UPSC (IAS) Preparation - Only most important current affairs for UPSC / IAS /UKPSC

6 January 2017

ukpcs RO Mains : some suggestion

RO Mains : some suggestion

If you read the notice given below ,you will find that last date for ro mains form process will be upto 10th feb 2017.Since commission has not declared any date for mains exam ,so it will take atleast one month after 10 th feb.

so now all candidate should prepare completely for UKPCS -2016 PRE EXAM . you will get sufficient time for RO mains after PCS prelims.

Rewriting the rules of political engagement

Rewriting the rules of political engagement

The apex court’s decision against canvassing for votes on grounds of religion, caste, creed, community or language moves into tricky territory

The Supreme Court’s seven-judge bench decision that candidates can’t seek votes on grounds of religion, caste, creed, community or language seems, on the face of it, like a progressive step that could potentially rewrite the rules of engagement in Indian politics. India is a secular state and, the court argues, it is only in the fitness of things that religion and the like are kept out of the electoral process. But the reality of politics and the political economy is more nuanced than the judgement might indicate—evidenced by the fact that three of the seven judges dissented with the majority opinion.

Technically, the relevant statute—Section 123 (3) of the Representation of People’s Act, 1951 (RP Act)—has been on the books for decades . It forbids “the appeal by a candidate...to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his (emphasis added) religion, race, caste, community or language...for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate...”. The “his” in this clause was understood thus far as a reference to the candidate.

Monday’s judgement has now expanded the interpretation to include the affiliations of the voter as well. It has read sub-section 3 with two other clauses: sub-section 3(A) under Section 123 of the RP Act and Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, both of which deal with the promotion of feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion, etc. The judges also traced legislative history to support their broad interpretation.

Justice Madan Lokur, who authored the majority opinion and wrote on behalf of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, opined that this broad interpretation was necessary to maintain “the purity of the electoral process” and ensure that it was not vitiated by “communalism, separatist and fissiparous tendencies”. Justice S.A. Bobde in his concurring but separate judgement made clear that since Parliament never intended for an appeal for votes on the grounds of religion, etc., to be permissible, it is immaterial whether “the appeal is made on the ground of the religion of the candidate, etc., or of the voter”. Chief Justice T.S. Thakur tilted the scales in favour of the “purposive interpretation” with a similar judgement, saying “an interpretation that will have the effect of removing the religion or religious considerations from the secular character of the State or state activity ought to be preferred over an interpretation which may allow such considerations to enter, effect or influence such activities”.

On the other side, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, writing the dissenting opinion on behalf of himself, Justices U.U. Lalit and A.K. Goel, also marshalled historical and legislative evidence to prop up their view that Parliament did not intend the clause to extend to the voter—as such a blanket ban would prevent candidates from raising issues related to religion, etc.

These contesting viewpoints must be seen in the correct historical and political context. Religion-based politics has two major drawbacks. First, it often defaults to an oppositional narrative. And second, from an economic and governance standpoint, it is a powerful enough motivator to enable blanket community appeals that cut across economic fault lines. Such broadcasting can sometimes lead to blocs voting against their rational interests. Against the backdrop of Partition, and given the first drawback, the extant constitutional safeguards—such as the original interpretation of the RP Act’s relevant clause as well as the other clauses pertaining to promotion of enmity—are understandable.

But the majority opinion moves into trickier territory. Religion is an essential component of culture, and culture and economic growth do not exist independent of each other. Max Weber’s seminal The Protestant Ethic And The Spirit Of Capitalism is perhaps the first comprehensive work exploring this. It has been roundly criticized since, and with reason—it is simplistic and indulges in various leaps of logic. But its core thesis remains. Sociologist Peter Berger has pointed to the link between religion and economic development in Latin America. And Harvard researchers Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary have examined data from 59 countries spread over decades and found a correlation between economic growth and religious belief in developing economies.

Correlation is not causation, of course. None of the research provides definitive answers. But what it does do is point to the reality that religion, culture and development can often be intertwined. In an Indian context, there are socioeconomic issues specific to particular communities. For example, will campaigning for Dalit empowerment count as caste-based canvassing? This may have to be decided on a case-by-case basis but who will decide where to draw the line? Either way, the interpretation could potentially censor all mention of religion, etc. This, the dissenting judges warn, would “reduce democracy to an abstraction”. The dissenting judges also highlight that not only does the Constitution engage with the injustices suffered by various groups, it has allowed for these groups to rally around their religion, etc., to fight back against centuries of social oppression.

How the ruling addresses these issues remains to be seen, based on how it is implemented. The debate on the limits of free speech in politics is, patently, a messy one.

What impact do you think the Supreme Court verdict will have on Indian politics?

Reclaiming India’s leverage on Tibet

Reclaiming India’s leverage on Tibet
India’s instinctive chariness and reserve on the issue persist, despite an increasingly muscular China upping the ante against it
Central governments come and go in New Delhi but India’s instinctive chariness and reserve on the issue of Tibet still persist, despite an increasingly muscular China upping the ante against it. Tibet’s annexation has affected Indian security like no other development, giving China, for the first time under Han rule, a contiguous border with India, Bhutan and Nepal and facilitating a Sino-Pakistan strategic axis through a common land corridor.

Even as then-independent Tibet’s forcible absorption began just months after the 1949 Communist victory in China, India—despite its British-inherited extra-territorial rights in Tibet—watched silently, even opposing a discussion in the UN general assembly on the aggression. Since then, India has stayed mum on increasing Chinese repression in Tibet. But now, it is allowing itself to come under Chinese pressure on the Dalai Lama’s activities and movements within India.

Consider the recent development when the Dalai Lama attended a public event at Rashtrapati Bhavan and met President Pranab Mukherjee. The government did the right thing by permitting the Dalai Lama to participate in the event, especially since it was organized for children’s welfare by Nobel laureates, a group that includes the Dalai Lama himself.

But after China protested the Dalai Lama’s presence at Rashtrapati Bhavan, India responded gratuitously rather than disregarding Beijing’s silly gripe, which was couched in imperious terms.

Demanding that India respect China’s “core interests” to avoid “any disturbance” to bilateral ties, the Chinese foreign ministry stated, “China has urged India to clearly recognize the Dalai Lama’s anti-Chinese and separatist nature, to respect China’s core interests and concerns, to take effective measures to eliminate the negative influences of the incident, and to avoid disturbing China-India ties,” adding, “Recently in disregard of China’s solemn representation and strong opposition, the Indian side insisted on arranging for the 14th Dalai Lama’s visit to the Indian presidential palace, where he took part in an event and met President Mukherjee.”

The ministry of external affairs responded not to censure China for seeking to interfere in India’s internal affairs or for dictating terms to it; rather, it responded to explain the matter to Beijing, saying, “India has a consistent position. His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, is a respected and revered spiritual leader. It was a non-political event organized by Nobel laureates dedicated to the welfare of children.”

Where was the need for India to explain apologetically that it was “a non-political event”—that too to a country that has no compunction in blocking UN sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists or in frustrating India’s admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group? The way to deal with China on such an issue is to ignore its protests and keep doing more frequently what it finds objectionable so as to blunt its objections. This approach is necessary in order to send a clear message that China cannot arrogantly lay down terms for India to follow.

Just as China has perfected the art of creeping, covert warfare through which it seeks to take one “slice” of territory at a time, by force, its objections regarding the Dalai Lama have similarly advanced in a crawling form. From objecting to official discussions between the Dalai Lama and a foreign head of state or government, China’s opposition has progressed to protesting his presence at any state-linked event or even his purely spiritual visit to another country, as to Mongolia recently. It has also sought to crimp his freedom within a free India.

Take Mongolia, which has had close links with Tibet ever since the great Mongol king, Altan Khan, converted to Tibetan Buddhism. Indeed, the fourth Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia. But when Mongolia in November stood up to China by permitting the Dalai Lama to undertake a four-day religious tour involving no official meeting, Beijing responded as a typical bully by freezing ties and seeking to throttle its economy—dependent on commodity exports to China—by slapping punitive tariffs and shutting a key border crossing point. And it kept up the coercive pressure until Mongolia, battling a recession, agreed not to allow the Dalai Lama in again even for a religious tour.

Far from being vulnerable to Chinese economic blackmail, India is in a position to employ trade as a political instrument against China, given the lopsided nature of bilateral commerce. Fattened by a rapidly growing trade surplus with India that now totals almost $60 billion yearly, China has been busy undermining Indian security, either directly or through its surrogate Pakistan. China’s surplus has actually doubled since Narendra Modi assumed office.

India not only needs to fix the increasingly asymmetrical trade relationship with China but must also reclaim its leverage on the Tibet issue—a leverage it remains very reluctant to exercise. Had China been in India’s place, it is unthinkable that it would have shied away from employing the Tibet card or the trade card.

Tibet is to India against China what Pakistan is to China against India. But China has had no hesitation in playing the Pakistan card against India, including by building Pakistan as a military balancer on the subcontinent through continuing transfers of nuclear-weapon, missile and conventional-weapon technologies.

Way back in 1965, then education minister and soon to be minister of external affairs M.C. Chagla declared, “The conditions under which we recognized China’s suzerainty no longer exist.” Yet today India recognizes Tibet as part of China even as Beijing openly challenges India’s unity and territorial integrity, including by occupying the Aksai Chin plateau and claiming an entire Indian state.

Without India asserting itself by reopening the Tibet issue, China will continue to breathe down its neck and seek to dictate terms. For example, when the Dalai Lama tours Arunachal Pradesh shortly, Beijing will again unleash its diplomatic fury by hectoring India.

Major Initiatives and Achievements of Department Of Industrial Policy & Promotion – 2016

FDI Policy Reforms for Economic Growth

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy formulated

National Industrial Corridor Development & Implementation Trust (NICDIT)
to provide for integrated development of Industrial corridors

Incentives under Make in India & Start-up India

· Foreign Direct Investment

· Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2016:
§ The ninth edition of this series was released on 7th June, 2016, incorporating all FDI policy amendments carried out since the release of last FDI Circular i.e. since May 12, 2015.

§ It has been made simpler and investor friendly; and will serve as a ready reference for foreign investors on various provisions of the FDI policy.

· Policy Reforms :
§ To further supplement domestic capital, technology and skills, for accelerated economic growth, DIPP announced FDI policy reforms on 20th June, 2016. The policy amendments became effective from the date of release of the press note i.e. 24th June, 2016.

§ The reforms inter-alia include FDI beyond 49% in Defence under approval route and 100% FDI for e-commerce in Food Products manufactured/ produced in India under approval route.

§ Government vide Press Note 6 (2016) dated 25.10.2016 reviewed FDI policy on Other Financial Services and NBFCs.

§ Foreign Investment in financial services activities regulated by financial sector regulators will be 100% under the automatic route.

§ In financial services, which are not regulated by any financial sector regulator or where only part of the financial service activity is regulated or where there is doubt regarding regulatory oversight, foreign investment upto 100% will be allowed under the government approval route

· Inflows :

§ The total FDI inflows received during the last financial year (2015-16) at US$ 55.6 billion, an increase of 23% compared to the previous financial year (US$ 45.1 for 2014-15), has been the highest ever for any financial year till date.

§ During the current financial year, The FDI inflows during April-October, 2016-2017 stood at US$ 27.82 billion as compared to US$ 21.87 billion in April-October 2015-2016.
§ Manufacturing constitute around 41.5% of the equity inflows while non-manufacturing around 58.5% (during April 2014 to Sept 2016)

· Intellectual Property

· Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy:

§ In May, 2016, Government for the first time adopted a comprehensive National Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policy to lay future roadmap for intellectual property.

§ This aims to improve Indian intellectual property ecosystem, hopes to create an innovation movement in the country and aspires towards “Creative India; Innovative India” “रचनात्मक भारत; अभिनव भारत”.

§ Objective of this policy is to increase IPR awareness; stimulate generation of IPRs; have strong and effective IPR laws; modernize and strengthen service-oriented IPR administration; get value for IPRs through commercialization; strengthen enforcement and adjudicatory mechanisms for combating IPR infringements; and to strengthen and expand human resources, institutions and capacities for teaching, training, research and skill building in IPRs.

§ Subsequent to the approval of this policy, a Cell for Intellectual Property Rights Promotion and Management (CIPAM) has been created as a professional body which will be working under the aegis of DIPP for addressing the 7 identified objectives of the Policy.

§ MOU in the field of Intellectual Property signed with U.K, Singapore and E.U
§ India-USA Workshop on Protection of Trade Secrets organized by CIPAM.

§ Trademarks filing increased by around 10% and Trademark examination increased by around 250% during FY16 till Nov vis-à-vis FY15.

§ Trademark pendency has come down to 3 months and to be 1 month by March 2017

· Industrial Infrastructure

· National Industrial Corridor Development & Implementation Trust (NICDIT):

§ Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project Implementation Trust Fund (DMIC-PITF Trust) is now re-designated with an expanded mandate of integrated development of Industrial Corridors.

§ This would be an Apex body under administrative control of DIPP for coordinated and unified development of all industrial corridors in the country.

§ It will channelize Govt. of India (GoI) funds as well as institutional funds for development of corridors. It will coordinate all central efforts for the development of Industrial Corridor projects and will also monitor their implementation.

§ Total outlay has been increased to Rs. 17,550/- for the period now extended up to 31SI March, 2022.

· Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor:

§ Approval of Construction of trunk infrastructure for Phase II of Part I of Shendra Bidkin Industrial Area (SBIA) namely the Bidkin region spread across 31.79 sq km (3,179.20 ha) at an estimated project cost of Rs. 6,414.21 crore.

§ Investment of Rs. 2,397.20 crore as 49% equity of DMIC Trust in the City/ Node SPV in a phased manner; and issuance of EPC tenders for selection of contractors for various packages of trunk infrastructure in a phased manner.

§ Development of the SBIA as a manufacturing hub will generate a series of direct and indirect benefits through employment, development of ancillary units and spin-off of socio-economic benefits.

· Modified Industrial Infrastructure Upgradation Scheme (MIIUS) :

§ Under this Scheme, projects have been undertaken to upgrade infrastructure in existing Industrial Parks/ Estates/ Areas. Greenfield Projects can also be undertaken in backward areas and North Eastern Region (NER) with a Central Grant upto 50% of the project cost with a ceiling of ₹ 50.00 crore.

§ Final approval has been accorded to 24 projects with central grant amounting to ₹ 604.71 crore and 6 projects with central grant of ₹ 129.91 crore are at ‘in-principle’ approval stage. Central assistance of ₹ 181.92 crore has been released to 22 projects as on 31.10.2016.

· Support to Industry

· Indian Leather Development Programme:

§ One of the major activities under Indian Leather Development Programme is to provide placement linked skill development training to unemployed youth.

§ As against the target of providing training to 1.44 Lakh persons during 2016-17, 60,705 unemployed persons have been trained out of which 48,752 trainees have been employed in leather and footwear industry.

§ For augmentation of institutional infrastructure, assistance has been provided for establishment of two new branches of Footwear design and development Institute (FDDI) at Banur (Punjab) and Ankleshwar ( Gujarat).

§ Approval has been given for setting-up Mega leather Cluster (MLC) at Nellore, Andhra Pradesh with GOI assistance of Rs 125 crore.

· Investment Promotion

· Make In India:

§ On completion of two years of ‘Make In India’ initiative, sector achievement reports in respect of eleven sectors viz. Power, Mining, Automotive, Telecommunication, Textile & Apparel, Electronics & IT, Skill Development, Leather and Port & Shipping Tourism and Food Processing have been released during the year.

· Ease of Doing Business:

§ The World Banks’ Doing Business 2017 report shows that for the first time the absolute score of ‘Distance to Frontier’ that measures the gap between India and the global best practice has increased for two consecutive years. It has improved by 2.5% from 55.27 to 53.93 over a period of last one year.

§ A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between India and UK to support Ease of Doing Business in India. A national conference on Ease of Doing Business was organized with support from Government of UK to disseminate the best practices.

§ Through constant efforts, States too have been brought on board in the process to expand the coverage of these efforts. The rankings of the States/UTs based on 340-Point Business Reform Action Plan released on 31st October 2016, show that national implementation average of reforms undertaken by States/UTs stands at 48.93%, significantly higher than last year’s national average of 32%.

§ It also shows that 12 States scored more than 90 % as against none last year.

· Start-up India:

§ Fund of Funds for Startups: `129 crore committed by SIDBI to Venture Funds.

§ Notification issued by RBI allowing Foreign VCs to invest in equity or equity linked or debt instrument issued by an Indian startup without RBI approval.

§ Notification issued for Relaxed Norms of Procurement in Government Departments and CPSUs.

§ Funds for 10 Startup Centers released and 9 Technology Business Incubators approved.

§ Establishment of Atal Tinkering Labs: NITI Aayog has announced a list of 257 schools.

· Incentives for Industries of North East and Himalayan States –

§ North East Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy, 2007 revised with notification on 22nd Nov, 2016 for resumption of registration process for new industrial units that had commenced production on or after 01.12.2014.

§ Committee headed by CEO, NITI Aayog to suggest a roadmap for a new industrial policy for the region.

· International Cooperation-
§ Korea Plus- It is a special initiative to promote and facilitate Korean Investments in India. It was operationalized on June 18, 2016 comprises of a representative from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy, Government of the Republic of Korea and representative from Korea Trade Investment and Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and three representatives from Invest India

Fiscal policy in the age of inflation targets

Fiscal policy in the age of inflation targets
The trajectory of nominal GDP growth in the medium term deserves to be watched—once the transient effects of the currency shock subside
One trend in the Indian economy that deserves far more attention right now is the sharp recovery in the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) over the past four quarters. This recovery is especially significant as the countdown to the new budget to be presented by finance minister Arun Jaitley begins. There is also a related policy quandary about the nature of fiscal policy when the Indian central bank has been tied down to a formal inflation target.

A bit of background: The deflation in wholesale prices had pulled down the growth of nominal output till recently. The low point was in the quarter ended September 2015. Nominal output in that quarter grew at its lowest pace in nearly a decade. There has been a gradual improvement since then as wholesale price deflation has receded. Nominal output in the September 2016 quarter grew at rates that were common before the strange episode of wholesale price deflation (see chart).

Click here for enlarge
Why should all this matter? Most analysts are focussed on how rapidly the economy is growing in real terms—after stripping away the effects of price changes. There are good reasons to do so. What matters for economic welfare is the increase in output rather than the value of output.

However, there is one important reason why economists sometimes need to look to nominal rather than real values. Nominal GDP matters when the government sits down for its annual budgeting exercise. The amount of tax that can be collected is based on the size of nominal rather than real output. That is because we pay tax on nominal incomes or profits rather than real incomes or profits. Indirect taxes are also imposed on the nominal prices of any commodity or service. The recent recovery in nominal GDP growth is good news for finance minister Jaitley as he does preparatory work for the budget due to be announced on 1 February.

There are two parts of nominal GDP growth—the increase in actual output plus some measure of price changes. How important these two parts are at any point in time is also important. High nominal GDP growth can be driven by a combination of low real growth plus high inflation. It can be the result of high real growth plus low inflation. Or it could be something in between. There are no prizes for guessing that a robust economy should be driven by high real growth plus low inflation.

The finance ministry usually works with an overall estimate of nominal GDP growth. It pays relatively less attention in its budget to whether nominal growth in the economy is dominated by high growth or high inflation. This could be a problem at a time when the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been formally asked to focus its monetary policy on meeting an inflation target. The question worth asking right now is whether Indian fiscal policy should explicitly take the monetary policy target into consideration when the budget is being finalized.

Most budgets as a thumb rule seem to assume that nominal GDP in the next year would grow at around 12%. The increase in tax collections is derived from this number after assuming some level of tax elasticity. It is quite likely that Jaitley will work with a similar assumption in his new budget. Now the question to ask is: What is the underlying inflation assumption?

Let us move back into the realm of monetary policy. The middle point of the inflation range given to the Indian central bank is 4%, though the range is 2 percentage points on either side of this level. There has been some ambiguity about how the RBI would interpret its policy target. Would the intermediate target of Indian monetary policy be a range or a point? Significantly, in the meeting of the monetary policy committee held in early December, where it was decided unanimously that policy rates should not be changed, governor Urjit Patel said: “Achieving the inflation target of 5 per cent for Q4 of 2016-17 and securing 4 per cent—the central point of the notified target range—remains the primary objective.”

Fiscal policy should ideally keep this inflation target in mind when the assumptions about nominal GDP growth are being made. There are two issues here. The first issue is of signalling. It is likely that the private sector will get confused if the inflation levels assumptions underlying monetary and fiscal policy are different from each other. The second issue is of policy coordination. An inflationary budget could then trigger off an asymmetric monetary policy response, a cue for friction between New Delhi and Mumbai on several occasions since 2004.

The trajectory of nominal GDP growth in the medium term deserves to be watched—once the transient effects of the currency shock subside. The importance given to the inflation target when designing the budget is also an issue that should attract more attention. There is too little discussion on these important macroeconomic issues as the finance minister prepares to unveil his fourth budget on the first day of February.