India tops list of migrants living abroad at 17 million: UN

India tops list of migrants living abroad at 17 million: UN
India tops the list of people living abroad at 17 million with about 5 million Indians residing in the Gulf region alone, according to UN’s 2017 International Migration Report
India has topped the list of people living abroad at 17 million with about 5 million Indians residing in the Gulf region alone, according to a new UN report.

Mexico, Russia, China, Bangladesh, Syria, Pakistan and Ukraine also have large migrant populations living abroad, ranging from 6 to 11 million each, according to the 2017 International Migration Report.

In 2017, India was the largest country of origin of international migrants at 17 million, followed by Mexico at 13 million. Other countries of origin with large migrant populations include the Russia at 11 million, China at 10 million, Bangladesh at 7 million, Syria at 7 million and Pakistan and Ukraine at 6 million each.

The number of migrants from India now reside in multiple destination countries, including the United Arab Emirates at 3 million, the US and Saudi Arabia at 2 million each, the report said. There are now an estimated 258 million people living in a country other than their country of birth — an increase of 49% since 2000, it added.

International migration is a critical concern for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the report said.

“Reliable data and evidence are critical to combat misperceptions about migration and to inform migration policies,” said Liu Zhenmin, UN department of economic and social affairs’s under-secretary-general. “These new estimates of numbers of international migrants around the world will provide an important baseline for Member States as they begin their negotiations on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” Liu said.

The report shows that international migration makes an important contribution to population growth in many parts of the world and even reverses population decline in some countries or areas. Between 2000 and 2015, migration contributed 42% of the population growth in Northern America and 31% in Oceania. In Europe, the size of the total population would have declined during the period 2000-2015 in the absence of migration.

Vijay Gokhale appointed as India’s foreign secretary

Vijay Gokhale appointed as India’s foreign secretary
Vijay Gokhale’s appointment as foreign secretary is a step seemingly in line with India’s focus on China and east Asia
India on Monday named Vijay Gokhale its new foreign secretary, a step seemingly in line with its focus on China and east Asia.

An Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officer of the 1981 batch, Gokhale will succeed S. Jaishankar of the 1977 batch, who worked on India's embrace of the US during his three-year tenure.

Gokhale, who takes charge on 28 February, will have a two-year term, during which he is likely to focus on India’s look east policy. At present, Gokhale is secretary for economic relations in the ministry of external affairs (MEA).

Gokhale, who was India’s ambassador to China from January 2016 to October 2017, deftly worked to avert any major crisis during a 73-day military standoff between the two countries in Bhutan’s Doklam plateau last year.

He has vast experience in dealing with East Asia and China, something that could come in handy as India's government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeks to check Chinese influence in its immediate neighbourhood and East Asia.

Gokhale, a postgraduate in history from Delhi University, is known among his colleagues as someone who would speak his mind on policy matters rather than merely pursue orders.

After the Doklam standoff, Gokhale was named secretary of economic relations in the MEA in November, and led the annual India-Bhutan Development Cooperation Talks, which is an important bilateral mechanism to review the entire gamut of India’s development partnership with Bhutan. The bilateral meeting took place just days after India’s visit of Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck.

According to MEA, his previous diplomatic assignments include postings in Hong Kong, Hanoi, Beijing and New York.

He has also served as deputy secretary (finance), director (China & East Asia) and joint secretary (East Asia) during his stints at MEA in Delhi. He was also India’s High Commissioner to Malaysia from January 2010 to October 2013, following which he was India’s envoy to Germany from October 2013 to January 2016.

It was during his tenure as India’s ambassador to Germany that PM Modi inaugurated the Hanover-Messe in 2015 and exhorted the world to “Make in India”.

“Choosing Gokhale serves two simple purposes for government—one he fits the bill on seniority scale as he is not someone out of turn and thus does not create any disquiet within the ministry and two, he is a good choice because of his experience in dealing with China and several important assignments in the past few years,” said Ajay Darshan Behera, professor at the Academy of International Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia University.

Myanmar at 70: the burden of a flawed legacy

Myanmar at 70: the burden of a flawed legacy
Myanmar has witnessed long-running civil wars and is currently in the news for the Rohingya crisis
Myanmar celebrates the 70th anniversary of its independence on 4 January. It’s a good occasion to examine its flawed legacies. The country has witnessed long-running civil wars and is currently in the news for the Rohingya crisis. This unending turbulence is seen both as cause and consequence of weak political institutions—which explains why the generals were in command for so many decades after the military coup in 1962 that ended Myanmar’s first experiment with democracy. Even today, the military continues to wield political influence—although over the past decade, the military-drafted 2008 constitution has enabled piecemeal empowerment of civilian leaders following two general elections in 2010 and 2015.

Indeed, since last August, the Rohingya crisis overwhelmed Aung San Suu Kyi, once a global icon of the democratic struggle against Myanmar’s military regime. She is seen to be acquiescing, if not conniving, with the military’s treatment of the Rohingyas. One online petition calling for revocation of her 1991 Nobel Peace Prize has accrued nearly 4,36,000 signatures. Oxford University’s St Hugh’s College—where Suu Kyi earned her degree in politics—has decided to take down her portrait and remove her name from the title of its common room. Britain’s second largest trade union, Unison, has suspended Suu Kyi’s honorary membership. Journalists shout questions at her as she refuses to meet the press. Given that India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) have decided to keep a safe distance from the entire affair, a desperate Suu Kyi is compelled to seek support from the same China that had backed Myanmar’s military junta which kept her under house arrest for 15 years.

The Myanmar military too continues to engage Beijing, which has thwarted UN fact-finding missions from investigating human rights violations in Rakhine state that was home to 1.3 million Rohingyas. Of these, some 750,000 have been displaced. The UN calls it a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” with secretary-general António Guterres making personal appeals to Myanmar to end the violence.

Yet, commemorating 70 years of the Myanmar air force last month, senior general Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of the Myanmar armed forces, commissioned 10 aircraft provided by Russia, France and the Netherlands. A week later, he oversaw the induction of seven new naval vessels. In February, the Myanmar military will participate as an observer at the US Pacific Command sponsored multinational annual Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand. As Asia’s oldest and largest military exercise, Cobra Gold involves thousands of military personnel. Last year, 29 nations participated in it. All this leaves no doubt as to the fact that Myanmar continues to enjoy the major powers’ blessings.

Exuding that confidence in his 15 December speech last year on modernizing the army, Hlaing shared plans to procure new weapons, build relationships with foreign militaries and improve recruitment and training. This enthusiasm on the part of one of South-East Asia’s largest armed forces—numbering around 400,000—is bound to further undermine any hope of change in the Myanmar civil-military equation. This weakens the country’s experiment with installing a popularly elected civilian government. What lessons can be drawn from this?

“The truth is that only some form of dictatorship, either of a man or a party, can bring order to Burma and maintain it”, is how the 9 April 1947 edition of The Times (page 5) had prophesied Burma’s (known as Myanmar since 1988) future. It was the day of elections for its Constituent Assembly as per the January 1947 agreement that Britain had signed with Burma’s interim government. The latter consisted almost entirely of members of the Anti-Facist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) led by the youthful Aung San who had fielded 200 candidates for 210 seats. Of this, 56 were elected unopposed and the rest were pre-decided as the opposition chose not to participate.

Just like Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistan and M.K. Gandhi in India, Aung San did not live long enough to participate in building his newly liberated nation. The last seven decades of Britain’s former colonies in South Asia clearly highlight the significance of grooming a second rung of leadership and their role in building and maintaining strong political norms and institutions. At the young age of 32, Aung San was assassinated along with six others of the AFPFL. The burden of leading the freedom struggle fell upon his compatriot U Nu, who guided the process of a new constitution being adopted in September 1947. Burma became independent on 4 January 1948.

A pious Buddhist and former schoolteacher, U Nu was popular for his personal integrity. Yet, intra-AFPFL factionalism contributed to his failures with economic planning as also in dealing with communists, ethnic minority revolts and the Kuomintang that had been driven out from China to eastern Burma. This dissipated his energies and empowered the armed forces. In 1958, U Nu asked general Ne Win to be the prime minister of a “caretaker government” until the elections. It was the same Ne Win who overthrew U Nu’s elected government in 1962.

In short, in these 70 years, the Burmese people have witnessed a democratic experiment during 1948-1962, a revolutionary period during 1962-74 and a socialist phase during 1974-88 which ended with the military’s brutal crackdown killing several thousand protesting students, monks and children. Unfortunately, there is no respite for ordinary Burmese yet in sight.

राजनीतिः चाबहार की अहमियत

राजनीतिः चाबहार की अहमियत
चाबहार होकर भारत को अफगानिस्तान जाने का एक रास्ता मिला है। वहीं अफगानिस्तान का व्यापार भी दुनिया के बाकी हिस्सों से बढ़ेगा। लेकिन सबसे ज्यादा लाभार्थी ईरान होगा। भविष्य में ईरान इसे उत्तर-दक्षिण परिवहन गलियारे से जोड़ेगा जो यूरोप तक जाता है। ईरान की भविष्य की योजना चीन के ‘वन बेल्ट वन रोड’ के लिए चुनौती है।
भारत-ईरान संबंधों में उतार-चढ़ाव के बीच तीन दिसंबर को चाबहार बंदरगाह के पहले चरण का उद्घाटन हो गया। चाबहार के पहले चरण की शुरुआत भारत-ईरान संबंधों में भी एक नए अध्याय की शुरुआत है। ईरान के राष्ट्रपति हसन रूहानी इस बंदरगाह का उद्घाटन किया। अब भारत, पाकिस्तान को छोड़, सीधे अफगानिस्तान और मध्य एशिया से व्यापारिक रिश्ते कायम कर सकेगा। बंदरगाह की शुरुआत पश्चिम और मध्य पूर्व एशिया की कूटनीति को सीधे प्रभावित करेगी। क्योंकि अब ईरान का कद यूरेशिया की सीमा तक बढ़ गया है। पाकिस्तान तो चिंतित है ही, चिंता चीन को भी होगी।
ईरान इस बंदरगाह के व्यापारिक इस्तेमाल से जहां मजबूत आर्थिक शक्ति बनेगा, वहीं चीन द्वारा पाकिस्तान के तट पर विकसित ग्वादर बंदरगाह के लिए चुनौती भी। मध्य एशिया और पश्चिम एशिया की कूटनीति में सऊदी अरब के नेतृत्व वाले सुन्नी गठबंधन को लगातार चुनौती दे रहा ईरान इस समय किसी को भी आंख दिखाने की स्थिति में है। सीरिया, यमन, लेबनान में अपने सफल हस्तक्षेप के बाद ईरान ने दुनिया को यह संदेश दिया है कि पश्चिम एशिया और मध्य-पूर्व एशिया में उसे कमजोर आंकना ठीक नहीं है।
चाबहार होकर भारत को अफगानिस्तान जाने का एक रास्ता मिला है। वहीं अफगानिस्तान का व्यापार भी दुनिया के बाकी हिस्सों से बढ़ेगा। लेकिन सबसे ज्यादा लाभार्थी ईरान होगा। भविष्य में ईरान इसे उत्तर-दक्षिण परिवहन गलियारे से जोड़ेगा जो यूरोप तक जाता है। ईरान की भविष्य की योजना चीन के ‘वन बेल्ट वन रोड’ के लिए चुनौती है। ईरान दुनिया को यह बताने में कामयाब रहा है कि ओमान की खाड़ी और हिंदी महासागर से मध्य एशिया और यूरोप तक पहुंचने का एक महत्त्वपूर्ण रास्ता ईरान है। चाबहार चीन के अलावा अमेरिका के लिए भी एक संदेश है। क्योंकि ईरान से खराब संबंध ने अमेरिका को पाकिस्तान पर निर्भर बना दिया। आज भी अमेरिका अफगानिस्तान में नाटो सैनिकों तक सैन्य साजो-सामान पहुंचाने के लिए कराची बंदरगाह पर निर्भर है। अमेरिका की इसी कमजोरी का लाभ पाकिस्तान ने अकसर उठाया है।

चाबहार के पहले चरण के उद््घाटन ने पाकिस्तान की चिंता बढ़ाई है। भारत को अफगानिस्तान तक पहुंचने का आसान रास्ता मिल गया है। पाकिस्तान का आरोप है कि भारत चाबहार के रास्ते अफगानिस्तान पहुंच पाकिस्तान को घेरेगा। भारत पाकिस्तान को दोनों सीमाओं पर घेरने की योजना में है। पाकिस्तान और चीन दोनों मजबूरी में चाबहार में घुसपैठ करना चाहते हैं। उधर ईरान संतुलन साधने की रणनीति पर है। अमेरिकी राष्ट्रपति डोनाल्ड ट्रंप ईरान के प्रति लगातार सख्त हो रहे हैं। सऊदी अरब के दबाव में वे ईरान से हुए परमाणु करार को एकतरफा रद््द करने की बात कर रहे हैं। यही कारण है कि चाबहार खोलने का मतलब यह नहीं है कि ईरान भारत के प्रति खासा उदार हो गया है। ईरान भारत से अपनेसंबंधों को व्यावहारिकता के आधार पर तय करेगा। ईरान की व्यावहारिक कूटनीति ने उसे इराक, सीरिया और लेबनान में मजबूत किया। कतर जैसा सुन्नी देश सऊदी अरब से विद्रोह कर ईरान से संबंध बढ़ाने को तरजीह दे रहा है।
भारत, आस्ट्रेलिया, जापान और अमेरिका के चतुर्भुज गठबंधन पर ईरान की नजर है। ईरान खुले पर तौर पर भारत-अमेरिका की बढ़ती नजदीकियों पर कोई प्रतिक्रिया नहीं दे रहा है, लेकिन व्यवहार में वह भारत को समय-समय पर झटका देने में संकोच नहीं करता। ईरान ने फरजाद बी गैस क्षेत्र से गैस निकालने का अधिकार भारतीय कंपनी ओएनजीसी-विदेश को देने के बजाय एक रूसी कंपनी को दे दिया। कूटनीति के जानकारों के अनुसार भारत को ईरान ने जानबूझ कर झटका दिया। जबकि ओएनजीसी विदेश लिमिटेड ने इस गैस क्षेत्र में दिलचस्पी दिखाई थी।
गौरतलब है कि इस गैस क्षेत्र की खोज भारतीय कंपनी ने की थी। ईरान ने भारत को झटका देते हुए तर्क दिया कि गैस क्षेत्र की खोज और अनुसंधान तक का अधिकार भारतीय कंपनी के पास है। इसलिए गैस निकालने का काम वह रूसी कंपनी को दे रहा हैं। हालांकि भारत ने इस गैस क्षेत्र में 11 अरब डॉलर के निवेश का प्रस्ताव दिया था। यही नहीं, भारत-अमेरिका की बढ़ती नजदीकियों के मद््देनजर ईरान ने भारत को तेल सौदों में दी गई कुछ छूट भी वापस ले ली थी।
दक्षिण पूर्व एशिया में अमेरिका के साथ अहम सहयोगी की भूमिका निभा रहे भारत को रूस-ईरान गठजोड़ पर ध्यान रखना होगा। क्योंकि ईरान की नाराजगी भारत की परेशानी का सबब बन जाएगी। अफगानिस्तान से लेकर मध्य एशिया तक के व्यापारिक रास्ते भारत के लिए ईरान ही खोल सकता है। पाकिस्तान भारत के लिए अफगानिस्तान का रास्ता आज भी खोलने को तैयार नहीं है। वैसे में भारत के लिए चाबहार के अलावा कोई और दूसरा रास्ता नहीं है। भारत को यह सावधानी बरतनी होगी कि यहां चीन और पाकिस्तान घुसपैठ करने को तैयार हैं।
अगर मध्य एशिया और पश्चिम एशिया में भारत को अपने महत्त्व को बनाए रखना है तो ईरान से संबंध मधुर रखने ही होंगे। सऊदी अरब के तमाम अहसानों के बावजूद पाकिस्तान ईरान से संबंध खराब करने को तैयार नहीं है। पाकिस्तान ईरान के महत्त्व को समझता है। पाकिस्तान की एक बड़ी सीमा ईरान से लगती है। पाकिस्तान अच्छी तरह जानता है कि इस समय अफगान-तालिबान के कमांडरों की ईरान में काफी घुसपैठ है। अफगान-तालिबान के नेता ईरान के संपर्क में है। इसका खुलासा अमेरिकी मीडिया ने भी किया है।
चीन की चिंता अलग है। चीन-पाकिस्तान आर्थिक कॉरिडोर का एक बड़ा हिस्सा पाकिस्तान के बलूचिस्तान प्रांत में है, जिसकी सीमा ईरान के साथ लगती है। ग्वादर बंदरगाह भी बलूचिस्तान में स्थित है। ईरान से खराब संबंध सीधे चीनी निवेश को प्रभावित करेगा। बलूच विद्रोही पहले ही चीन-पाकिस्तान आर्थिक कॉरिडोर का विरोध कर रहे हैं। यही कारण है कि पाकिस्तान आतंकवाद के खिलाफ सऊदी अरब के नेतृत्व में बने 41 देशों के संयुक्त सैन्य गठबंधन में शामिल होने के बावजूद ईरान से अपने संबंधों को मधुर बनाए हुए है। इस गठबंधन में सीरिया, ईरान और इराक नहीं हैं। ईरान इस गठबंधन का घोर विरोधी है।
अफगानिस्तान भी ईरान की बढ़ती ताकत को समझ रहा है। अफगानिस्तान को पता है कि ईरान शुरू से ही उसके आंतरिक मामलों में दखल देता रहा है। क्वेटा-कंधार-अश्काबाद आर्थिक गलियारा जो पाकिस्तान से अफगानिस्तान के रास्ते तुर्कमेनिस्तान जाता है, उस पर ईरान की नजर काफी समय से है। यह आर्थिक गलियारा ईरान की सीमा से लगते हुए तुर्कमेनिस्तान को जाता है। इस गलियारे पर कब्जा करने की कोशिश पाकिस्तान ने भी की, लेकिन ईरान ने उसे सफल नहीं होने दिया। ईरान समय-समय पर इस गलियारे पर नियंत्रण के लिए स्थानीय अफगान आबादी, तालिबान और अन्य गुटों को आर्थिक और सैन्य मदद देता रहा है। अफगानिस्तान में इस समय ईरान फिर सक्रिय है। हाल ही में पश्चिमी मीडिया में इस तरह की खबरें आई हैं।
खबरों के मुताबिक अफगान-तालिबान के लड़ाके ईरानी सेना से प्रशिक्षण ले रहे हैं। वे क्वेटा से सीधे ईरान की सीमा में जाते हैं। उन्हें आर्थिक मदद भी मिलती है। अफगानिस्तान के फरह में नाटो सेना और तालिबान की लड़ाई में मारे गए तालिबानी लड़ाकों के बीच कुछ ईरानी सैनिकों के शव भी मिले। खबरों के मुताबिक अफगानिस्तान के हेलमंड, कंधार, हेरात प्रांतों में ईरानी सैनिक सीधे हस्तक्षेप कर रहे हैं। इसके बावजूद अफगानिस्तान के राष्ट्रपति अशरफ घनी ईरान से अच्छे संबंधों की वकालत कर रहे हैं, क्योंकि अफगानिस्तान को बाहरी दुनिया से व्यापारिक पहुंच के लिए चाबहार बंदरगाह की जरूरत है। अफगान-पाक संबंध इस कदर खराब है कि पाकिस्तान अफगान सीमा की बाड़बंदी में लग गया है।

INSTC

INSTC
India, Iran and Russia had in September 2000 signed the INSTC agreement to build a corridor to provide the shortest multi-model transportation route linking the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran and St Petersburg. From St Petersburg, North Europe is within easy reach via the Russian Federation. The estimated capacity of the corridor is 20-30 million tonnes of goods per year.

The route primarily involves moving freight from India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia via ship, rail and road. The objective of the corridor is to increase trade connectivity between major cities such as Mumbai, Moscow, Tehran, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Astrakhan, Bandar Anzali and etc.

Significance of the corridor: Conceived well before China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), INSTC will not only help cut down on costs and time taken for transfer of goods from India to Russia and Europe via Iran but also provide an alternative connectivity initiative to countries in the Eurasian region. It will be India’s second corridor after the Chabahar Port to access resource rich Central Asia and its market.

The European project’s Catalonia challenge

The European project’s Catalonia challenge
The EU’s role as a peacemaker abroad hinges on stability at home, that reputation is at risk, thanks to the crisis in Spain
The European project rests on the idea that its member states enjoy sovereignty while eliminating trade barriers and erasing borders within the union. The Brussels bureaucracy and the Strasbourg parliament constantly work towards blending identities and integrating the continent, whose divisions had been so bloody and whose boundaries were once considered so sacrosanct that to defend them millions had died.

Weakening national identities have emboldened regional voices to look for greater space, and that drama is now most visible in Spain. The pain in Spain is mainly in its extremities—the Basque region had always seen itself as separate, and now prosperous Catalonia threatens to redraw the Spanish map. The disputed referendum, in which Catalonians voted for independence, has prompted Spain to dissolve the regional parliament and press sedition charges against the ousted Catalonian President Carles Puigdemont, who is in Brussels and has made his return conditional upon getting a fair trial.

This sounds like a situation where European Union (EU) diplomats would intervene, except that they have said they won’t, since Spain is part of the EU. Can the EU do at home what it advocates abroad?

Spain is a multilingual, and arguably multi-ethnic, country. To argue that all Spaniards speak Spanish is as arrogant and illiterate as saying that all Indians speak Hindi. What’s often described as “Spanish” is actually the version spoken over the widest territory—Castilian—and it is different from the Galician, Basque, or Catalonian languages. Describing those languages as dialects is also a political act; as the old joke goes, a dialect is a language without an army.

Catalonia has enjoyed substantial autonomy (it has its own flag and parliament), but it wants more powers, which Madrid is unwilling to grant. Turning back from brinkmanship is possible, but it would require deftness, adroitness and diplomacy, which seem difficult in the charged political atmosphere. Both sides have miscalculated. Catalonians demanding separation assume that the EU will let them become a full-fledged nation without many adverse consequences. But some investors have already moved headquarters to the Spanish capital Madrid. And European officials have told Catalonians that there is no automatic entry into the union for breakaway nations.

Perhaps Catalonians overplayed their hand when they held the referendum, in which 2.2 million voters, less than half the eligible 5.3 million, turned out. The low turnout took the shine off the 90% vote in favour of independence. Several opposition parties didn’t support the referendum. Did the low turnout mean that those who didn’t vote opposed the referendum? Or were they unable to vote and would have voted for independence? It is impossible to tell, except that many in Catalonia question the need for the referendum.

Spain’s over-the-top response to the referendum didn’t help matters. The enduring image of the referendum is of security forces dragging peaceful Catalonians wanting to vote, bringing back memories of divisions that date back to the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, in which tens of thousands of civilians died. Francisco Franco’s dictatorial rule ended only with his death in 1975, and Spain joined the EU only in 1986.

Since Puigdemont declared independence, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has dissolved the Catalonian parliament and called for fresh elections in Catalonia in December. If held in a free and fair manner, those elections offer hope for a peaceful conclusion. Two European countries will watch the elections with more than casual interest: The UK, where Scotland may opt for another referendum should the Brexit talks descend into chaos, and Belgium, where Wallonia and Flanders sit uncomfortably alongside as if in an unhappy marriage.

To be sure, national self-determination is an essential element of international law, but even governments that support nationalistic aspirations elsewhere crush dissent at home sternly. Think of Indonesian use of force in East Timor, China’s suppression of Tibet, and closer home, the insurgencies India has faced in the North-East and in Jammu and Kashmir. Regardless of the law or the specifics of each case, there are legitimate questions: To what extent do the separatists represent the people in whose name they seek freedom? If referendum is the answer, is a simple majority enough to win? How would minorities be protected in the new nation?

In 1970, East Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly for the Awami League. Instead of inviting the Awami leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to form the government recognizing his majority, Yahya Khan prolonged negotiations with the Awamis and sent troops, unleashing terror in which hundreds of thousands were killed, making Bangladesh’s independence inevitable.

The Catalonian situation is vastly different. But Rajoy has raised the stakes by pressing sedition charges. Walking back from such a precipice requires sagacity. In the period of prolonged uncertainty that lies ahead, avoiding and dealing with unpleasant surprises will require wisdom.

The EU was formed to prevent violence on a blood-soaked continent. On its periphery, it has failed twice: the Balkans in the 1990s, and Ukraine more recently. Its role as a peacemaker abroad hinges on stability at home. That reputation is at risk. The Spanish dilemma may prove to be far more complicated than Brexit, which now looks like a comedy in comparison.

Asia’s maritime-quad might prove elusive

Asia’s maritime-quad might prove elusive
A closer look at the emerging naval dynamics in Asia makes clear that the maritime ‘quad’ isn’t still a wholly viable proposition
The “quadrilateral” is back, and with a verve that is making strategic pundits sit up and take notice. After reports emerged last week that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe would propose a four-way dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India during President Donald Trump’s visit to Tokyo this week, there is speculation in New Delhi that the new “quad” might seek to counter Chinese naval power in Asia. Indian analysts say New Delhi might be willing to experiment with the idea of a countervailing alliance if it addresses India’s power imbalance with China. India’s expansion of the Malabar Exercises to include the Japanese navy and the reinvigoration of defence ties with Tokyo and Canberra, they suggest, is a sign that Indian policymakers are amenable to the idea of hard-balancing in Asia.

Yet, the prospects for an Indo-Pacific “concert of democracies” in maritime Asia aren’t strong. A closer look at emerging naval dynamics in Asia makes clear that the maritime “quad” isn’t still a wholly viable proposition. First, neither Japan nor the US has given any indication that the new grouping will have a China-centric security agenda. Earlier this week, a senior US administration official rejected suggestions that the “quad” alliance was about containing China. If anything, reports from Tokyo and Washington suggest the group might be focused on finding an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The second reason why India’s nautical observers might have to wait longer for their “quad” moment is Washington’s indifference to the geopolitics of maritime South Asia. Nearly a year into Trump’s presidency, the US is yet to address New Delhi’s key concerns in its near-littorals, including China’s growing footprint in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, the Indian Navy’s inability to track Chinese submarines in the Bay of Bengal, and the strengthening China-Pakistan nexus in the Arabian Sea. Indian analysts say Washington’s real equities reside in the Western Pacific, where senior US officials expect New Delhi to play a larger security role. But even in East Asia, the Trump administration is looking circumspect, with a growing dependence on China to solve vexing problems like North Korea. From an Indian standpoint, the more Washington needs Beijing to negotiate with Pyongyang, the less leverage it has in shaping China’s strategic choices in the Indian Ocean.

New Delhi won’t be surprised if Trump’s promotion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” is more focused on trade, than maritime security. With rising angst among Apec (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) members over Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Washington is under pressure to underline its commitment to the economic development of the Asia Pacific. Even if the US wanted to signal a hardening of maritime posture in Asia, it is likely to be dissuaded by Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), which is showing a new enthusiasm for naval engagement with Beijing (evidenced by the first joint China-Asean maritime search and rescue exercise in the South China Sea last month). With many South-East Asian states openly acknowledging China’s role in regional security and development, it seems unlikely a proposal aimed at the containment of Chinese naval power in Asia will find much support—regardless of Beijing’s real and perceived violations in the disputed littorals.

The third reason why New Delhi might have to wait longer for a four-way naval alliance is the lack of clarity over what a naval quadrilateral really means for Indian interests. For the US and its Pacific partners, the maritime “quad” is a concept aimed at the joint implementation of a rules-based order in Asia. For India, however, the endeavour is an opportunity to develop its military capabilities to secure the Indian Ocean, a primary theatre of strategic interest. However, with Japan no longer in contention for the India’s submarine project P-75 (I), and US defence firms still unwilling to part with proprietary technology (including vital anti-submarine warfare know-how), the proposal for a close maritime cooperation holds little promise for improving India’s underwater surveillance and combat prowess.

Finally, if there is a need for a balancing coalition in Asia, it must happen only when the threat becomes clearer. Despite an expansion of PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) activity in the Indian Ocean Region, China does not pose a physical threat to Indian interests (not for the moment). Chinese naval assets haven’t challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent. Nor have PLAN ships and submarines impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea-lanes and choke-points. To the contrary, the Chinese navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals, limiting its ventures to friendly countries in the region, many of which are happy to benefit from Beijing’s economic and military power.

This does not mean India’s grievances with China are invalid. New Delhi is rightly concerned about Beijing’s use of its navy to normalize Chinese dominance of the littorals, a condition that supports Beijing’s vision of a unipolar Asia. Indian maritime observers are convinced that China’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean involves a “slow choke” of New Delhi’s geopolitical influence in its strategic backyard. But Beijing is going about its business carefully, ensuring that its military presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) does not cross the threshold of conflict with India. Whatever the impact of China’s naval expansion in South Asia on New Delhi’s geopolitical and strategic equities, it does not constitute an intrusion for which Beijing can be held legally, politically or militarily accountable.

At the first quadrilateral discussion in the Philippines next week, India will observe how far Japan, Australia and the US are willing to take substantive cooperation forward in the Indian Ocean. The turn of events at Manila will determine whether and how New Delhi will expand its trilateral Malabar naval exercise with the US and Japan to include Australia.

For the moment, the maritime-quad remains an idea whose time still hasn’t arrived.

The emerging Indo-Pacific architecture

The emerging Indo-Pacific architecture
While the ‘Quad’ is a crucial pillar of the peace and security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, it needs to be buttressed by at least two other pillars—EAS and Apec
The term “Indo-Pacific” has long been in vogue among marine biologists and ichthyologists to define the stretch of water from the tropical Indian Ocean, through the equatorial seas around the Indonesian archipelago, the South China Sea, and to the western and central Pacific Ocean. The term entered the geopolitical lexicon only in the early 21st century and, predictably, has proved to be far more contentious than its scientific definition. The region has been the locale for some of the bloodiest inter- and intra-state wars in the 20th century and promises to be the theatre for similar conflagrations in the foreseeable future between failing, emerging and established nuclear-armed countries. This potential for conflict is exacerbated by the absence of a robust regional peace and security architecture.

Against this backdrop, efforts to rejuvenate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the “Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan and the US on the sidelines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Manila are of notable significance. Although this meeting was low-keyed and downplayed by India in particular, the Quad itself has the potential to secure the region against great power conflict.

There are several factors why the countries chose to revivify the Quad at this juncture. For India, the Doklam confrontation with China and concerns over the latter’s so-called Belt Road Initiative (BRI) were crucial considerations. Similarly, following US secretary of state Rex Tillerson’s visit, there is a desire to engage Washington more closely in the region. For Australia, and to some extent Japan, the key drivers behind formally reviving the Quad was the concern about the commitment of the Donald Trump administration to the bilateral alliance arrangements and the quest to buttress them with the Quad commitment. For the US, the Quad offers a way to share its burden of containing China in the region.

When it comes to fruition, the Quad will not be dissimilar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), which managed to “keep Russia out, the US in and Germany down”. Most observers have simplistically branded the nascent organization as a tool to contain China. However, to be truly effective—like Nato—the Indo-Pacific Quad will also have to fulfil three simultaneous missions: keep China out, the US in and Japan down.

While managing China and keeping Beijing on the status-quoist path, the Quad will also have to ensure the continued engagement and commitment of Washington to the region, which can no longer be taken for granted. Given the disruptive and isolationist tendency of Trump (evident in his skipping the EAS) and, possibly other future US leaders, this is a crucial role that the organization will have to fulfil. Similarly, given Japan’s brutal World War II record in the region, the Quad will also have to reassure other potential future members, including from ASEAN, that Tokyo’s role will remain benign and any revisionist tendencies will be kept in check.

Although the Quad was formally initiated in 2007 at the prompting of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, its informal origins can be traced to 2004. In the wake of the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, Australia, India, Japan and the US launched an ad-hoc humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) mission, which allowed them to come together operationally. Since then the four navies have worked together on several occasions.

While formal Quad meetings were shelved following strong objections from China in 2007, discussions nonetheless continued. For instance, in 2015 the foreign secretaries of Australia, India and Japan met ostensibly to firm up the security leg of India’s “Act East” policy. Soon thereafter the India, Japan, US trilateral meeting was held in Honolulu. Thus, the Quad continued to function under the garb of two trilateral meetings. Subsequently, since 2015, the India-US Malabar naval exercises have included Japan and are likely to include Australia in the next iteration, thus making the military component of the Quad a reality.

Nonetheless, the Quad’s potential is likely to be limited by several internal differences. For instance, while India promotes the principle of “freedom of navigation”, it is reluctant to enforce it through freedom of navigation operations by sailing warships through exclusive economic zones, particularly in the South China Seas. Thus, the 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy cautions that there may be divergent security perceptions “with nations that may be traditional friends (read US)”. Members of the Quad will have to address these differences to develop the institution further.

Moreover, while the Quad is a crucial pillar of the peace and security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, it needs to be buttressed by at least two other pillars. The EAS serves the role of the political pillar and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) as the trade and economic pillar. While all Quad participants are members of EAS, India is still not a member of Apec. This lacuna needs to be remedied if New Delhi is to contribute to all three pillars of the Indo-Pacific architecture.

Finally, India will also have to shed its inherent abhorrence for formal military arrangements and cooperation, even though this might bring with it the prospect of being dragged into a war not of its making. As Nato has shown, sometimes a democratic military alliance is essential to maintain peace.

indo israel

PM Narendra Modi to advance sales and production of missiles, drones and radar systems from Israel under his signature ‘Make in India’ drive
Narendra Modi is making a first visit to Israel by an Indian prime minister next week, in a public embrace of a country that he has long admired for its military and technical expertise but which his predecessors kept at arm’s length.

India has traditionally trodden a careful diplomatic line in the region, analysts say, wary of upsetting Arab states and Iran—upon whom it relies for its vast imports of oil—and its large Muslim minority. It has been a vocal supporter of the Palestinian cause, even as it quietly pursued ties with Israel.

But now Modi is lifting the curtain on a thriving military relationship. He will hold three days of talks with his Israeli counterpart, Benjamin Netanyahu, to advance sales and production of missiles, drones and radar systems under his signature “Make in India” drive, officials in Delhi and Tel Aviv said.

The Indian leader will not travel to Ramallah, the seat of the Palestine Authority and a customary stop for visiting leaders trying to maintain a balance in political ties.

At home, the apparent shift in what has long been a bedrock of India’s foreign policy risks sharpening criticism that the country’s 180 million Muslims are increasingly being marginalized under Modi’s Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, which swept to power in 2014.

“Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel will only strengthen its occupation of Palestine,” said Asaduddin Owaisi, a member of the Indian parliament from a regional group that promotes Muslim rights.

In previous decades, under the left-leaning Congress Party, former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was a regular visitor to New Delhi, pictured hugging then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when the two were championing the Non-Alignment Movement.

In May, Modi hosted Arafat’s successor, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and offered help in health and information technology, but the trip was low-key.

The scale of the ongoing collaboration with Israel dwarfs anything India is attempting with the Palestinians, officials say.

“We have a wide ranging partnership with Israel that ranges from agriculture cooperation to homeland security,” said Bala Bhaskar, head of the foreign ministry’s West Asia division.

He said India’s ties with Israel and Palestine were important in their own right and neither should viewed through the prism of the other. But an Israeli diplomat said Modi’s standalone trip to Tel Aviv was an important signal.

The two sides are expected to announce strategic partnerships in areas including water, agriculture and space technology during Modi’s visit. But it is the defence relationship that is most advanced—India is now Israel’s biggest arms market, buying weapons at an average of $1 billion each year.

Eli Alfassi, executive vice-president of marketing at state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the country’s biggest defence firm, said it was supplying India with drones, radar, communication systems and cybersecurity.

Missiles, food security

The centrepiece of the collaboration is the Barack 8 air defence system, built jointly by the two countries in a boost for Modi’s campaign to develop a domestic defence industry.

“We are adjusting to the ‘Make in India’ policy which says only local companies will win tenders, so we are setting up three joint projects in India with local companies,” Alfassi said.

IAI has signed a memorandum of understanding to build missiles with India’s state-run Bharat Electronics Limited, launched a joint project with Dynamatic Technologies to make drones and is scouting for a partner for a joint venture for its subsidiary Elta, which specialises in electronic warfare and communication systems, he said.

India is in the midst of a military modernisation programme worth more than $100 billion to help counter rivals Pakistan and China. Israel, the United States and Russia are India’s top military suppliers, and Modi’s government has said it will favour countries that are ready to share technology.

Avi Mizrachi, executive vice-president of business development for Israel and Southeast Asia at Elbit Systems, which supplies electro-optic systems and upgrades of helicopters and combat vehicles, said it would be bidding for a tender to supply drones in partnership with the Adani group.

The two countries stress, though, that there is more to the relationship than arms deals.

Modi will be discussing a plan for Israeli help in boosting India’s food security, officials said. The plan is to expand 26 agriculture expertise centres that Israel has set up in 15 Indian states to help increase output of everything from vegetables to mangoes and pomegranates.

Modi wants Indian companies involved in turning these small centres into commercial entities that would help tens of thousands of farmers to boost productivity.

Sikkim standoff: India pushes more troops in Doka La in longest impasse since 1962

Sikkim standoff: India pushes more troops in Doka La in longest impasse since 1962

Officials say India brought in more troops in Doka La after the destruction of two of its bunkers and ‘aggressive tactics’ adopted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Arm
India has pushed in more troops in a “non-combative mode” to strengthen its position in an area near Sikkim, where its soldiers have been locked in a standoff with Chinese troops for almost a month now in what has been the longest such impasse between the two armies since 1962.

India brought in more troops after the destruction of two of its bunkers and “aggressive tactics” adopted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), officials said.

In a “non- combative mode”, the nozzle of a gun is placed downwards. Giving details for the first time about the events that preceded the face off between the two armies, the officials said the PLA on 1 June asked the Indian Army to remove the two bunkers set up in 2012 at Lalten in Doka La, which falls in the vicinity of Chumbi Valley at the corner of India-Bhutan- Tibet tri-junction.

The Indian Army, which had been patrolling this area for many years, decided in 2012 that two bunkers would be positioned there as a backup option, besides providing security to the Bhutan-China border. The Indian Army forward positions informed Sukna-based 33 Corps Headquarter in North Bengal about the Chinese warnings on the bunkers, the officials said.

However, during the night of 6 June, two Chinese bulldozers destroyed the bunkers, claiming that the area belonged to China and that India or Bhutan had no right over it, the officials said. Indian troops on the ground prevented the Chinese men and machines from doing any further damage or transgressing into the area, they said.

Additional forces from nearby brigade headquarters, located 20km from the face off point, were moved in on 8 June during which a scuffle led to soldiers on both sides suffering minor injuries. PLA troops were rushed in from its 141 division located in the area, prompting the Indian Army to also strengthen its position. This is the longest standoff between the two armies since 1962.

The last one, which carried on for 21 days, occurred at Daulat Beg Oldie in the Ladakh division of Jammu and Kashmir in 2013, when Chinese troops entered 30km into Indian territory till the Depsang Plains and claimed it to be a part of its Xinjiang province. They were, however, pushed back.

Sikkim, which became a part of India in May 1976, is the only state which has a demarcated border with China. The lines are based on a treaty signed with the Chinese in 1898. After the India-China war of 1962, the area where the Indian troops are stationed was placed under the Indian Army and the ITBP, which is the border guarding force and has a camp 15km from the international border.

As the scuffle broke out between the two sides, the Indian Army rushed an officer of the Major General rank to the area and a flag meeting was sought with the Chinese counterparts. China rejected two such requests from the Indian side, but accepted the third call for a meeting, where it asked the Indian Army to withdraw its troops from the Lalten area, which falls in Doka La.

Doka La is the Indian name for the region which Bhutan recognises as Dokalam, while China claims it to be part of its Donglang region. As a fallout of the standoff, the Chinese refused to allow the first batch of 47 pilgrims, who were to conduct the annual Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, into Tibet.

They also conveyed to the Indian side that visas of another batch of 50 yatris had also been cancelled, the officials said, describing the move as an indication of “increased tempers” in Beijing. The Sikkim route to Mansarovar, which is in Tibet, was opened in 2015, enabling pilgrims to travel the 1500km long route from Nathu La to Kailash by buses.

It is not the first time that such a transgression has happened at Doka La. The Chinese forces had in November 2008 destroyed some makeshift Indian army bunkers there. Defence experts believe China wants to exert its dominance over the Chumbi Valley, which is a part of the southern reaches of Tibet.

By claiming the Doka La area, Beijing wants to maximise its geographical advantage so that it can monitor all movements along the India-Bhutan border. China has also increased diplomatic pressure on India and lodged a protest over the alleged “crossing of boundary” by Indian troops in the Sikkim section.

They demanded their immediate withdrawal, as Beijing warned that future visits of Indian pilgrims to Kailash Mansarovar would depend on the resolution of the standoff. “Our position to uphold our territorial sovereignty is unwavering. We hope the Indian side can work with China in the same direction and immediately withdraw the personnel who have overstepped and trespassed into Chinese border,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang had told the media in Beijing last week.

People’s Liberation Army spokesman Col Wu Qian also spoke a tough language while making a reference to the 1962 Sino- India conflict, saying that New Delhi should “learn historical lessons”. Qian described Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat’s remarks that India was ready for a “two-and-a-half front war” as “extremely irresponsible” and asked him to “stop clamouring for war”.

Rawat had said India was prepared for security threats posed by China, Pakistan as well as by internal threats. “Such rhetoric is extremely irresponsible. We hope that the particular person in the Indian Army could learn from historical lessons and stop such clamouring for war,” he had said.

The defence minister, Arun Jaitley, made New Delhi’s stand clear when he said the India of 2017 was different from that of 1962. “If they are trying to remind us, the situation in 1962 was different and the India of 2017 is different,” Jaitley had said when asked about China’s warning. Of the 3,488km-long India-China border from Jammu and Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh, a 220km section falls in Sikkim.

291 people reached

Needed: A mutual restraint pact with China

Needed: A mutual restraint pact with China
The 2015 India-China statement on ‘respect and sensitivity to each other’s concerns’ should be narrowed down to primary concerns and core interests
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Beijing in May 2015, India and China issued a well-considered joint statement. The first section of the document, subtitled “Strengthening Political Dialogue And Strategic Communication”, stated: “Full use will be made of the opportunities provided by the presence of their leaders at various multilateral fora to hold consultations on bilateral relations and issues of regional and global importance.”

Yet when such an opportunity was presented last week in the G20 summit, both sides went out of their way to insist that they had not sought a meeting. Against the backdrop of a serious stand-off along the border, there could be no starker proof of the fraying of India-China ties over the past two years.

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To consider why things have come to this pass, it is important to understand how this difficult relationship was managed over the past 25 years. The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 was a decisive break from the pattern of Sino-Indian relations since the 1962 war. The agreement formalized the two sides’ commitment to maintaining status quo on the border until they arrived at a negotiated settlement. The agreement also enabled them to bracket the boundary issue and allow the bilateral relationship to develop in other areas.

The agreement was enabled by a particular domestic and international conjuncture. Having embarked on major economic reforms, prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao was keen to ensure a stable relationship with China. This would help check defence expenditure and allow India to focus on its internal transformation.

In the wake of the Tiananmen massacre and the ensuing international opprobrium, China too was keen to avoid confrontation with its adversaries and create a suitable external environment to spur its economic growth. Both China and India were also reconciled to the fact of American unipolarity and sought to leverage it for their own power and purposes.

The peace and tranquillity agreements of 1993 and 1996 delivered their core promise. When certain aspects of them, such as clarification of the Line of Actual Control, proved difficult, the two sides responded not by restricting cooperation but expanding it. Think of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bold decision in 2003 to embark on political negotiations on the border. Over the following decade, the common refrain was: “There is enough room for the growth of both China and India”.

The strategic and political context today is rather different. Having gained an upper hand on border infrastructure, the Chinese are keen to prevent India from catching up. Hence, the new forms of Chinese military activity along the border over the past five years.

More broadly, China’s relative power in the international system has risen since the global financial crisis. Not surprisingly, China’s definition of its core interests and its willingness to pursue them has also increased. India’s interests too have expanded with its growing power. Not only is it prepared to adopt a more assertive posture on the border, but it also harbours concerns about South China Sea and China’s rising footprint along India’s periphery.

Even as New Delhi attempts to resolve the current stand-off, it should think ahead. We now need a restraining pact with China. Diplomatic history is replete, as historian Paul Schroeder reminds us, with such examples of managing antagonistic relations by associative means—also known as pacta de contrahendo.

The Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars stabilized Russia’s relations with Austria and Prussia—countries that had been its enemies recently and that continued to compete with Russia along its periphery. The Entente Cordiale, similarly, helped stabilize Britain’s ties with its historic enemy, France. Contrary to popular wisdom, the entente was aimed not at a rising Germany but at managing Britain’s rivalry with France over colonial possessions.

What could be the elements of an agreement on mutual restraint with China?

The 2015 statement spoke of “respect and sensitivity to each other’s concerns, interests and aspirations”. This should be narrowed down to primary concerns and core interests. For instance, Chinese military activism along the border is a primary concern for India. Not so the political cover they provide in the UN to Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism. Yet India should make it clear that Pakistani terrorism jeopardizes regional security—especially in the context of Chinese projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Both sides should also set aside aspirational or status goals: be it India’s desire for Chinese support on Nuclear Suppliers Group membership, or China’s desire for Indian support on the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s leadership more generally.

As for the border, both sides could build on previous agreements. Former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon has observed that neither side has explored the reference in the 1993 agreement (and subsequent statements) to the need for “mutual and equal security” and for agreement on force levels. An accord based on these principles could help arrest the downward slide on the border and assure both sides of their core interests pending a boundary settlement.

It is easy to naysay the possibility of such a restraining pact. However, diplomacy is not about pessimism but realism—especially if the alternative is heading to hell in a handcart.

The 30-year itch in India-China ties

The 30-year itch in India-China ties
The biggest foreign policy crisis of the year is India’s chance to comprehensively revamp its China policy
The stand-off at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction reflects the dissonance in the Sino-Indian relationship, driven by a hardening of the Chinese stand on territorial claims. Some Indian analysts suggest a comprehensive relook at India’s approach to such assertiveness, while others believe such a “reset” is already under way.

The last such “reset” of relations was in 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi visited China. Though a trip had been in the making since 1984, a formal invitation arrived with the Chinese vice-foreign minister in 1987. The trip next year, the first premier-level exchange since 1960, eased strains accumulated from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru-Zhou Enlai. This indicates that a relationship “reset” has a shelf-life of about three decades. So, if it is time to reassess, what should it entail?

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As part of my research, I recently interviewed senior members of the foreign policy establishment in the Rajiv Gandhi government. They said they knew that the engagement resulting from the 1988 visit would break from established policy. It was their opportunity to separate border disputes from other issues and introduce cooperation into a relationship of contention.

The benefits of the 1988 modus vivendi accrued to both sides. Bilateral trade flourished, the boundary issue was managed, and both countries could grow as economic powerhouses without being tied down in their backyards.

Thirty years later, there is a growing view that the 1988 rapprochement has run its course. As those I interviewed explained, with both countries expanding global roles, the agreement needs a revisit.

For some years now, the Chinese elite have believed that their time as the pre-eminent power has arrived. Initiatives like “China Dream” for a “fully developed Chinese nation”, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are critical to hoist China to the centre of the international system. Publicizing the BRI summit in May was a way of claiming legitimacy for this role.

These alone perhaps would not have required an immediate reorientation. However, US President Donald’s Trump’s apparent transactional approach to Asia makes it a pressing necessity. There is little clarity on how a distracted American administration would react to developments in South Asia.

China believes this is its opportunity to claim geopolitical space in Asia. The selective approach to terrorism, or opposing India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, indicate where it wants to see India in a China-led order. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Gilgit-Baltistan helps tie down India in South Asia. Similarly, the current stand-off is China’s attempt to legitimize its claim and change the status quo.

The Doklam incident follows a template that China has been using for a while. This involves identifying an area with unsettled claims, and moving in. When challenged, an indignant China claims rights “since ancient times”. As evident elsewhere, China has carefully separated the project of reclaiming national pride from economic relationships—which means better trade relations or Chinese direct investment alone is unlikely to change anything.

The closeness following 1988 was as much a necessity for China as it was for India. Still not an economic behemoth, China needed newer markets to expand. The post-Tiananmen crackdown soon after also made it necessary to nurture new relationships. The China of 2017, however, is far removed from the China of 1988, and India must account for this asymmetry.

First, recalibrating the relationship will require clear signalling of expectations and nuanced communication. Not all developments will merit a reaction but the ones that do will need to be identified and responded to, purposefully. These may include China inciting anti-India sentiment in the neighbourhood, or impeding infrastructure development in Indian territory. To consider these red lines will demand communicating the message clearly; if tested, India will also need to demonstrate that it has a multi-step strategy, and the willingness to follow it.

Second, the government will have to decide on responses—will it challenge China’s own red lines, its “core interests?” India’s approach has changed since the 2015 Chumar incursion. Tibet policy, too, shifted when the “prime minister” of the Central Tibetan Administration attended Narendra Modi’s swearing-in. Turning these separate incidents into cohesive strategy will leave little room to dither. Missteps like the one involving Uyghur activist Dolkun Isa’s visit will have to be avoided. Closer relations with Taiwan will also demonstrate resolve. Following up on these will require determination and finesse, and no space for muddling through.

Third, India will have to consider context while responding. For instance, is it sufficient to only protest China’s stand on Masood Azhar, or will questioning China’s equivocation on terrorism help more? How do the economic and strategic benefits of BRI stack up against the objections?

Admittedly, answering these questions is far easier in theory than in practice. An ad-hoc approach will not work for a reorientation of foreign policy of this magnitude. Serious institutional energy will have to be spent in considering all options and planning a coherent strategy. As in 1988, it will require deliberate signalling that the entire relationship will not hinge only on these issues. As the veterans of South Block explained, the earlier “reset” worked because it was consistently nurtured for years. Another one, if considered, will also need to play the long game

Nepal signs mega hydro project deal with Chinese firm

As per the agreement, the storage project would be built under engineering, procurement, construction and finance (EPCF) model. Under this model, CGGC will help arrange funds required to develop the project

Nepal has signed a major deal with a Chinese company to develop a 1,200 MW hydroelectric project, the biggest hydro project in the landlocked country that could resolve its perennial power crisis. Nepal’s Ministry of Energy Sunday signed an MoU with China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) for the development of teh much-touted 1,200 MW Budhigandaki Hydroelectric Project.

The agreement was signed at the prime minister’s residence, in the presence of outgoing prime minister of Nepal Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Yu Hong, The Kathmandu Post reported. As per the agreement, the storage project would be built under engineering, procurement, construction and finance (EPCF) model. Under this model, CGGC will help arrange funds required to develop the project.

The funds will be mobilised in the form of soft loan or commercial loan from Chinese financial institutions on terms and conditions acceptable to the Nepal government. CGGC will also undertake the overall responsibility of executing the project.

The Chinese developer, according to the MoU, will also conduct additional studies and investigations on the project if required. The MoU has given one year’s period to the Chinese developer to conduct assessment of the hydropower project and arrange necessary funds for its development.

This understanding, according to Energy Ministry officials, will not bind the government legally or financially to hand over the project to the Chinese company for construction, as the final agreement is yet to be signed. The government has allocated a budget of Rs 5.33 billion for the project’s development in the current fiscal year.

The EPCF model of project development, under which the contracting firm makes all the arrangements including mobilisation of financial resources to build the project, is considered to be one of the most effective and efficient models for development of huge infrastructure projects.

CGGC is currently building 30MW Chameliya Hydropower Project in the far west and 60MW Upper Trishuli 3A Hydropower Project in the central region.

The Budhigandaki Project has been touted as a key project to resolve the perennial power crisis in the country. The government has been raising infrastructure tax of Rs 5 from sales of every litre of petrol, diesel and aviation fuel to collect funds to build the project.

What India can learn from Israel

India has much to learn from Israeli’s application of hard power, who are living in a part of the world where most of their neighbours don’t even acknowledge their right to exist

The year 2017 marks important anniversaries for Israel: the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the first official British declaration recognizing the need for a Jewish state; 1947 when the United Nations passed a resolution in support of a Jewish state, a year before its creation; and 1967, which saw the Six-Day War resulting in an overwhelming Israeli victory over Arab aggressors, establishing Israel’s control over all of Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza, Golan, and Sinai.

This year also marks the 25th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between India and Israel. To commemorate this important anniversary, and by remarkable coincidence coinciding with all these other important anniversaries, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit Israel on 4-6 July, in what will be another first: the first time ever that an Indian prime minister will visit Israel.

It’s noteworthy that the customary add-on, a visit to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, is being skipped. This signals in no uncertain terms that India no longer hyphenates Israel and Palestine and acknowledges what has been evident below the radar screen for years, the enormous importance of the India-Israel bilateral relationship. Whether it’s military cooperation, trade or combatting Islamist extremism in their respective neighbourhoods, Israel is fast becoming one of India’s staunchest and most important partners. Credit for the ramping up of this long overdue boost to the relationship is due both to Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

A recent visit to Israel reinforced all of the reasons I already believed India and Israel are natural partners. That begins with the natural affinity and warmth between the two peoples. Israelis love to travel to India and love seeing Indians in their own country.

India is perhaps unique in having a long history of Jewish migration without any persecution of the Jews from the indigenous population. Anti-semitism came to India with the arrival of European colonizers and in fact it was the Maharaja of Cochin who sheltered members of the ancient Jewish settlement when they were marauded by the Portuguese. Much later, Baghdadi Jews played an important part in Bombay’s rise as a modern metropolis and commercial centre. Indeed, one of the so-called original merchant princes of Bombay was David Sassoon, a Baghdadi Jew. As it happens, about 80,000 Indian Jews have settled in Israel and are great ambassadors for India there. They contribute to India’s soft power in the Israeli consciousness which is considerable.

In the opposite direction, India has much to learn from Israeli’s application of hard power, living as they do in a part of the world where most of their neighbours don’t even acknowledge their right to exist and many are trying actively to wipe them off the map. India too faces existential threats but for too long, our political elite were both unwilling to acknowledge this fact and to draw the correct lessons from the Israeli experience.

In conversations with senior Israeli military and security officials, it became clear that the Israeli approach is to balance strength and military and strategic superiority and a focus on deterrence on the one hand, with the ability to be compassionate and emphatic on the other. Thus, it is little known that on Israel’s northern border with Syria on the Golan Heights, where civil war is raging between government and rebel forces, those in need of medical care, often injured in the shelling and firing, cross over to the Israeli side and get treated at Israeli hospitals free of cost. These were people who grew up thinking of Israel as their mortal enemy that needed to be destroyed.

It’s striking that Israeli settlers have ventured right up to the UN administered buffer zone between Israeli occupied Golan, neighbouring Syria and Lebanon, confident that Israeli forces will protect them. There’s a good reason: as several security officials said, their goal is to ensure life is as normal as it can be for those they protect.

Unfortunately, the same can’t be said for Jammu and Kashmir, where indigenous Pandits were driven out while the Indian state looked the other way and in which it’s not even legally permissible for non-Kashmiri Indians to settle there. Nor can Indian security forces guarantee safety in regions affected by Maoist and other insurgencies.

India could well take a cue from how Israel maintains stringent external and internal security, allowing Israeli settlements right up to the border of conflict zones. In India, by contrast, we seem to be in perennial reaction mode, trying to contain situations as they’re unfolding rather than pre-empting trouble before it happens.

Israelis understand that genuine compassion and empathy even toward those bent on destroying them comes from a position of strength, not of weakness. But all of this requires political will and a deeper commitment and investment to our military and security establishment. The former requires that there be a broad political consensus that India faces existential threats from within and without. The latter requires taking these existential threats we face seriously as the Israelis do theirs.

In 1967, Israel faced a threat to its very existence from Arab neighbours and vanquished its enemies. In 1962, India faced abject defeat at the hands of Chinese neighbours who continue to occupy some of our territory. When will India get its act together and learn from Israel?