IAS (PRE)-2016 TEST SERIES.SAMVEG IAS DEHRADUN

IAS (PRE)-2016 TEST SERIES.SAMVEG IAS DEHRADUN

Indian policymakers must incorporate in nuclear doctrine a realistic response to tactical nuclear warheads

Last week, shortly before US President Barack Obama's meeting in Washington with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, its Foreign Secretary, Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, acknowledged small-yield, short-range tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) as part of his country's nuclear arsenal. In March, Lieutenant-General Khalid Kidwai, the long-time chief of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (which controls nuclear weapons targeting) had said the same thing in a talk in Washington; but since Mr Kidwai had recently retired, that was not official confirmation. Now Mr Chaudhary has explained that TNWs are Pakistan's counter to India's so-called Cold Start Doctrine. This doctrine, the very existence of which is denied by New Delhi, is an operational plan to punish unacceptable Pakistani provocations - such as high-casualty terrorist strikes in India - by launching swift, shallow offensives into that country with tank-heavy forces.

Pakistani military planners know that, given India's powerful tank forces, they would be spread too thin to halt India's Cold Start thrusts. Inevitably, many thrusts would make headway, capturing Pakistani border towns and creating the impression of an Indian victory. The rapidity of Cold Start offensives would overtake the deterrence time lines that had prevailed earlier. Now Indian war objectives might be met before Pakistan's General Headquarters (GHQ) at Rawalpindi could signal to New Delhi - halt, or we will cross the nuclear threshold, using traditional nuclear weapons of 15-20 kilotonnes (KT) or more, delivered by missiles over hundreds, even thousands, of kilometres. GHQ tightly controls these "strategic" weapons, so it takes time to ready and launch them, providing India's offensive forces the time to achieve their ends.

To speed up their nuclear response, Pakistan developed TNWs - relatively small nuclear weapons, usually below 2-3 kilotonnes, which are launched at battlefield targets like tank forces, at ranges of 60-100 kilometres, through short-range missiles. Due to the distances between the National Command Authority in Islamabad and the India-Pakistan border, TNWs would have to be located near the border and placed under local corps commanders. This "de-centralisation" renders TNWs vulnerable to theft or, even unauthorised use by renegade commanders. While Pakistan must be developing preferential access links (PALs) for its TNWs - software codes to restrict their operation to select commanders - these would take time to implement and perfect. And, in the confusion of a possible battlefield debacle, TNWs could well fall into the hands of unauthorised persons.

Such doomsday scenarios create the insecurity and uncertainty that suit Pakistan. Islamabad hopes that by posing a clear and present danger, it can force Washington's hand, extracting concessions - like a nuclear pact - that would allow Islamabad spin-doctors to claim Pakistani equivalence with India, a cherished strategic objective. Mr Sharif implicitly justified his TNWs by blaming a "hostile" India for forcing his military's hand. Addressing the US Institute of Peace, Mr Sharif declared that India's "dangerous military doctrines… will compel Pakistan to take several countermeasures to preserve credible deterrence." Nobody doubted he was talking about TNWs.

New Delhi has little control over Pakistan's decision to deploy TNWs. Nevertheless, Indian policymakers must now incorporate in our nuclear doctrine a realistic response to TNWs. Our nuclear doctrine - issued as a "draft nuclear doctrine" in August 1999, and modified slightly in a gazette notification on January 4, 2003 - pledges that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with massive retaliation should deterrence fail."

This implies India's default response to a Pakistani TNW strike - even against Indian troops on Pakistani soil - would be "massive retaliation", i.e. striking counter-value targets (towns and cities) in Pakistan with the full weight of India's arsenal. However, India's massive response would only damage, not destroy, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to the well-respected Arms Control Association, India and Pakistan have about 120 nuclear weapons each. Even if India's "massive retaliation" destroys half of Pakistan's arsenal (and there is little surety of that), India would then have to absorb Pakistan's "second-strike" response, which would consist of about 60 nuclear bombs on Indian towns and cities. This would be an unimaginable blow. Yet Indian planners blithely go about their day as if the game would surely end with India's massive first strike.

Furthermore, few outside Lutyens New Delhi swallow the notion that India would respond to a single TNW by reducing Pakistan to a smoking ruin (albeit one that would shortly afterwards reduce India to the same state). Deterrence is a mind-game that one side quickly loses if the opponent does not believe that a threat will be executed.

Former Israeli Air Force chief, General David Ivry, explains deterrence through a formula - "Power (P) x Intent (I) = Deterrence (D)" - which regards deterrence as the product of two factors. The first, i.e. power, is not the actual capability of the deterring country (India), but what the country being deterred (Pakistan) believes its capability to be. If Pakistan believes, rightly or wrongly, that Indian missiles and aircraft cannot deliver nuclear weapons to Pakistani targets, the P in the equation will be zero, and deterrence will fall to zero too. The second factor, i.e. intent, represents the deterring country's "political and military willingness to use force". Regardless of India's actual strength and intent, if Pakistan believes that Indian policymakers do not have the stomach for obliterating Pakistan with a devastating "massive retaliation", the factor D, i.e. the deterrence value of the Indian arsenal again falls to zero.

That is why Israel has retaliated swiftly and overpoweringly to every provocation: pre-emptively smashing three Arab air forces in the Six Day War of 1967, rescuing hostages from an El Al airliner hijacked to Entebbe in 1976, pre-emptively destroying an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981, taking out Syrian anti-aircraft missile sites in the Bekaa Valley in the Lebanon War of 1982, avenging the killing of three Israeli civilians in 1985 with punitive air-strikes on the Tunis headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and striking and destroying a suspected nuclear facility in the Deir-ez-Zor region of Syria in 2007. Given Israel's willingness, even eagerness, to use pre-emptive or retaliatory force, its I-factor is extremely high, raising deterrence.

In contrast, New Delhi's forbearance pegs its I-factor close to zero. India's military was poised on the border for 10 months after Pakistani terrorists attacked India's parliament building in 2001, but New Delhi desisted from using force. Similar restraint was displayed after a terrorist squad sailed into Mumbai from Pakistan and killed 165 people in the infamous 26/11 attacks. New Delhi also shrank from retaliating against Pakistan in 1993; after 257 people were killed in serial bomb blasts in Mumbai; and in 2006, when a series of bombs in suburban trains in that city killed 187 Indian citizens. The last time India used force against Pakistan was in 1999, when troops from that country sought to change the border in Kargil.

Without passing judgment on such restraint - forbearance is often advisable - New Delhi's remarkable consistency in avoiding the use of force subtracts credibility from any Indian doctrine of massive retaliation. Pakistan's formal announcement of TNWs is a reminder for the Indian doctrine to incorporate flexible retaliation, which increases our planners' options, and complicates the opponents' calculations.

The Europe refugee crisis highlights how dominant industrial powers have singularly failed to live up to their promises

Skeletons in the cupboard

The Europe refugee crisis highlights how dominant industrial powers have singularly failed to live up to their promises and commitments on both political and economic fronts

Waves of refugees seeking shelter in Europe have enabled the hard right to capture power. On 18 October, Switzerland witnessed a rightward shift after the Swiss People’s Party registered major gains in the parliamentary elections. Avowedly right-wing parties, espousing anti-immigration policies, captured 101 of 200 seats in the Swiss lower house of parliament. The Alpine country, with over six million people, has been almost untouched by the exodus of refugees and economic migrants until now.

But the flood of images of hapless victims from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Africa queuing up at the borders of Austria and Germany helped the Schweizerische Volkspartei, or the Swiss People’s Party, increase its strength to 65—almost one-third of the Swiss lower house. The People’s Party made gains in the Swiss countryside by promising to pursue a strong asylum policy. The day-to-day business in the Swiss parliament is bound to be dominated by a mix of immigration and austerity policy initiatives.

Clearly, the emergence of the right in several European countries, with Poland being the latest to join the bandwagon, has more to do with the failed political and economic policies of the West. It is an open secret that the migrants seeking shelter in Europe are the innocent victims of the disastrous “shock-and-awe” policies pursued since 2001. “I apologize for some of the mistakes in planning and, certainly, our mistake in our understanding of what would happen once you removed the regime (in Iraq in 2001),” said Tony Blair, former British prime minister, in an interview to Fareed Zakaria on CNN on Sunday.

Because of the (former US president George) Bush-Blair policies, the world is paying a heavy price for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Several estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed as part of the collateral damage, along with soldiers. These wars have created a perpetual cycle of chaos and insecurity across the world. It is highly unlikely that both Bush and Blair will ever stand trial on war crime charges. Leading social critic Noam Chomsky has repeatedly called for trying both Bush and Blair for their war crimes under the Nuremberg principles.

With immigration policies among the hottest political issues in many industrial countries, new efforts to open labour markets might appear ill-advised. But Geneva-based International Organization for Migration (IOM) has highlighted substantial gains that would accrue from migration. Despite the growing paranoia in many countries, including India, about economic migrants from neighbouring countries, IOM said migrants will bring diverse skills to the economy. “Diversity arising from the presence of migrants is shown to increase productivity and be of benefit to urban areas, if strategically managed,” IOM argued in its latest report Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility.

“As in informal settlements, immigrants play a vital role in creating economically vibrant, competitive cities as they contribute to a dynamic labour force and spur economic growth,” the agency maintained. Immigrants, according to IOM, are more likely to start businesses and create jobs in their cities. The report said “immigrants have added $3.7 trillion to the housing wealth in the US”.

In Switzerland, the canton of Vaud has the highest proportion of foreign residents (32%), after the cantons of Geneva and Basel City (which headquarters leading pharmaceutical companies Roche and Novartis). While Switzerland is not a member of the European Union (EU), it is a signatory to the Schengen visa-free travel zone. Nevertheless, Switzerland has imposed immigration limits on EU citizens following a referendum last year. More importantly, the movement of capital across borders has witnessed the elimination of barriers on a war-footing since the early 1990s. The developing countries all along argued that their comparative advantage lay in the movement of skilled and semi-skilled short-term services providers such as doctors, IT professionals, engineers and architects. When the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations concluded in 1993, trade in services came under the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) scaffolding. Services trade was defined in the agreement as capable of supply from one World Trade Organization (WTO) member country to another (cross-border), by consumption overseas, by setting up commercial presence, and by the presence of “natural persons” in the territory of other WTO members.

The fourth possibility—generally referred to as “Mode 4” in trade terminology—can comprise the delivery of services like those of software professionals, architects or unskilled or semi-skilled labourers through temporary entry into another country. At the low-skill end of the spectrum, movement is related to labour shortages and wage differentials. At the other end, highly skilled managers or professionals can be required in relation, for instance, for commercial establishments where new entries to the market must ensure brand name compatibility.

While WTO members’ GATS schedules of commitments reveal varying levels of commitments under each of the modes of supply, the restrictions placed on “Mode 4”, for the temporary movement of personnel, are usually significantly more restrictive than those for the other three modes of supply.

There is a pronounced asymmetry between what the industrialized countries managed to secure for their movement of capital in “Mode 3”, relating to commercial presence, and what they were prepared to give under “Mode 4”. The failure to secure real labour access through “Mode 4” commitments stands out as an eyesore in globalization. Even the recent regional and bilateral trade initiatives, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, have offered close to zero benefits for “Mode 4” supply of services.

In a nutshell, on both political and economic fronts, the dominant industrial powers have singularly failed to live up to their promises and commitments. Whether it is the reform of the United Nations, the Kyoto Protocol of common but differential commitments to address climate change, the much-promised developmental dividends of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, and now the migrant crisis, they all point towards skeletons in the cupboard.

Fiscal discipline: now comes the hard part

Despite improvements in the recent period, deficits need further trimming

Macroeconomic conditions in India have improved a great deal since the second half of 2013, when the country narrowly avoided a ratings downgrade to junk after the so-called “taper tantrum”. The Indian rupee was in a free fall and the economy was stumbling towards a crisis thanks to economic mismanagement in the preceding few years. The three most important indicators of economic health were flashing red: inflation, current account deficit and fiscal deficit.

Much has improved since then. The current account deficit and inflation are now under control, and there has been a considerable improvement in the fiscal position, though the consolidated fiscal deficit of the Indian government is around five percentage points higher than the average of its emerging market peers. Yet, the policy establishment has had good reasons to hope for a ratings upgrade, which will improve India’s standing in the global financial markets.

However, Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, last week dismissed all such hopes, at least for now, citing the state of public finances as a key constraint for an upgrade.

While some enthusiasts in New Delhi may not agree, the reality is that despite improvements in the recent period, government deficits need further trimming, even as the task ahead will be made challenging by the prospect of higher salary and pension commitments. The one-time dividend from lower global energy prices has also been used; there is no similar windfall likely next year.

The coming Pay Commission recommendations will increase pressure on both central and state government finances. The government has accepted the One Rank One Pension scheme for the armed forces. Debt-laden state electricity boards will have to be rescued at some point in the near future, possibly by transferring part of the debt to the books of state governments (though that will not be a permanent solution to a persistent problem).

Further, the central government may have to infuse more equity in the public sector banks to help them deal with their bad loans, meet global regulatory requirements and enhance their lending capability.

The government also has to push capital expenditure to revive economic growth in the absence of investment activity in the private sector. And slower expansion in nominal gross domestic product essentially means that the denominator of the fiscal deficit and public debt ratios is growing at perhaps its slowest rate in a decade.

All these factors put together will make further fiscal consolidation a tough task—and will test the commitment of the finance ministry.

One way forward for the government is to aggressively push growth through reforms. Faster growth is the best way out. The second United Progressive Alliance government managed to follow a reckless fiscal policy yet keep the public debt burden under control by inflating away its debts.

What India needs as part of a sustainable fiscal correction is faster real growth, which will also help tax buoyancy.

One immediate policy option needs to be activated. As noted by the 13th Finance Commission, the government should use disinvestment to increase capital expenditure—a sort of asset swap. While the current government in New Delhi showed the intent to aggressively use the disinvestment option, and had set a praiseworthy target for the current year, the movement in the first half of the fiscal has been poor.

While many would disagree with the assessment of credit rating agencies, and their action (or lack of it) during and after the financial crisis has certainly not enhanced their credibility, it does not hurt to take their evaluation positively. It is indeed true that general government deficit in India has been on the higher side compared with its emerging-market peers and other middle-income countries.

Therefore, the necessary fiscal adjustment will not only be credit positive, but will also enhance India’s ability to absorb shocks emanating from global markets and create conditions for sustained higher growth in the medium to long run.

The political economy of welfare schemes

Governments that are interested in scaling up social security schemes prefer universal coverage

Social welfare schemes the world over are going through interesting times. Egged on by fiscal management targets, welfare cuts are routinely passed off as “reforms”. Subsequently, there is usually pressure on governments to target welfare to the most deserving. Determining who the deserving beneficiaries are and the appropriate value of these transfers is critical.

In a recent edition of the Pathways’ Perspectives, social policy specialist Stephen Kidd bats for universal social security schemes. His central argument is built around the political economy of targeting, suggesting that “inclusive social security schemes build political alliances between those living in poverty, those on middle incomes and the affluent”. Governments that are interested in scaling up social security schemes prefer universal coverage. The argument goes that this way, they build a wide coalition of interests that support their scheme and hope that this support translates into electoral endorsement. On the other hand, governments that are interested in scaling back social security schemes do so by first withdrawing from universal schemes and then introduce an element of targeting. Soon, those that do not benefit from the scheme are more likely to see it as wasteful public spending and therefore, support a move to cut back.

Theoretically, as a political economy argument, this makes a great deal of sense. The real test, therefore, is: this is a theory borne out by empirics? Here, Kidd offers us a variety of examples, ranging from 19th century Europe and modern-day United Kingdom to Mongolia and Uganda. These examples show how countries with more inclusive schemes display a higher commitment to financing social security, as demonstrated by higher levels of tax-financing for such schemes. For example, Nepal’s universal pension scheme spends about 0.5% of its GDP, which is significantly higher than that of its South Asian neighbours, India and Bangladesh, which only have poverty index-based pension coverage.

Kidd also provides examples of Chile, Bangladesh and the UK to show how poverty-targeting can lead to the exclusion of the poor from these schemes, either due to weak administrative capacity, or poorly administered eligibility criteria of poorly designed social security schemes. As opposed to this, universal schemes have not only the advantage of a straightforward beneficiary identification process, but can also be introduced as rights that citizens enjoy. There is also substantial evidence from across the world that for basic social security schemes such as old-age pension, universal coverage not only scores higher on equity, but is also administratively efficient and cost-effective.

Finally, with the example of Uganda’s successful universal Senior citizens’ Grant, Kidd illustrates how domestic political support (and finances) can be mobilised in favour of a universal social security scheme—the kind of support that is critical if development agencies supporting recipient governments are preparing for local ownership, scale-up and their eventual withdrawal.

While the political economy argument works, it also raises an interesting question: why would a democratically elected government ignore this rationale of expected electoral dividends? The answer lies in the specific nature of domestic electoral politics. But first an aside—from the country cases cited, I must point out that the likes of Uganda are hardly model democracies. There may be many other forces that contributed to the political economy conditions that led to the kind of decisions the governments in these countries took with regard to social security schemes, but electoral politics is unlikely to have been one of them. Social security schemes are as much about gaining legitimacy, as they are about promoting inclusive development. Even autocratic or semi-autocratic governments desire for a semblance of legitimacy.

Coming back to the nature of electoral politics, it is useful to examine how the specific conditions on the ground influence the design and roll-out of social security schemes in different countries.

Let’s take India, for instance—admittedly frustrating at times, as it does not conform to most general theories, but undeniably important since the country houses a large chunk of the global population that ranks poorly on various human development indices. Electoral politics in India is highly complex. A combination of identity-based politics, fragmented polity (numerous viable political parties) and the first-past-the-post system of elections creates conditions where narrow voting allegiances are cultivated through patronage dispensation. Therefore, determining ‘who’ benefits will always be controversial. Either aggregate data is plainly disputed by one or the other players in the system, or data takes a back-seat in the battle over identity-based entitlements. In regions where negotiations to corner a greater share of state resources play out as a zero-sum game, it is difficult to see political leaders pushing for universal benefits.

This is exacerbated by the existence of numerous viable political parties and the first-past-the-post electoral system which incentivises consolidating the votes of a core base of supporters rather than canvassing for a wider cross-cutting vote. Also, the fact that the poor turnout in higher numbers to vote also affects the thinking on these issues. Where a universal social security scheme might change the baseline conditions across an entire population, additional votes are likely to come from securing differentiated and attributable benefits for narrow constituencies.

More than the narrative around the pressure to manage the government’s fiscal deficit, perhaps that explains why governments in India are not committed to universal coverage of social security schemes? So long as political parties confine themselves to conventional politics, social security schemes will continue to be targeted, based on one or more criteria, rather than universal, even when faced with evidence to the contrary. It remains to be seen whether we will have a government that can push the boundaries of electoral politics, towards a politics of shared welfare through mobilisation that goes beyond conventional political allegiances.

The theme for the Vigilance Awareness this year is “Preventive Vigilance as a tool of Good Governance”.

The Vigilance Awareness Week is being celebrated from 26th October to 31st October, 2015. The theme for the Vigilance Awareness this year is “Preventive Vigilance as a tool of Good Governance”. The Commission has been laying stress on Preventive Vigilance and driving home the point that vigilance should not be seen in isolation but as a tool to achieve good governance and better operational results. The Vigilance Awareness Week is being celebrated every year and coincides with the birthday of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, known to be a man of high integrity.

A press meet was organized by the Central Vigilance Commission in New Delhi today. Addressing the media persons, the Central Vigilance Commissioner, Shri K.V. Chowdary said that more emphasis should be given to ‘preventive vigilance’ than the ‘punitive vigilance’. The systems and processes should be set in place so as to generate alarm in case of anything happening beyond the prescribed processes. He said that it is important to bring changes in the system so that we can prevent such misconducts.

Commenting upon the delays and pendency of cases, he said that areas need to be identified where delays have happened and appropriate action should be taken to streamline the procedures and SOPs about the dealing of applications, their criteria and other related matters. Explaining the scope of corruption, he said that corruption is not only about giving money, but it includes all actions where processes are being compromised. He said that now the Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) have been made to access the pendency of cases pertaining to their organizations through the website of the Commission, thus speeding up the disposal of cases and reduction in pendency. The Commission can keep a tab on the log of the CVOs.

The prime focus of the Commission is to curb the pendency of cases. The number of cases pending sanction for prosecution (more than 4 months old) were 28 as on 30-06-2015 which were reduced to 15 as on 31.08.2015, thus coming down to half within 2 months.

He said that the purpose of Vigilance Awareness Week is to generate awareness in the public at large about the bad effects of corruption. He informed that this year then CVC is giving lectures at school and college levels. This will take the message of preventive vigilance to the young minds and they will be in a position to influence the society at large, he added. He said that the training of the Officers of the Commission and CVOs is being organized within the country and abroad for improving their skills and efficiency. Commission has, as a part of its knowledge management exercise, initiated a program to invite one eminent person every month to address its officers and all CVOs (through video conferencing) on a topic related to vigilance and improvement of governance.

He said that road ahead for the Commission is to analyse the suggestions received by the Commission from CVOs and public at large.

The CVC also appealed to the media to spread awareness on this issue among the public at large. He said that the Commission receives many complaints from the public at large every year. The awareness should be generated among the public so that the complaint is addressed to the appropriate authority and the action can be taken faster.

Giving emphasis on preventive vigilance, Shri T M Bhasin, Vigilance Commissioner said that prevention is better than cure. He said that investigative vigilance takes time and it also affects the morale of the employees, so preventive vigilance should be given prominence over the investigative vigilance. He said that the theme of Vigilance Awareness Week is not for a week only, but it will be for the next one year and is a part of its regular and dynamic process.

The observance of Vigilance Awareness Week will begin with taking of pledge on 26th October, 2015 at 11:00 AM in all the Government, Public Sector Organizations, Autonomous Organizations and Local Bodies.

Besides the regular activities of display of banners, posters, advertisements in the Newspapers and organization of activities such as lecture, panel discussions, competitions in Government and Public Sector Organizations, the Commission this year is reaching out to college and school students in a big way. Debates/Elocution/Lectures are being organized in 135 cities/towns spread across the country. CVOs of 101 organizations are involved in organizing these competitions and each CVO has been assigned certain number of cities/towns with the instruction to organize these competitions in at least 3 colleges and 2 schools. It is expected that competitions would be organized in more than 2000 colleges and schools. Activities are being organized across India in cities including Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Pune, Vijayawada and Ahmedabad. The Hindi College, Lady Shri Ram College, St. Stephen’s College, IIT Delhi, JNU from Delhi; Anna University, SRM University from Chennai, NNIMS College from Mumbai, Birla Institute of Technology from Kolkata and Gujarat National Law University from Ahmedabad are among other educational institutions organizing activities during Vigilance Awareness Week.

Africa, the indispensable continent for India

Africa, the indispensable continent for India
The third India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in New Delhi this week, with over 40 African heads of governments and states attending, will be the biggest foreign policy event hosted by India in more than three decades. While this process was partly in response to initiatives by other emerging powers, particularly the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation launched in 2000, it was also a belated recognition that Africa was becoming an indispensable continent for India’s future—one that New Delhi can ignore at its own detriment.

Today, India and Africa matter to each other in at least four ways: First is the common historical experience of colonization and decolonization. Derived from that is the normative notion and principle of independent, sovereign states committed—at least in theory—to the liberal peace paradigm. This was evident in the historic soft power approach that promoted sovereignty, independence and support for the liberal model of development.

Second, following India’s economic liberalization from 1991 onwards, Africa has emerged and is likely to remain crucial for natural resources and developing markets. This is evident in the increasing trade, which in the past five years has grown six-fold to nearly $70 billion. India is now Africa’s fourth largest trading partner, though raw materials make up over 80% of Africa’s exports to India. Crude oil and gas have emerged as the leading exports to India, accounting for nearly two-thirds of all exports. The increase in India-Africa trade has also been a principal driver behind India’s evolving concept of development partnership cooperation and has been the key approach for engagement with Africa since 2003.

Third, Africa remains vital for India’s emergence as a global actor in the international institutional arena. Both India and Africa are keen to reform the existing global governance structures, especially the UN Security Council (UNSC), and shape the emerging global regimes, particularly those related to food, energy, climate, water, cyber and space. However, there are two challenges: first, neither India nor African nations have the capacity to shape these regimes on their own; they will have to work together. Second, on many issues, such as climate change, UNSC reform and UN peacekeeping, there are significant differences.

In case of UNSC reforms, for instance, the Ezulwini consensus adopted by African nations at the prodding of China effectively preserves the status quo and benefits only the existing five permanent members of the UNSC rather than either India or Africa’s interests.

Finally, there are security threats emerging from Africa that not only impact the African nations but also have a strong bearing on India. Terrorism and organized crime (including piracy) are of increasing concern to India and Africa. International terrorism has been on the rise in Africa in recent years extending from Nigeria in West Africa to Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Reports also claim that terrorist groups with linkages in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq have been using Africa as recruiting grounds for jihad. While India is not directly affected by the localized terrorist organizations in Africa, the troubling links between Somali and other groups such as the al Qaeda-affiliated al Shabab, and militant groups in the Af-Pak region could significantly affect India’s future security.

While the IAFS process is crucial to sustain the complex and multifaceted India-Africa relationship, this process alone may not be enough to strengthen the burgeoning relationship. That may require multiple and more frequent processes of engagement involving not only government-to-government interaction but also the private sector, state governments as well as civil society.