Getting to 'Digital India'

With the economic mood having swung in India's favour, partly by inspired effort and partly by the luck of falling prices for oil and commodities, how can we effectively capitalise on our disorderly yet undeniable potential? Asked by Prime Minister Narendra Modi last October what could be done to promote business in India, the chief executive of Siemens, Joe Kaeser, reportedly said: (a) prioritise, and (b) take one step at a time. Surely good advice, and not just for promoting business and growth.

There's a subtext in that terse advice that we and our governments would do well to deconstruct and internalise. And that is the underlying discipline, process orientation and order in the German work ethic that produces high quality. Other attributes such as thoroughness and being result-oriented come to mind, all of which would do us well, but an essential precondition is the discipline of meticulous, step-by-step process planning and execution for results.

In other words, there are explicit activity flows that extend from where one is to where one hopes to be, the desired ends, delineated in flowcharts that underlie integrated systems. After prioritising and goal-setting, it is these detailed steps that must be articulated before starting out on the first step. This applies to Digital India as much as to any other initiative, such as Swachh Bharat, or energy or transport development.

Where and how do we begin to prioritise? With a focus on productivity, because that may be the best way to escape the boom-to-seven-or-eight-per-cent-gag-on-inflation-bust cycle. To this end, if we can get more things right in infrastructure especially relating to communications to begin with, it will enable growth with less risk of asset bubbles and demand-driven inflation.

To materialise, improvement in communications will need to be in combination with some level of improvement in energy and transport/logistics, to the point where gains from communications are realised. This is likely to happen by improving the extent of realisation for efforts and inputs, through productivity gains from such areas as, for instance, online education, transactions and logistics tracking. In sectors such as healthcare or tourism, productivity could improve with online transactions relating to accommodation, transport and procedures/events. Obviously, there need to be satisfactory facilities and services available to users in these sectors, without which there will be few gains.

The reason for starting with communications is that returns on investment tend to accrue sooner and for a lower magnitude of investment than from other capital-intensive infrastructure such as energy or transport. In addition, this potential is enhanced by the likelihood of significant pay-offs from purely administrative and/or legal changes. This is possible because legacy developments in India in communications are such that the same assets and capital expenditure can result in greater delivery capability - capacity and throughput - from "simply" changing the administrative rules, that is, by framing enabling regulations.

A case in point is the opposition by the department of telecommunications (DoT) to 3G roaming. This kind of restriction results in a reduction in output from investment, because available capacity (that is, a readily usable service) is constrained. Is it likely that the DoT would intentionally deprive the economy of the productivity gains from roaming? Or is it more likely that the motivation to protect the position of the public sector companies, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL), and the fear of being accused of giveaways to operators after the accusations in the 2G spectrum scandal have hamstrung decision-making that would be more beneficial for the common good?

Constraints such as these seriously hamper the scope of Digital India, an initiative that would add hugely to productivity when India sorely needs greater enabling capacity for a larger number of young people. Yet high-speed internet, the first item in the Digital India vision statement , doesn't appear to be getting the step-by-step, detailed flowchart approach that will help get us there, despite the hoopla.

Consider the evidence:

• Our spectrum policies are unchanged, with the government expecting Rs 1 lakh crore from the coming auction. Our networks will be deprived of that investment, as they've been deprived of previous payments in spectrum auctions. One estimate is that the investments in networks and equipment, excluding spectrum, amount to $30 billion (Rs 1.8 lakh crore), while cumulative charges for spectrum also amount to the same
  Instead, if authorised operators were able to access broad swathes of spectrum on a pay-for-use basis as needed without ownership, imagine what it could do to increase investment in networks and services.
   
• A 2009 study by ABI Research estimated that operators could save $60 billion worldwide over the following five years from active infrastructure sharing. This assumed active sharing of the entire network, including the radio access networks (RAN) and spectrum. The estimate of incremental savings from active sharing over passive sharing was 40 per cent. If network sharing were adopted on common-carrier, pay-for-use principles, imagine how much more effective coverage in rural/less-populous areas could be, and how the payback potential would improve. A more recent article reinforces this finding, emphasising the benefits to tower companies as well as operators ("ActiveRAN sharing business models can bring benefits to towercos as well as operators"
   
• Digital India needs to have access to more spectrum at less cost to bridge the last mile, in addition to considering other innovative approaches such as cable and satellite technologies, and TV bands that can be used for broadband delivery of TV broadcasts as well as the internet.

In sum, we need the end-to-end connectivity planned and extended beyond the National Information Infrastructure concept down to household clusters and individual households, as well as to commercial and educational units and customer service centres. The regulations and methods that enable structures, organisations and procedures that could make this possible involving government agencies, public sector units, private operators and service providers need to be worked out to get the benefits of a fully Digital India.

The image and the man

I am told on good authority that far from taking a swipe at India, US President Barack Obama did Narendra Modi a favour by saying "every person has the right to practise his faith without any persecution, fear or discrimination." According to this version, if the prime minister didn't actually ask the president to warn Indians of the dangers of religious fanaticism, he encouraged him to do so. Modi may have felt it might compensate for what the Delhi archdiocese chancellor, Father Mathew Koyickal, has since called his "deafening silence on recurring targeted attacks on our places of worship."

Since any US president is to some extent the prisoner of Bible-thumping and human rights lobbies, Obama's team felt it would be unwise to sweep either their concerns or the rejection of Modi's visa applications for a decade under the carpet. American credibility demanded some reference that the president could then cite at home both to justify Washington's earlier visa refusal and to prove he hadn't sold out on principles that earnest-minded children of the Pilgrim Fathers hold dear.

Apparently, when he sought to whisper a word of caution in his host's ear, Modi turned round and said something like, "Why not say it aloud? Let everyone hear your views on the subject!" Obama obliged, possibly not realising that in discharging his own domestic obligation he was also pulling Modi's chestnuts out of the fire. Indian analysts and television anchors might in their ignorance fume over such seeming impertinence. Significantly, however, there wasn't even a squeak of comment - leave alone protest - from anyone in authority in the party or government.

For all his handsome majority and control of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) he has purged of potential critics, Modi, too, must be wary of his stalwarts. Part of the secret of his success is that he lives - nay thrives - more on perceptions than on verifiable facts. Very few people actually know the prime minister. But everyone nurses an image of the man. It's the image that inspires like and dislike.

Businessmen swear by him as the architect of growth, irrespective of tangible measures to increase GDP. The urban middle classes see him as the pioneer of civic welfare without noticing that in their eagerness to make the headlines, publicity-hungry amateurs in the Swachh Bharat crusade may leave behind more litter than they clear. Many Muslims in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan fear he is a committed foe.

Modi's relationship with religion compounds the paradox. He refuses to wear a Muslim cap and makes a big thing of worshipping Mother Ganga. But he won't oblige Hindutva champions by demolishing mosques and erecting temples to Rama. Yet, he dare not - certainly not on the eve of the Delhi elections - discipline rampaging bigots who desecrate churches, attack discos and dance halls, murder missionaries, rape nuns and force Muslims to convert. It was with their unspoken but powerful backing that he pulled off a coup and worsted BJP veterans who played by conventional rules and enjoyed the confidence even of people who didn't endorse their ideology.

This is where an obliging buddy like Obama comes in handy. As Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told the Carnegie Endowment last year when he was still India's ambassador, the India-US relationship has survived the romance of courtship and arrived, and that Indians and Americans are victims of their own success. Dizzy courtship yields to staid marital stability when partners take each other for granted. Modi's proud boasts on the Mann ki Baat programme and at Hyderabad House left listeners in no doubt he felt he was on terms of the utmost intimacy with the exalted guest whose first name he lovingly trotted out no fewer than 23 times. That being so, it would be only natural for the prime minister to explain his dilemma to Obama and explain that a few words of warning and reproof from him might not come amiss.

A Jawaharlal Nehru would have bristled indignantly at an American president's intervention. But, then, Nehru wouldn't have been so flattered at being matey with a Western leader, especially one who determinedly refused to reciprocate his aggressive familiarity. Nor could any Christian priest ever have said of Nehru, "We are sure he would not have been silent if temples were desecrated."

---

Leave aside the demeaning social one-upmanship, what matters is that a tocsin has been sounded. Modi's most ardent camp-followers now know they will be blamed if the Indo-US barque runs aground. Whether they will heed the warning is another matter

India’s tango with the great powers

Geopolitical and economic factors and the re-energised relationship between the U.S. and India are the drivers of change in the trilateral relationship between India, Russia and China. The cumulative impact of these two trends points to a new, emerging configuration of the triangular relationship

The latest trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China was held on shifting strategic sands. It would be no exaggeration to say that the triangular relationship between these countries is entering a new phase — one that differs significantly from the past. India’s ability to navigate this unfolding terrain will not only impinge on its relationships with Russia and China, but also on its wider, international objectives and choices.

The drivers of change in this trilateral relationship are primarily geopolitical and economic. The civil war in Ukraine shows no sign of abating, nor indeed does Russia’s involvement in the conflict. The resurgence of the fighting in eastern Ukraine has left the peace talks in tatters. And Russian support for the rebels has ensured that the Ukrainian forces cannot gain the upper hand. Indeed, the Ukrainians have suffered heavily in the recent fighting. This has led to a chorus of calls in the West to arm the Ukrainian forces. Although U.S. President Barack Obama has demurred against this, several influential voices — including Mr. Obama’s nominee for Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter — have come out in favour of providing heavy weapons to Ukraine.

Any such move will lead Russian President Vladimir Putin to dig in his heels still deeper. Russia already faces a raft of economic sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) and the U.S. The Russian economy is apparently wilting under the one-two punch of these sanctions and the free-fall in oil prices. The projected slowdown in growth, the depleting foreign exchange reserves, the rising inflation, the downgrading of Russia’s credit rating to junk status: all point to a serious economic crunch. The economic sanctions have already led Russia to tilt closer towards China. The talk of providing weapons to Ukraine or imposing further sanctions will accentuate this shift.

The second driver of change is the re-energised relationship between the U.S. and India. The U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision put out during Mr. Obama’s visit not only singles out the South China Sea dispute but also commits India and the U.S. to work together with other democracies in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. The wisdom of issuing such a statement is debatable. Are we staking our credibility before creating capabilities? Does it needlessly restrict our room for diplomatic manoeuvre in the event of a crisis in the South China Sea? New Delhi insists that a strategic embrace of the U.S. need not limit its relations with China. While this may be true in some generic sense, we should not forget that every move on the chessboard of international politics will invite countermoves. We do not yet live in a world that is free of consequences.

India-Russia relationship

The cumulative impact of these two trends points to a new, emerging configuration of the triangular relationship between India, Russia and China. Going forward, Russia-China ties might become the strongest side of the triangle. From India’s standpoint, this is historically unprecedented. New Delhi’s strategic ties with Moscow first took shape in the late 1950s. The backcloth to the blossoming of this relationship was provided by India’s deteriorating relationship with China owing to the disputed boundary. At the same time, ideological and strategic ties between Moscow and Beijing were coming apart. Although the Russians played an ambivalent role during the war of 1962, Indo-Soviet ties, especially in defence, continued to tighten.

The clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces in 1969 led Moscow to propose a treaty of friendship with India. The treaty was eventually consummated at the height of the Bangladesh crisis of 1971. This crisis also saw the American opening towards Maoist China, which subsequently led to a strategic nexus aimed at the Soviet Union. While New Delhi and Moscow were pulled together by their shared concerns about Beijing, India found its choices being circumscribed in other areas as well. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, India publicly supported the Russians, while the Americans and the Chinese covertly assisted Pakistan and the Mujahideen against the Red Army.

By the time the Cold War drew to an end, there was a rapprochement between Russia and China. The collapse of the Soviet Union also led India to look more towards the West. Yet, at no point, was there a possibility of a Russia-China entente of the kind that is now crystallising. Nor did the normalisation of the Russia-China relationship outweigh Indo-Russian ties. Most importantly, the developing relationship between Moscow and Beijing did not impact on New Delhi’s immediate interests.

All this appears to be changing. In June 2014, Russia announced the lifting of its long-standing embargo on arms sales to Pakistan. In November, Russia and Pakistan signed their first ever military cooperation agreement. The Russians argue that if India can buy defence equipment from the U.S., why couldn’t they sell to Pakistan. The problem for India, of course, is the strategic import of such moves by Russia. Then again, we must realise that our growing proximity to the U.S. reduces our leverage over Russia. As does Russia’s increasing tilt towards China. As always, a bit of history can be useful.

“Russia-China ties might become the strongest side of the triangle. From India’s standpoint, this is historically unprecedented.”

Back in the 1960s, the Russians first mooted the idea of selling military equipment to Pakistan. The Indian response was swift and sharp. In a meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi bluntly said that “nothing should be done from which it could be inferred that the Soviet Union treated India at par with Pakistan.” India, she added, was “especially worried with regard to Soviet help [to Pakistan], as such help might neutralise what we have obtained from the Soviet Union.” Moscow promptly backed off. The Russians did so because they needed Indian support in their own problems with China. Moreover, India — unlike Pakistan — was not an American ally.

Security architecture

The strategic picture now is rather different. Discussions in the recent trilateral meeting underscored the complexities that will confront India. The joint statement issued in Beijing makes the usual noises about the desirability of a multipolar world. Yet, several points need to be unpacked. The statement calls for a security architecture in Asia that must be “open, inclusive, indivisible and transparent”. The use of “indivisible” is interesting. This refers to the American “pivot” and attempts at rallying its allies. By contrast, the India-U.S. statement supports — at least rhetorically — the U.S.-led efforts. The Chinese and Russians have clearly taken note.

Things would be easy for India if it confronted stark choices between the U.S. and China. Consider the position taken by the three countries on climate change. The statement hopes that in 2015, a legally-binding instrument would be arrived at on the basis of “equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” This fits with India’s negotiating position so far. But the fact is that the U.S. and China have already agreed upon a plan that effectively carves out an exceptional space for themselves and leaves little for countries like India to work with. This is a nice example of the “G2” solutions for which India will have to watch out.

Another instance of this might be in international trade. The joint statement affirms that the World Trade Organization (WTO) must remain the “preeminent global forum trade”. This reflects their concern about U.S. efforts to create new regional trading blocs in Europe and Asia. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negotiated by the Obama administration aims to bring into force a very different kind of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in Asia-Pacific, which will bring on to the trade agenda a new set of norms and standards. The Chinese have been explicitly kept out of it by the Americans — in the hope that China will eventually have to come to terms with this trade agenda. Indeed, as the TPP negotiations near completion, the Chinese have informally conveyed to the U.S. their desire to get on board. As in climate change, a U.S.-China convergence on this issue will hurt Indian interests.

Then again, there are issues where the three countries’ interests seem closely aligned — and in opposition to the U.S. They have agreed to support a U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) resolution prohibiting intervention and “forced regime change”. This cuts against the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was introduced by the western powers through the UNGA and sought to be built up as a norm governing interventions.

India’s relations with the great powers, then, are entering a period of unprecedented complexity. There are no pat solutions or simple trade-offs. And every move we make will be consequential.

Focus on implementing policy

This is the final year for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were set for the period 1990-2015, and as clear indications are available on what can be achieved by the end of the period, a stocktaking can be undertaken. A UN report has done just that, and a mixed picture emerges. Targets in achievement have been exceeded in some areas, while they have not been in others. The targets themselves in some areas have been modest, so that achieving them fully or substantially should not raise the comfort level unduly. An enormous amount of work still remains to be done in terms of achieving minimum levels of development and policy should be geared to that. For example, the target of halving the number of people without sanitation will be almost achieved - but according to 2011-12 figures, 44 per cent of people were still without access to proper toilets.

The report card for the first goal, eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, is positive. The target of halving the proportion of people earning less than $1 a day has already been achieved. The concurrent goal of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger (measured by the prevalence of under-three underweight children) will miss the target, but only slightly. The second goal of reaching primary education to all will be substantially achieved as will be the survival ratio (those entering class I reaching class V) by looking at the enrolment figures, but all know by now, this is a poor indicator of how much of the reading and writing skills children actually acquire. The achievement in promoting the third goal of gender equality will be substantial - but that's thanks to targets being exceeded by three indicators (proportion of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education). In real terms, India will be a laggard - look at the proportion of women able to take up non-agricultural wage employment, with only 19 per cent being in that position in 2011-12.

When it comes to the fourth goal - of reducing child mortality - there is a real need to sit up and take notice. The targets of reducing by two-thirds the under-one and under-five mortality ratio, and those without measles immunisation, will all be missed by sizeable margins. It is in the area of maternal mortality, where also India's record has been poor, that the picture will be mixed and not wholly negative. The target of reducing by three-quarters the maternal mortality rate will be exceeded, but the achievement in raising the proportion of births attended by skilled personnel will be less than 80 per cent of the target.

The goal to reduce India's disease burden by combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases looks like being achieved - trends are positive. Similarly, the target for reducing the proportion of those without access to safe drinking water by half will be more than achieved through 90 per cent coverage. It is likely that in most fields - barring perhaps education and gender-based employment - more or less the right policies are in place. It is now a question of last-mile implementation.

Shifting global axis

The Chinese economy is slowing down, Russia's is tanking.Europe can't seem to get out of its debt and currency crisis, and Japan can't seem to get growth going. Brazil is troubled by more than lower oil prices, while in Europe it is not just Greece and Spain that are the problem. Italy's economy has shrunk every year for the last five years, and has enormous debt weighing down its future. The US economy has been the only bright spot in recent months, while Indian gross domestic product (GDP) numbers have just done a rope trick. Where is the world economy headed, especially when the central banks of the largest economies are serially pumping out enormous amounts of cash in a desperate effort to get growth going?

It helps to look at medium-term trends, over five years since the financial crisis of 2008 (international data comparisons are available only till 2013). Among the great developed economies of the world, the United States has grown, Japan has been stagnant and the European Union's GDP has shrunk. Between the three of them, overall GDP has expanded by barely three per cent in these five years. Indeed if you take the six largest economies of Europe, every one of them has seen GDP shrink (Germany only marginally so).

The BRICS economies offer a sharp contrast to this trend. Chinese GDP has doubled, and India's has grown more than 50 per cent. Brazil and Russia have grown, too, but more modestly. When all four BRICS economies are taken together, they grew 60 per cent in this period. Barring accidents, the combined BRICS GDP may become bigger than America's in a couple of years. Five years ago, they were less than two-thirds of the US economy.

The swing from the developed economies to the emerging markets is a broader trend, not confined to BRICS. Seven smaller emerging economies - like Indonesia and Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Argentina - saw their combined GDP grow by close to 40 per cent during this period. Most of them matched India's five-year growth, while Indonesia and Nigeria did even better. Indeed when you look at the African economies, they have had some of the best growth records of this period. Africa was the fastest growing continent in 2013, and a third of the sub-Saharan economies have been growing faster than six per cent.

It goes without saying that country rankings have changed. India was ranked 12th among the large economies in 2008, and moved up to 10th by 2013, overtaking Canada and Spain. In 2015 it could well be eighth, overtaking troubled Russia and shrinking Italy. Brazil meanwhile has moved up from 10th to seventh, and China has moved from third to second, while Russia has remained where it was, in ninth place. Canada and Spain have now dropped out of the top 10. This is not to suggest that no wealthy, trillion-dollar economy is doing well. Canada, Australia and South Korea have all grown in these five years. Nevertheless, the shift in momentum towards the emerging markets is undeniable.

If one were to look ahead to the next five years, these trends are almost certain to continue, despite China slowing down and Russia losing its way in a haze of tough-state nationalism. India's growth prospects have improved, and Indonesia (which recently overtook Turkey's economy in size) could join the trillion-dollar club before too long. The original BRICS countries should have been less politically correct when they included South Africa in their grouping and added Indonesia instead, even if that meant three Asian members and no African representation. With South Korea and Australia the two best-performing rich countries, there is little doubt that the swing towards Asia is even more marked than the rise of the emerging economies as a whole.

India, China and an opportunity

Keeping up the momentum in India-China relations, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj came back from her three-day visit to China with several deliverables — including a new Chinese openness in seeing India take up permanent membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Previously, the Chinese had linked SCO membership with a greater role for Beijing in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Ms. Swaraj, during her first visit to China as External Affairs Minister, built on the three meetings Prime Minister Narendra Modi has had with Chinese President Xi Jinping. She also called on the Chinese President, a rare opportunity for any visiting Foreign Minister. Clearance for the early operationalisation of a new route to Kailash Mansarovar and a decision to hold a session of talks between the Special Representatives tasked by the two sides to resolve the boundary dispute, are other takeaways. Her trip was also part of preparations for Mr. Modi’s visit later in the year. As reported in the Chinese media, President Xi himself has set the agenda for taking bilateral ties to a new level by suggesting that the two countries seize the “opportunity of the century” by combining their development strategies. With a slowing economy and sluggish European recovery, China may be focussing on the Indian market. It also appears willing to invest, following Prime Minister Modi’s “Make in India” call.

It is in such a scenario of contact and consultation that “strong leaders” such as Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi can think about making some hard decisions when it comes to the decades-old boundary dispute that keeps surfacing during major bilateral visits. So far, the coalition nature of Indian governments has been seen as a major obstacle to the give-and-take, compromise approach on the border question. Today, Mr. Modi is in the happy situation where he can take a political call on issues, rising above intra-coalition pressures. In 2005, the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question signed by the two countries had raised hopes for an eventual settlement, but those have been belied. It would also seem that President Barack Obama’s successful visit to India around Republic Day has not dampened Beijing’s willingness to take relations with Delhi to the next level. Interestingly, India while talking to the U.S. and its other allies in the Asia-Pacific about safety in the sea-lanes, has agreed to set up a “consultation mechanism” on Asia-Pacific affairs with China and Russia. India’s diplomatic success lies in keeping several balls in the air at the same time

Essay2/2015

write an essay in 1000-1200 word .


Three dimensions of sustainability – economic, ecological and social. sustainable policies and idea of maximum  welfare are twin solution for future sustainability.