Teaching in tongues

The politics of language in India is often a farce; the pedagogy of language, on the other hand, is often a tragedy. So much energy is expended in an overstylised homogenisation-versus-diversity debate that we actually pay very little attention to the pedagogical failures that form the backdrop of this farcical politics. In terms of imagining a complex political relationship between languages, India is a triumph. But that triumph is not matched by the imaginative teaching of language. This failure is at many levels. The learning outcomes at the level of school education, as documented by ASER reports, are very poor. But its political implications are that there will be a large section of nominally educated Indians who will feel excluded from access to knowledge structures. Rather than blaming a poor education system as such, which often seems to fail to teach in any language, it is likely that this group will be permanently available for mobilisation against a language “Other.”

Some might think this fear is far-fetched, particularly since there is a massive turn to English anyway. States with pronounced vernacular nationalisms, like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, have also turned to English at earlier grades; and the poor seem to be voting with their feet for English. But the pedagogic effects of this are decidedly mixed. As Karthik Muralidharan’s brilliant empirical work has shown, it appears that from the point of view of learning outcomes, switching mediums seems to make students worse off. As he puts it, “switching medium of instruction may hurt accumulation of content knowledge”.

In Andhra Pradesh, according to this study, switching to English-medium private schools led to improvement in learning English, but also to worse scores in subjects like maths. To be clear, these results are suggestive. But switching mediums seems to be a real problem, exacerbated by the fact that English learning is hard to reinforce at home in most languages. But the larger point is this: so much energy has been expended in celebrating this turn to English as a kind of acknowledgment of modern politics, an iconic turn to a new cosmopolitanism, unfettered by the past, that very little attention has been paid to pedagogic effects. Language choice has been so consumed by a politics of identity that we cannot even get a proper cognitive debate on language going.

Think of other ways in which politics trumps pedagogy. You want to the see the real scandal of India’s political language compromise?Most students in India do at least three or four years of a third language, but the net retained learning outcome in that language, with some exceptions, is roughly zero. Three years is a long time to pick up a language, but no one has asked the question of why the formula is leading to such low linguistic competence outcomes in the third language. We can bemoan the loss of Sanskrit in north India. But this is not because it did not find adequate place in the school curriculum, in north India at least. In fact, quite the opposite. If you want to kill a language, make it a third language in an Indian school.

Think of how politics has trumped pedagogy at every stage of language teaching. First, there is a peculiar choice we have forced on students that access to good English often requires going to an English medium school; the distinction between learning a language and committing to it as a medium of instruction is often lost. There is very little pedagogical imagination. Because of linguistic politics, the emphasis in teaching has been more on differentiation than on finding commonalities. Learning a language has, paradoxically, been seen more as creating a barrier than building a bridge. The divide is very palpable, for example, in the pedagogic evolution of Hindi and Urdu; modern Hindi teachers in Delhi’s most progressive schools take expunging “Urdu” words to absurd lengths. But a little more imagination could bridge other divides: a little teaching of one or two more scripts for example, could make a Hindi speaker more functional in at least a couple of other regional languages. Two different stalwarts of Hindi literature, Shivani and Hazari Prasad Dwivedi, could find a home more easily in Shantiniketan than in Benares, in a way that now seems unimaginable. But the obstacles to a more polyglot linguistic imagination are not pedagogical, they are political.

Nowhere have political concerns more damaged language pedagogy than in Hindi. This is true in three respects. First, the Hindi-speaking region is the only region where there is a genuine social divide over language. In all the other regions, elites are not embarrassed by their identification with the regional language. No Bengali runs away from Bengali as a mark of social distinction in the way in which elites in north India, at some point, get embarrassed by Hindi. A lot of the politics of Hindi imposition is not directed against other regions; it is more a product of the fact that the Hindi-speaking region is subject to a peculiar politics of ressentiment, in a way no other region experiences.

Second, pedagogic choices in Hindi have been constricted by identity and purity concerns, not the growth of the language. It is not an accident, therefore, that this is one language in which modern disciplines have grown the least, at least compared to Malayalam or Bengali. No wonder even Hindi papers source so much editorial content from English writing. And third, if you want to seewhat is wrong with Hindi, just see the typical CBSE or ICSE syllabus. It is not clear, first of all, whether this syllabus was designed to excite kids about the possibilities of the language or whether it was designed by a group of morose social reformers who thought the Hindi syllabus was occasion to be earnest, boring and identify all the ills of Indian society. Its earnest paternalism and infantilism is in stark contrast to most children’s social worlds and is a permanent turn off from the language. No language has been damaged as much as Hindi has been damaged by its intellectual custodians.

India was truly innovative in not following the identification of language and nation-state that bedevilled Europe. On the other hand, in the ensuing politics, pedagogy has been given short shrift. Therefore, we waste so much of our children’s efforts, we constrict their choices, create false conflicts and ultimately damage language in the name of preserving it. The politics of Hindi is not driven by a desire to impose; it is driven by a larger learning and social failure.

NASA reschedules launch of carbon dioxide monitoring satellite

American space agency NASA is all set to launch a satellite designed to study atmospheric carbon dioxide on Wednesday, after it cancelled the lift off in the final minute of the countdown on Tuesday.

NASA said the countdown stopped at 46 seconds because of the failure of the launch pad water suppression system and added that the launch team has completed troubleshooting the snag. A valve that is part of the pulse suppression water system had failed to function properly during the final minutes of the launch on Monday, the space agency said.

“The failed valve has been replaced with a spare, and the system is being tested in preparation for Wednesday’s launch attempt,” it said.

The satellite named Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2), which would be launched aboard a Delta II rocket, will produce the most detailed picture of natural sources of carbon dioxide, as well as their “sinks” – places on Earth’s surface where carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere, the space agency said in a statement.

“The observatory will study how these sources and sinks are distributed around the globe and how they change over time,” NASA said.

The Planning Commission, in practice,for ias mains

As speculation mounts by the day that the Modi government is thinking of winding up the Planning Commission, this is an opportune moment to reflect on the relevance of the institution in the context of a rapidly changing Indian economy and society.

One way of classifying institutions is in terms of the balance between their potential positive power (PPP) and potential negative power (PNP). Potential positive power may be broadly understood to mean the capacity and power to enforce or facilitate positive change that would hasten the achievement of national goals. Potential negative power, on the other hand, refers to the capacity or power to obstruct, delay or derail positive reform, in cases where such reform threatens entrenched vested interests, status quo or business as usual. The exercise of PNP is often a ruse to foster corrupt practices, but it can also be an exercise of wanton power for its own sake, reflecting a perverse sense of power-induced pleasure.

The two institutions with perhaps the highest quotient of both PPP and PNP in the government of India are the Planning Commission and the ministry of finance. In my five years in the Planning Commission, I saw many instances of PNP and how this became a source of great resentment against the Planning Commission, both among state governments and Central ministries. Of course, at times, the Planning Commission acted with sagacity in checking profligacy of funds and schemes. But there were many cases where in-principle approvals, investment clearances, grants-in-aid and other decisions appeared to smack of bureaucratic red tape more than an application of mind motivated by the broader national interest and effectiveness of functioning. There were also visible vestiges of the old Stalinist command and control, inspector raj mindset.

But it is also true that in these five years I saw innumerable instances of the exercise of positive power. I believe there are at least five broad areas in which the Planning Commission played an extremely positive role: one, pioneering an inclusive planning process; two, facilitating and mainstreaming reform, especially emphasising the principle of subsidiarity, recognising the deep diversity of India; three, co-ordinating across, if not breaking down silos; four, being the spokesperson of the states at the Centre; and five, arbitrating disputes by taking a more long-term and holistic view of issues.

The 12th Plan process saw a completely unprecedented architecture of plan formulation. For the first time in the history of the Planning Commission, the 12 working groups on water, rural development and panchayati raj were chaired by eminent experts from outside government and included the best minds and practitioners from across Central and state governments, academia, research institutions, industry, civil society, and panchayati raj institutions. It was clearly recognised that all wisdom does not reside within government and that the best plans, programmes and policies could be made only with the active involvement of those outside government. This wasnot mere tokenism in the name of participation. Final decisions were made by these inclusive working groups. For me, the true indicator of the success of this process was that even though none of the players involved were fully happy with the final outcome, something truly pathbreaking was achieved. This only reflected the spirit of compromise that is a hallmark of good governance, as a hard-fought consensus was thrashed out among the members and the chair and co-chair, who was in each case the seniormost official of the concerned department.

The result was a series of landmark proposals that constitute a paradigm shift in water management in India, including the first-ever National Aquifer Management Programme, a new approach to incentivise de-bureaucratisation of large irrigation projects and irrigation management transfer to increase water use efficiency, a new integrated approach to rural drinking water and sanitation, a proposal to regularly audit the industrial water footprint, a new approach to flood management, a scheme to empower gram panchayats, a radically reformed MGNREGA, etc, each of which drew upon best practices pioneered by the states, who have always led the reform process in our country.

At the request of the chief minister of Punjab, I chaired a high-level expert group on waterlogging in Punjab. The group, consisting of the nation’s best experts on the subject, conducted a thorough investigation of the problem in close partnership with the state government and came out with a package of solutions, which was generously supported by the government of India. When the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh went on a fast, raising a series of legitimate grievances of the state with the Centre, the prime minister asked me, as member in-charge of Madhya Pradesh, to work with all concerned Central ministries to hammer out an amicable solution, which was done in record time, to the satisfaction of the aggrieved CM. Similar roles were played by other members in other contexts, which illustrate how the PC can be an effective mediator and problem-solver for states, rather than their tormentor.

My aim in the Planning Commission was to be a support available 24×7 to dynamic officers in the states to showcase their best practices and help mainstream these across the length and breadth of the country. I attempted to do this with the Jyotigram separation of power feeders scheme in Gujarat, the participatory irrigation reforms of Andhra Pradesh, the water regulator of Maharashtra and many others. My hope is that whatever the Modi government decides will only give greater strength and momentum to this positive role of the Planning Commission, in whatever shape and form

Panchsheel 2014

Last week’s celebrations in Beijing, marking the 60th anniversary of the Panchsheel proclamations, from Delhi’s perspective, might have looked like a ritual that had to be performed. For China, though, the occasion was about mobilising regional political support, including from India, for a new security framework that President Xi Jinping has been promoting with some vigour.

As it rises to become a great power, China is determined to reconstitute Asian geopolitics, which had been dominated by the United States since the end of World War II. Central to Xi’s argument is the proposition that the US security role in Asia is a manifestation of outmoded Cold War thinking. He is suggesting that American alliances must be replaced by a new regional security order.]

Xi has affirmed that “in the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation.” Heady stuff indeed. This kind of rhetoric has not been heard in Asia for decades.

The Panchsheel is at the very heart of Xi’s conception of a new security order for Asia. The five principles were outlined by Zhou Enlai in separate joint statements with Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma’s U Nu in 1954. These principles — respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence — were later expanded at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. The first summit of the non-aligned nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961 endorsed these principles.

Last week in Beijing, Xi argued that “it is no coincidence that the five principles of peaceful coexistence were born in Asia, because they embody the Asian tradition of loving peace”. Xi went on to add that, thanks to the contributions made by China, India and Myanmar, “these principles are accepted in other parts of Asia and the world”. For some, Xi’s attempt to recalibrate Panchsheel for its contemporary foreign policy needs might seem empty rhetoric at worst or political romanticism at best. A more careful look, however, would suggest China is dead serious.

The idea of “Asia for Asians” is of old provenance and has a record of repeated failures. Way back in 1940, imperial Japan called for a “bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western Powers”. If Tokyo’s call found some political resonance among those Asians yoked to the European empires, Japan’s own colonial ambitions exposed the limitations

of the slogan “Asia for Asians”. In fact, nationalist China, British India and the US pooled their resources to defeat Japanese imperialism.

In the immediate post-war period, the idea of “Asia for Asians” gathered much momentum after Nehru convened the Asian Relations Conference in early 1947. Yet the impact of the Cold War and new nationalisms in Asia undermined the hopes for Asian unity. As it normalised relations with the US in the 1970s, Beijing toned down its campaign against the American military presence in Asia. It believed American alliances in Asia would counter “Soviet hegemonism” and prevent the revival of “Japanese militarism”.

China now appears confident that an America in decline has opened the door for the construction of a new security order in Asia. Xi’s vigorous pursuit of “Asia for Asians”, however, has run into some political resistance. China’s expanding military clout and its assertiveness in territorial disputes are driving some of its neighbours into a tighter embrace with the US. Although Xi has repeatedly sought to give reassurance that China’s rise is peaceful and Beijing will never exercise hegemony, few Asians are willing to take it at face value.

In a controversial move this week, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to re-interpret Japan’s peace constitution. After being a passive partner in the military alliance with the US all these decades, Tokyo is seeking a more active military role in shaping its security environment. Communist Vietnam, which fought a bitter war against the US in the 1960s and 1970s, has rapidly expanded its security cooperation with Washington. The Philippines, which threw American military forces out of the country in the early 1990s, is restoring the American presence and deepening defence ties with Japan.

If Beijing is trying to undermine American alliances in Asia, its neighbours are trying to strengthen them. How does India respond to this unfolding contestation in Asia? On the face of it, a non-aligned India should oppose all alliances and support collective security proposals seemingly in tune with Delhi’s “idealist” tradition. Yet, India’s foreign policy record speaks otherwise.

After its conflict with China in 1962, India turned first to the US and then the Soviet Union to balance Beijing. Despite its embrace of Moscow, Delhi rejected the proposals for collective security that emanated from Russia’s Leonid Brezhnev (1969) and Mikhail Gorbachev (1986). Put simply, non-aligned India was not averse to playing balance of power politics when compelled by external circumstances.

As an increasingly powerful China seeks to reorder Asia, Delhi must firmly locate China’s Panchsheel campaign in a clinical assessment of Asia’s rapidly evolving geopolitics and its consequences for Indian security. China is doing what rising powers, including the US, have done before — frame one’s national interests in universal terms, push other major powers out of one’s immediate vicinity and replace the old regional order with a new one. Beijing is undoubtedly following a well-trodden path in international politics. But Delhi appears a long way from developing an appropriate strategy to cope with Asia’s new power play

For a better MGNREGA,for ias mains

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) has a significant influence on agricultural operations and cultivation costs. If its present focus on community works can be reoriented to proactively promote improvements on the landholdings of small and marginal farmers through the creation of durable assets, it will be beneficial for agricultural productivity and incomes.

Critics say that the MGNREGS draws labour away from agricultural operations and hikes up costs through increased wages. They hold that leakages and corruption have vitiated rural work culture and the assets generated do not justify the huge expenditure (budget outlay of Rs 33,000 crore in 2013-14). Supporters see a model of inclusive development, creating durable assets. The scheme is credited for mitigating distress migration, improving household food security, enhancing the bargaining power of rural labour, generating “green employment” and fostering climate-resilient agriculture.

The linkage of the MGNREGS with agriculture is in-built in the legislation. Permissible works include land development and soil conservation, water harvesting, irrigation provisioning, drought proofing, horticulture, tree-plantation and afforestation. Works under the MGNREGS can be taken up on both community and private lands. Small and marginal farmers, SC/ST and Indira Awaas Yojana beneficiaries are eligible for taking up works on their own lands.

Some people think durable assets mean only brick and mortar structures. But a different school of thought recognises that a rejuvenated and replenished natural resource base — land, water, biodiversity — is an even more valuable asset. For the lives and livelihoods of millions of small holder farmers, pastoralists, forest dwellers, herders and fisher folk depend upon the productive capacity of these natural resources.

The thrust of the MGNREGS in the past eight years has been to open up works on community lands. The proportion, last year, of works taken up on private lands was a mere 11 per cent. This needs to be raised to at least 50 per cent. The impetus to agriculture will be triggered when there is greater asset creation on individual farms. Such a shift in emphasis would incentivise small holders to take up works leading to restoration and revitalisation of their own farmland, higher productivity and consequently more agricultural employment. Landless unskilled labour could benefit from the additional employment generated from small farms and also continue to supplement their income from the MGNREGS, albeit on a lesser scale.

The productive value of small landholdings could be enhanced further with material and technical inputs from effective convergence with other ongoing agricultural development programmes such as the National Food Security Mission, the horticulture mission, Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana, the National Rural Livelihoods Mission and the National Agroforestry Policy. A study on the creation of assets on the lands of small and marginal farmers, SC/ST and Indira Awaas Yojana beneficiaries in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha,Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh has revealed that almost half the households studied that sought employment under the MGNREGS and on whose land work was undertaken, did not come back to work on the MGNREGS the following year. This suggests that an increase in cultivable land, irrigation and cropping intensity on private farmlands generated additional agricultural employment to keep them gainfully occupied on their own farms. This needs to be studied in greater detail.

Studies conducted by the Indian Institute of Science and other international institutions and NGOs find that: a portion of MGNREGS wages is ploughed into the cropland through purchased farm inputs; investments are made in small ruminants, poultry and pigs; there has been a shift towards diversified, high value and more remunerative crops from traditional staples; credit worthiness for agricultural loans has improved; and the premise of the MGNREGS crowding out other forms of employment is not sustained.

Empirical evidence also points towards a rise in water availability and the area under irrigated crop production from making water structures; a shift in cultivation pattern from mono-cropping to two-three crops a year; improvement in soil quality and increase in soil organic carbon, leading to improved fertility and crop yields; and a decline in the livelihood vulnerability index of households.

If the MGNREGS works on private land are to gain momentum for creation of durable assets, some clear work areas emerge.

One, dug wells, farm ponds, recharge structures and irrigation channels help improve productivity and efficiency of water use. Value enhancement of dug wells occurs when the farmer acquires a water-lifting device through convergence with other programmes. Madhya Pradesh, with the highest percentage of works on individual land, has emphasised the creation of irrigation potential.

Two, soil in farmers’ fields is the basic material asset. Centuries of use and abuse has led to erosion, degradation and depletion of this finite and fragile resource. Replenished and restored soil fertility needs to be recognised as a durable asset under the MGNREGS. Protocols will need to be developed to quantify and document soil fertility improvement before and after the interventions. The concept has within it the nucleus of a “land-care movement”, which could be spurred by convergence with the sustainable agriculture mission.

Three, trees on farms are durable assets and need to be scientifically and rigorously promoted for their products — fruit, fodder, fuel, fibre, fertiliser and timber contribute to food and nutritional security, income generation and insurance against crop failure. Services provided by trees include nutrient recycling, carbon storage, biodiversity preservation, resilient cropping environments, prevention of deforestation, and enabling agricultural land to withstand extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts, and climate change. MGNREGS convergence has been factored into the National Agroforestry Policy notified earlier this year. ]

Four, promoting asset creation on small holdings requires simpler methods of measurement and validation due to individual farmers finding it difficult to maintain records designed for large-scale community works, for example, elaborate muster rolls. An exemplar is the earlier Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme. This standardised the labour payment to bemade to farmers working on their own lands, which was based on measurable farm output. Such practices contributed significantly to the state’s horticulture revolution.

Five, the door should remain open for out-of-the-box initiatives. For instance, linking the MGNREGS with the system of rice intensification (SRI), a technology practice known to increase yields while affecting significant savings in water use, seed and agrochemicals. SRI is labour intensive and lends itself to the prospect of including SRI as a permissible item under MGNREGS.

NASA, Boeing to develop most powerful rocket for Mars

NASA and Boeing have inked a $2.8 billion deal to develop a giant rocket which is set to be the largest and most powerful ever built, paving the way for manned missions to Mars.

Boeing has finalised a contract with NASA to develop the core stage of the Space Launch System (SLS), the most powerful rocket ever built.

In addition, Boeing has been tasked to study the SLS Exploration Upper Stage, which will further expand mission range and payload capabilities.

The agreement comes as NASA and the Boeing team complete the Critical Design Review (CDR) on the core stage — the last major review before full production begins.

“Our teams have dedicated themselves to ensuring that the SLS — the largest ever — will be built safely, affordably and on time,” Virginia Barnes, Boeing SLS vice president and programme manager said in a statement.

“We are passionate about NASA’s mission to explore deep space. It’s a very personal mission, as well as a national mandate,” said Ms. Barnes.

During the CDR, which began last month, experts examined and confirmed the final design of the rocket’s cryogenic stages that will hold liquefied hydrogen and oxygen.

This milestone marks NASA’s first CDR on a deep-space human exploration launch vehicle since 1961, when the Saturn V rocket underwent a similar design review as the U.S. sought to land an astronaut on the Moon.

Scheduled for its initial test flight in 2017, the SLS is designed to be flexible and evolvable to meet a variety of crew and cargo mission needs.

The initial flight-test configuration will provide a 77-tonne capacity, and the final evolved two-stage configuration will provide a lift capability of more than 143 tonnes.

Centring the Northeast

The Northeast needs a skilful person who can take the region out of its insurgency grip, mobilise leaders of substance and work out a decentralised multi-level development strategy

A vibrant Northeast? This is not Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s catch-all phrase for the seven northeastern States, though the region does figure in his list of priorities for economic rejuvenation, and strategic and infrastructural development.

I am not sure if General V.K. Singh’s choice as MoS (independent charge) for the development of the Northeast is right, even though he is knowledgeable about the region. He has the reputation of being straight-forward and a doer, but only in the realm of defence so far. The Northeast today needs a skilful politico-economic person who can take the region out of its insurgency grip, mobilise leaders of substance and work out a decentralised multi-level development strategy aimed at fostering the region’s growth.

The Look East Policy

The land-locked region continues to be stuck in politico-bureaucratic status quo, even after Prime Minister Narasimha Rao placed it under special focus as part of the Look East Policy in 1991. This has since become an integral part of India’s foreign policy rhetoric, which has already travelled from phase one to phase two under various Prime Ministers without addressing basic infrastructure and all-inclusive growth.

Each Prime Minister has reiterated the country’s commitment to take the Look East Policy forward, but this has been done somewhat half-heartedly in view of strategic and logistical problems emanating from sporadic bursts of violence by terrorist and insurgent groups operating on both sides of the border. Today, the situation on the insurgency front is somewhat easier, especially along the Myanmar and Bangladesh borders. Still, “caution” has to be the mantra.

The northeastern States account for about 8 per cent of the country’s geographical area. They share less than 2 per cent of their borders with other Indian States and share 98 per cent with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and the Tibetan region (of China). The challenge is to convert this location disadvantage into an opportunity. This can be done by opening up the seven-State gateway to more than millions of ASEAN consumers for trade, commerce and education. The Northeast requires proactive, bold policies. People are alienated because of lopsided economic growth stemming from a Delhi-centric approach to issues. The leaders in Delhi ought to understand the changing lives of the tribals who have adopted modern values, fashions and modes of living, and frame policies accordingly.

The Northeast can be rejuvenated by making the region a focal point for growth. Removing the Restricted Area Permit and Inner Line Permit would help to integrate the region with the rest of India. However, amid numerous misgivings about the existing institutional mechanism, what is reassuring is the concern among central and regional authorities and intellectuals about the future of the region and the alienation of its people.

This concern was expressed in an international conference organised by Chandigarh’s Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development in Shillong on June 6-7 in collaboration with the North-Eastern Hill University. The Shillong conclave had a number of prominent persons and experts drawn from different disciplines and nationalities to deliberate on India’s Northeast and southeast Asia. This initiative had the support of the External Affairs Ministry since it has stakes in opening up the region to Southeast Asia. While there was an overwhelming view in favour of preserving the distinct identity of northeastern people, there was also regret that the bureaucracy “has been indifferent to understanding tribal communities” since its stress “is on mainstreaming of culture.” A healthy economy, innovative tourism-oriented packaging of rich tribal heritage, and projecting modern facets of society are the keys to solving this problem. The success of Nagaland’s Hornbill Festival is one example of how the region can add to India’s cultural richness.

The Northeast has higher standards of living and literacy, but it also has an unbalanced economy and suffers from a terrible industrial sickness. Except Meghalaya, all the States in the region face a power shortage, despite the fact that the Northeast has a huge reserve of hydroelectric potential (30,000 to 40,000 MW). Power apart, the region needs special efforts for the development of world-class infrastructural network of roads and railways, for strengthening the telecom sector, healthcare services, and tapping into the agricultural industry and the region’s rich biodiversity. It can also emerge as a hub for higher education for the entire Southeast Asian belt.

There has also been concern over the involvement of non-regional entrepreneurs. We need to examine ways and means of creating a unified common market of nearly 40 million people which will provide a big boost to the economy of the region. We also have to ensure a massive investment flow for infrastructural development on both sides of the border in order to improve connectivity for trade and commerce. This will help the emergence of local entrepreneurs. As it is, the Delhi-Hanoi rail link, trilateral highway project between India, Myanmar and Thailand, and some other initiatives have got bogged down by red tapism and a lack of political will.

I would like to draw from the study of a northeast magazine that spoke of regional entrepreneurship. It said: “India needs entrepreneurs for two reasons — to capitalise on new opportunities and to create wealth and new jobs.” Compared to the rest of India, the level of start-ups in the Northeast “is much lower” because of “major bottlenecks and barriers to entrepreneurship like know-how, finance, administrative burden and cultural and social factors.” A few professionals, who tried to start initiatives on their own, did not get support, but this is changing.

Bridging the gulf

At the human level, there exists a big gulf between people from the hills and people from the plains. This has resulted in creating a trust deficit. Recent ugly incidents in Delhi have only reaffirmed the distance that separates the Northeast from mainstream India. Promoting understanding at the human level apart, it is also essential to bridge the chasm in the areas of communication, information and culture. We have to provide people from the Northeast opportunities as well as honour, dignity and equality. The North-East Region Vision 2020 document states: “It is in Northeast India that Southeast Asia begins and as such, it is for the Northeast to play the arrow-head role in the further evolution of this policy. This requires a redefining of the ‘Look East Policy’ to resolve outstanding issues of trade, transit and investment with countries neighbouring the region. It also involves promoting Indian investment infrastructure in partner countries, especially Myanmar, particularly in respect of ports such as Sittwe and international highways to connect the Northeast Region with ASEAN.”

In the long run, the Northeast, as an expert put it, can become a partner in “a wider Brahmaputra-Yangtze-Mekong quadrant.” Let us hope for the best. Over to Prime Minister Modi.