Face of new terror
As month-old Chibok kidnapping moves towards its denouement, it raises concerns along two axes: first set of questions centre around future of Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and largest economy. Secondly, some observers wonder if post-Afghanistan, non-state actors like Boko Haram presage sub-Sahel Africa region becoming the new warfront on ‘global war on terror.’ Credible answers to both these possibilities require a detailed and objective study of Boko Haram, world’s deadliest practitioner of mass-terror this year, killing nearly 2,000 so far.
Boko Haram means ‘Western education is prohibited’ in Hausa language of northern Nigeria. It is a Sunni Takfiri sect founded in 2001 in Borno state capital of Maiduguri by Islamic preacher Mohammed Yusuf seeking imposition of Sharia (Islamic Law). He soon found an ally in Ali Modu Sheriff, a candidate for state governorship, who promised to apply Sharia, if elected. However, on becoming governor, Sheriff prevaricated and reneged after re-election in 2007. Yusuf fell out with governor soon after and became a strident critic.
Increasingly violent clashes with authorities culminated in custodial death of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 and violent suppression of Boko Haram. The sect went underground and re-emerged within months as a militant outfit under Abubakar Shekau, its current head. In mid-2011, it signalled its arrival by launching two high profile attacks in Abuja on the UN building and the police headquarters. A campaign of bombing the churches in north and central Nigeria followed. Another high profile attack on January 20, 2012 simultaneously targeted nearly 80 offices in Kano causing nearly 200 deaths. In May 2013, federal Nigerian government imposed State of Emergency in three north-eastern states to combat growing insecurity. These states border Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Although Nigerian armed forces were given free hand, they have been unable to contain the insurgency. The violence has escalated sharply and has expanded beyond the north-east.
For instance, hours before Chibok kidnappings, Boko Haram exploded a car bomb at a crowded bus station on the outskirts of Abuja, nearly 1,000 kms away. 74 persons died in this deadliest attack. Boko Haram’s increasing operational sophistication, firepower and lethality have been attributed to easy availability of Libyan weapons, assistance from sister outfits in region: Somalia (Al-Shabab) Algeria (AQIM), Mali and elsewhere. No foreign state sponsor of Boko Haram has yet come to light.
Boko Haram’s publically stated objectives are largely rhetorical. For instance, their main demands are creation of Islamic Caliphate in Borno and the imposition of Islamic Sharia over entire Nigeria, nearly half of which is non-Muslim. This agenda is not only unrealistic, it is also self-defeating. They have also sought trial of those responsible for repression of Boko Haram cadres and custodial killing of their founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Boko Haram has single-mindedly sought the release of their captured colleagues. This has led to some speculation that Boko Haram intends to use the hapless kidnapped schoolgirls as a bargaining chip to get hundreds of its cadres in government jails released.
Ill-equipped armed forces
During past five years Boko Haram has exploited the inadequacies of Nigerian counter-insurgency campaign. Reports have often portrayed Nigerian armed forces as ill-equipped, badly trained and poorly led against a well-equipped and highly motivated enemy. High-handedness and corruption by armed forces and their civilian vigilante groups have also alienated the masses. Reported lapses, such as long delay in response to Chibok kidnapping itself have put Nigerian authorities on the defensive.
Moreover, the governors in all of three states under emergency belong to political parties different from the PDP ruling Nigeria causing lack of coordination and bickering. Federal policies have oscillated from outright military solution to ‘soft approach’ emphasising negotiated political solution and socio-economic development of Nigeria’s poorest region. However indirect contacts last year were fruitless. Current Nigerian politics is highly polarised with president Jonathan’s likely bid for re-election next February is opposed by a more unified opposition backed by many muslim politicians.
Boko Haram violence is senseless and counterproductive. While Boko Haram is a serious security menace, on its own the outfit does not constitute a direct political threat to Nigeria as a nation. Its sustained mass-terror, in tandem with other political and security tensions can, however, throw delicately balanced Nigerian polity into a convulsion. It can also seriously damage country’s image as good investment destination, particularly if it pulls off some spectacular operations in either Lagos, the economic hub, and/or oil-rich Niger Delta region.
Left unchecked, Boko Haram type of activities can also acquire regional or international form, particularly as many regional countries have Christian-Muslim faultlines. If Nigeria’s armed forces, largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, have struggled to control Boko Haram, the fate of smaller states can be well imagined. While western powers are ready to ‘assist,’ their intervention can easily become part of the problem. Absence of a state sponsorship, however, puts an upper limit on such militancy. The need is better and more representative governance at home and greater regional security cooperation.
India does have interest in the stability of Nigeria and neighbouring region. Nigeria-based Indians have suffered enormously from Boko Haram terror. January 2012 Carnage at Kano caused death of an Indian caught in the crossfire and six others were injured. In mid 2012, an attack on India-family owned Gum-Arabic plant at Maiduguri killed two of them and wounding the third. This first targeted attack on foreigners by Boko Haram ended the West Bengal based family’s brave defiance of security odds. They left Borno state, suffering trauma and huge financial losses. Their 70 Nigerians employees were rendered jobless. The episode has become a stark reminder of our stakes in this distant land with a complex narrative.
As month-old Chibok kidnapping moves towards its denouement, it raises concerns along two axes: first set of questions centre around future of Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and largest economy. Secondly, some observers wonder if post-Afghanistan, non-state actors like Boko Haram presage sub-Sahel Africa region becoming the new warfront on ‘global war on terror.’ Credible answers to both these possibilities require a detailed and objective study of Boko Haram, world’s deadliest practitioner of mass-terror this year, killing nearly 2,000 so far.
Boko Haram means ‘Western education is prohibited’ in Hausa language of northern Nigeria. It is a Sunni Takfiri sect founded in 2001 in Borno state capital of Maiduguri by Islamic preacher Mohammed Yusuf seeking imposition of Sharia (Islamic Law). He soon found an ally in Ali Modu Sheriff, a candidate for state governorship, who promised to apply Sharia, if elected. However, on becoming governor, Sheriff prevaricated and reneged after re-election in 2007. Yusuf fell out with governor soon after and became a strident critic.
Increasingly violent clashes with authorities culminated in custodial death of Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 and violent suppression of Boko Haram. The sect went underground and re-emerged within months as a militant outfit under Abubakar Shekau, its current head. In mid-2011, it signalled its arrival by launching two high profile attacks in Abuja on the UN building and the police headquarters. A campaign of bombing the churches in north and central Nigeria followed. Another high profile attack on January 20, 2012 simultaneously targeted nearly 80 offices in Kano causing nearly 200 deaths. In May 2013, federal Nigerian government imposed State of Emergency in three north-eastern states to combat growing insecurity. These states border Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Although Nigerian armed forces were given free hand, they have been unable to contain the insurgency. The violence has escalated sharply and has expanded beyond the north-east.
For instance, hours before Chibok kidnappings, Boko Haram exploded a car bomb at a crowded bus station on the outskirts of Abuja, nearly 1,000 kms away. 74 persons died in this deadliest attack. Boko Haram’s increasing operational sophistication, firepower and lethality have been attributed to easy availability of Libyan weapons, assistance from sister outfits in region: Somalia (Al-Shabab) Algeria (AQIM), Mali and elsewhere. No foreign state sponsor of Boko Haram has yet come to light.
Boko Haram’s publically stated objectives are largely rhetorical. For instance, their main demands are creation of Islamic Caliphate in Borno and the imposition of Islamic Sharia over entire Nigeria, nearly half of which is non-Muslim. This agenda is not only unrealistic, it is also self-defeating. They have also sought trial of those responsible for repression of Boko Haram cadres and custodial killing of their founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Boko Haram has single-mindedly sought the release of their captured colleagues. This has led to some speculation that Boko Haram intends to use the hapless kidnapped schoolgirls as a bargaining chip to get hundreds of its cadres in government jails released.
Ill-equipped armed forces
During past five years Boko Haram has exploited the inadequacies of Nigerian counter-insurgency campaign. Reports have often portrayed Nigerian armed forces as ill-equipped, badly trained and poorly led against a well-equipped and highly motivated enemy. High-handedness and corruption by armed forces and their civilian vigilante groups have also alienated the masses. Reported lapses, such as long delay in response to Chibok kidnapping itself have put Nigerian authorities on the defensive.
Moreover, the governors in all of three states under emergency belong to political parties different from the PDP ruling Nigeria causing lack of coordination and bickering. Federal policies have oscillated from outright military solution to ‘soft approach’ emphasising negotiated political solution and socio-economic development of Nigeria’s poorest region. However indirect contacts last year were fruitless. Current Nigerian politics is highly polarised with president Jonathan’s likely bid for re-election next February is opposed by a more unified opposition backed by many muslim politicians.
Boko Haram violence is senseless and counterproductive. While Boko Haram is a serious security menace, on its own the outfit does not constitute a direct political threat to Nigeria as a nation. Its sustained mass-terror, in tandem with other political and security tensions can, however, throw delicately balanced Nigerian polity into a convulsion. It can also seriously damage country’s image as good investment destination, particularly if it pulls off some spectacular operations in either Lagos, the economic hub, and/or oil-rich Niger Delta region.
Left unchecked, Boko Haram type of activities can also acquire regional or international form, particularly as many regional countries have Christian-Muslim faultlines. If Nigeria’s armed forces, largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, have struggled to control Boko Haram, the fate of smaller states can be well imagined. While western powers are ready to ‘assist,’ their intervention can easily become part of the problem. Absence of a state sponsorship, however, puts an upper limit on such militancy. The need is better and more representative governance at home and greater regional security cooperation.
India does have interest in the stability of Nigeria and neighbouring region. Nigeria-based Indians have suffered enormously from Boko Haram terror. January 2012 Carnage at Kano caused death of an Indian caught in the crossfire and six others were injured. In mid 2012, an attack on India-family owned Gum-Arabic plant at Maiduguri killed two of them and wounding the third. This first targeted attack on foreigners by Boko Haram ended the West Bengal based family’s brave defiance of security odds. They left Borno state, suffering trauma and huge financial losses. Their 70 Nigerians employees were rendered jobless. The episode has become a stark reminder of our stakes in this distant land with a complex narrative.
