita emissions (1.7 tonnes against China's 6.2 tonnes in 2010); aggregate emissions six per cent of the total (against China's 23 per cent, US' 16 per cent and the EU's 11 per cent in 2010). But in this battle of perceptions, India is unlikely to win. It is after all the world's third largest emitter of greenhouse gases. It is also perhaps the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Given their own vulnerabilities, smaller developing countries would also evaluate India on a nebulous scale of "climate leadership".
When encircled in battle, there are three options: surrender, fight from within, or have allies open up an escape route from outside. India will have to dispassionately develop a climate-negotiation strategy that combines all three.
First, which issues make little sense for India to oppose? A global phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), greenhouse gases much more potent than carbon dioxide and widely used as refrigerants, would be a good place to start. India has previously resisted discussing the issue under the Montreal Protocol, insisting that any deal on the HFCs should be part of a comprehensive package under the UNFCCC. The CEEW's first-of-its-kind modelling of India's HFC emissions found that 33-39 per cent of warming from the residential air-conditioning sector during 2010-2050 could be reduced by a shift to alternative (and more energy-efficient) chemicals. Indian appliance and automobile firms are innovating with alternatives, but receive no multilateral support yet (Chinese manufacturers already do).
Last week, India shifted its stand at the Montreal Protocol and asked for a detailed report on the HFC production and consumption by country. India should now insist on a policy framework that is technology-agnostic, promotes energy efficiency, ensures no adverse impacts on the ozone layer, and sends a long-term signal to firms and innovators with support from the Protocol's Multilateral Fund.
Secondly, how should India keep up the fight on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)? India could be bold: reducing emissions intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) by up to 50 per cent by 2030; increasing the share of renewable energy in electricity generation to 20 per cent by 2030 (with hydropower, 25 per cent). These aggressive targets would, of course, be contingent on available financing, appropriate technology learning curves and dissemination, and a global carbon price; all of which India should demand. Moreover, India should promote differentiated responsibility within countries (say, higher carbon tax on large point sources or on luxury emissions, such as purchase of diesel sports utility vehicles). This would be more equitable than the already pioneering coal cess, which India applies. It would demonstrate that India was willing to consider alternative ways to categorise countries and citizens without abandoning the principle of differentiated responsibilities.
In the Mahabharata, Abhimanyu was trapped within the chakravyuh because he had not learnt how to escape the formation and others were not available for help. India needs to think of climate leadership not simply as announcements from within but about finding allies outside. Where could India lead with others following?
One, an "energy access prize" would set a target for lowering the cost of decentralised renewable energy to a specified level or lower than a certain share of household income. India already has significant capabilities in this sector, and could partner with countries, firms and investors to promote technologies and business models.
Two, a "global partnership on energy efficiency" would showcase India's efforts (efficient appliances, building standards, perform-achieve-trade scheme) and establish strategic ties with countries such as Germany, Japan and the United States.
Three, a "partnership on energy storage R&D, enterprise and deployment" (PES-RED) would bring together innovators, firms and countries developing storage technologies and grid-management practices to balance intermittent electricity supply from renewables.
Four, an "international coalition for low-carbon rural development" would focus on agriculture, water, climate adaptation and livelihoods facing imminent climate-related risks.
The above strategies are core to India's interests, in line with its climate-action plan, and would secure supporters among both poor and rich countries. The chakravyuh might just be breached.
REGARDING UKPCS-2012 FREE TEST RESPONSE,samveg ias,dehradun
REGARDING UKPCS-2012 FREE TEST RESPONSE
Thanks to all student who shows the great response to our free complete test for ukpcs-2012.The performance of most of the student was very good in paper one but many lacks preparation in paper two.
but if u can maintain confidence and calmness during ur attempt on 3oth nov,u all can qualify for pre.revise all imp area.
thanks again
samveg ias dehradun (8475904943)
Thanks to all student who shows the great response to our free complete test for ukpcs-2012.The performance of most of the student was very good in paper one but many lacks preparation in paper two.
but if u can maintain confidence and calmness during ur attempt on 3oth nov,u all can qualify for pre.revise all imp area.
thanks again
samveg ias dehradun (8475904943)
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