Empowerment without well-being

Caste-based political parties failed to secure a victory as they continued to use the politics of difference as an end rather than as a means to graduate to the politics of redistribution

First generation leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and eminent modernist Indian sociologists expected that the institution of caste will dissolve under the spell of modernity. However, social realities proved to be far more complex and caste continued to reinvent itself, changing its form but not content and influencing much of socio-economic life. This debate has taken a new turn with the recent decisive electoral victory of the Bhartiya Janata Party under the leadership of Narendra Modi.

Caste-based political parties in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, who had galvanised the Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) towards a democratic revolution, experienced their worst electoral defeat. Election surveys conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies inform that the BJP not only drew massive support from its traditional constituency — upper castes and trading communities — but also attracted a critical number of Dalits and OBCs. One in four Dalits voted for the BJP. The Muslim vote did not make any impact because either their votes got divided between ‘secular’ parties or the addition of their votes to the non-BJP parties was not sufficient in a first-past-the-post system. The shift of a section of Dalits and OBCs towards the BJP was small, but very critical for the party to emerge victorious. It is also significant because ideologically the BJP believes in carving out an organic unity between different Hindu social groups and preserving social hierarchy between different castes. Why did this section of Dalits and OBCs vote for an ideologically incompatible political formation at the expense of parties that had laboured hard for their political empowerment?

Caste-based parties in U.P. and Bihar represent Dalits, OBCs and Muslims. Dalits and OBCs share an antagonistic relationship, but we are clubbing them to highlight a few analytical points that we believe explain the current electoral failure of caste-based political parties.

Political powerlessness

Caste-based parties acquired their political and electoral strength by opposing the ‘politics of equal recognition.’ Politics of equal recognition promised equal rights and equality between citizens. It was rejected by Dalits and OBCs in favour of the ‘politics of difference.’ The politics of equal recognition was seen as being ‘difference blind’ and attesting one hegemonic culture whereas the politics of difference recognised the particularities of each social group and the non-assimilation of group identity. The politics of difference practised by political parties drawing their support from the Dalits and OBCs gave them huge political dividends for almost two decades. However, the politics of difference, argues Nancy Fraser, is not sufficient and has to be complimented by the ‘politics of redistribution’, that is, policy initiatives for redistributing income, reorganising the division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision-making and transforming other basic economic structures. This is where caste-based political parties failed and they continued to use the politics of difference as an end rather than as a means to graduate to the politics of redistribution. Dalits and OBCs are caught between political assertion and belief in the domain of culture and electoral politics, and a sense of disappointment that their socio-political empowerment did not translate into economic well-being. This disappointment provided the BJP the space to craft a ‘politics around disillusionment’, which feeds on the collective estrangement of social groups from their original political choices due to their prevailing economic conditions. It is shaped by two inter-related elements: political rudderlessness and political powerlessness.

Political rudderlessness implies a deficit of political vision and acumen in caste-based political parties for ushering in fundamental change. Caste-based political parties eked out opportunistic political alliances to acquire political power and compromised on the emancipatory potential embedded in their original political vision. This not only disillusioned Dalits and OBCs but also led them to experience a certain kind of political powerlessness.

Political powerlessness develops when social groups seem to know the appropriate action for achieving their political goals, but are ineffective in practice. The failure of caste-based politics and political parties to usher in what Fraser calls ‘transformative recognition [politics of difference] and redistribution’ translated into a critical section of Dalits and OBCs shifting their political allegiance to an ideologically contradictory political formation upholding social hierarchy — the BJP — in a classic case of political powerlessness.

Reinventing vision

What does this entail for the future of caste-based parties? Caste-based parties have still not lost their core support. They need to reinvent their vision and demonstrate a road map for implementing a transformative politics of recognition/difference and redistribution. The former is already in play. However, what is lacking is a genuine politics of redistribution. One framework for operationalising the politics of redistribution is to politically support the principle of economic citizenship — a thesis put forth by Barbara Harriss-White and her colleagues in the context of India’s market society in which the informal sector contributes 60 and 93 per cent of the GDP and employment respectively. A majority of Dalits and OBCs toil in this sector as casual workers or are self-employed, earning a bare minimum and are denied any social security benefits. Thus, beyond the state, markets are the major providers of employment and livelihood opportunities. However, markets while rewarding cannot guarantee employment or ensure distributive justice. Instead, markets can generate oppressive wage conditions, displace labour, discriminate and adversely include ‘less privileged’ social groups.

The state alone can set the parameters for economic participation, including taking responsibility for the limits of its own control and for the conditions under which political citizens are economically active. Unless the Indian state sets a framework of rights where each able citizen is able to participate in the market and earn, the politics around disillusionment will continue to persist, albeit taking newer forms and content.

The politics of redistribution is not only crucial for caste-based parties but also for the BJP, if it has to consolidate the impressive electoral gains that it has made in the current election.

(Aseem Prakash is associate professor and Suraj Gogoi is research associate at the

PM inaugurates Uri-II hydroelectric project

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Friday inaugurated the 240-Megawatt Uri-II Hydro Electric Project (HEP) located near the Line of Control (LoC) in Baramulla district of Kashmir.

The Prime Minister dedicated the power project to the nation in presence of Jammu and Kashmir Governor N.N. Vohra, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and top officials of National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC).

This is the second power project on the Jhelum river in Uri area and is located downstream of 480-MW Uri-I HEP, which is already operational.

The Uri-II HEP has a concrete gravity dam which is 52-metre high and 157-metre long with four spillways of nine metres each.

The 4.23 km head race tunnel carries water from the dam to the powerhouse, which has four units of 60 MW each designed to generate 1,124 million units of electricity in a year.

The work on the power project was completed in time despite a massive earthquake striking the area on October 8, 2005 — two weeks after Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) started work on it.

“Overcoming challenges has always been a speciality of our engineers. We triumphed over every obstacle posed by difficult geographical conditions and freezing temperatures,” Chief Operating Officer of HCC Ambuj Jain said.

Plastic waste costs $13 billion worth of damages a year to marine ecosystems

Every year plastic waste costs marine ecosystems $13 billion in damages, says a report released recently by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The estimated 10-20 million tonnes of plastic waste that finds its way into oceans, smothers coral reefs, routinely entangles marine wildlife, and more insidiously, degrades into ‘microplastics’ that transfer toxins into the food chain.

Microplastics (or plastic particles of 5mm diameter or less) are ingested by creatures ranging from sea birds to mussels, said marine biologist and UNEP chief scientist Jacqueline McGlade at a press conference at the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) in Nairobi.

Microplastics form “plastispheres” that harbour thriving communities of dangerous microbes and also absorb and transfer heavy metals such as mercury across vast distances through the ocean.

The report titled ‘Valuing Plastic’ presents a “business case” for plastic-intensive companies, and recommends that companies monitor plastic use, disclose their results and increase resource efficiency and recycling.

Plastic toys, athletic goods, and household durable goods sectors use the largest amount of plastic in their products while food companies, soft drinks and the pharmaceutical industry are the biggest users of plastic in their packaging.

A growing source of microplastics is the cosmetic and personal care industry that has introduced plastic particles of 5mm diameter or less in products such as toothpastes and showergels, says the report.

Asia faces the highest environmental costs from plastic pollution because of the higher pollution intensity levels of manufacturing and a lack of adequate waste management facilities.

“Companies must consider their plastic footprint just as they do their carbon footprint,” said Andrew Russell, director of Plastic Disclosure Project that was part of the research.

However, consumer goods companies have a poor track record of disclosing their plastic use, the report finds. Of 100 companies assessed, less than half reported any data relevant to plastic.

Zoonotic diseases ignored in developing world

Decades of neglect have allowed infectious diseases to devastate the lives of thousands of people in the developing world, a new study has revealed. Researchers say three diseases in particular — anthrax, brucellosis and bovine tuberculosis — have failed to receive the official recognition and funding needed to combat them effectively. All three impact greatly on human and animal health in developing nations, posing a major threat to safe and plentiful food supplies.

The disorders — known as zoonotic diseases — are spread between animals and humans, and are common in societies where poverty is widespread, and where people depend on animals for their livelihood. A researcher at the University of Edinburgh reviewed every meeting of the World Health Organization’s decision-making body since its formation in 1948, to conclude that zoonotic diseases were almost totally ignored.

Their findings reveal that the diseases have been neglected because they mostly arise in developing countries. Scientists say the diseases have been eliminated or brought under control in more developed countries, as simple and effective controls are available.

The resolutions from all 66 World Health Assembly meetings held between 1948 and 2013 were examined to determine how many contain a specific focus on any of the following neglected zoonotic diseases as defined by the WHO — anthrax, bovine tuberculosis, Taenia solium cycticercosis, cystic echinococcosis, leishmaniasis rabies, and human African trypanosomiasis (HAT or sleeping sickness). Twenty one resolutions adopted in all the 16 assemblies between 1948 and 2013 targeted one or more of these diseases, representing 4 per cent of the total resolutions on infectious diseases passed up to now. The 2013 adoption of Resolution WHA66.12 targeting all 17 neglected tropical diseases marked a change in approach by the WHA. Earlier resolutions targeted each disease individually.

Poor healthcare infrastructure in affected countries can often mean that thousands of sufferers are left un-diagnosed. This presents huge challenges to health professionals, policy makers and researchers in their efforts to combat the diseases

Findings from the study, funded by the European Commission, are published in the journal PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases.

Professor Sue Welburn, Director of the University of Edinburgh’s Global Health Academy, who led the study, said: “It is extraordinary that in the 21st century we are failing to manage brucellosis and the other neglected zoonotic diseases that impact so severely on rural communities in developing economies when, for many of these diseases, the tools to manage them are well developed.’’

Chikungunya, dengue, Avian influenza, plague, SARS and acute encephalitis syndrome (AES) are some of the zoonotic diseases that have and continue to take a heavy toll of human life in India. Japanese encephalitis and AES kills hundreds of children in the eastern parts of the country every year and results in high morbidity. Reports of deaths due to Chikungunya, dengue and highly infectious Congo Haemorrhagic Fever are also not uncommon in the country, particularly during monsoon.

Salmonella, mycobacterium, E.coli and Brucellosis are some commonly found bacteria in India which cause highly infectious diseases like cholera and are often transmitted through unhygienic food and impure drinking water.

The big deal about the Army’s small arms

Even deciding on a multi-purpose tool, akin to a Swiss knife, for example, has been delayed despite trials in 2011 featuring European and American vendors.

Shortly after taking over as the Chief of Army Staff in May 2012, General Bikram Singh had emphatically declared that upgrading the small arms profile of his force was his foremost priority.

Two years later, as Gen. Singh prepares to retire in end July, neither the 5.56mm close quarter battle (CQB) carbines nor the multi-calibre assault rifles he promised are anywhere in sight for the Army’s 359 infantry units and over 100 Special Forces and counter-insurgency battalions, including the Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles.

The Army’s prevailing operational reality is that it does not own a carbine as the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) ceased manufacture of all variants of the WWII 9mm carbines, including ammunition, around 2010.

And, two years later, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally endorsed the Army’s persistent complaints regarding the inefficiency of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-designed INdian Small Arms System (INSAS) 5.56x39mm assault rifles. It agreed that they needed replacing.

The former Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, was forced into admitting in Parliament in late 2012 that the INSAS rifles had been overtaken by “technological development” — a euphemism for a poorly designed weapon system which the Army grudgingly began employing in the late 1990s and, unceasingly, had complained about ever since.

Among largest arms programmes

The Army’s immediate requirement is for around 1,60,080 CQB carbines and over 2,20,000 assault rifles that it aims on meeting through a combination of imports and licensed-manufacture by the OFB. Ultimately, the paramilitaries and special commando units of respective State police forces too will employ either or both weapon systems in what will possibly be one of the world’s largest small arms programmes worth $7-$8 billion.

Gen. Singh’s guarantees, however, remain delusional and, expectedly unaccountable. And, in time-honoured Indian Army tradition, they will now be transferred to his successor, the Army Chief-designate, Lieutenant Gen. Dalbir Singh Suhag, to vindicate.

An optimistic time frame in inking the import of 44,618 carbines, which have been undergoing an unending series of trials since August 2012, is another 12-18 months away if not beyond. The deadline to acquire assault rifles, trials for which are scheduled to begin in August, is even longer — certainly not before 2016-17, if not later.

Till then, the Army faces a fait accompli of making do without carbines, a basic infantry weapon. It will also have to make do with inefficient INSAS assault rifles, another indispensable small arm for the force’s largest fighting arm.

Currently, three overseas vendors are undergoing “confirmatory” trials at defence establishments and weapon testing facilities in Dehradun, Kanpur, Mhow and Pune with their CQB carbines. The November 2011 tender for CQB carbines also includes the import of 33.6 million rounds of ammunition.

Competing rivals include Italy’s Baretta, fielding its ARX-160 model, Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) with its Galil ACE carbine and the U.S. Colt featuring the M4. The U.S. subsidiary of Swiss gunmaker Sig Sauer, which was originally part of the tender with its 516 Patrol Rifle, has failed to turn up at the ongoing carbine trials.

Sig is under investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on charges of alleged corruption in potentially supplying its wares to the Indian paramilitaries. Alleged arms dealer, Abhishek Verma and his Romanian wife, Anca Neacsu — both are in Tihar jail — once represented Sig’s operations in India.

Inefficiencies

The carbine trials, expected to conclude by mid-July, will be followed by a final report by the Army, grading the vendors on the performance of their systems. Thereafter, the MoD will open their respective commercial bids, submitted over two years earlier and begin price negotiations with the lowest qualified bidder — or L1 — before inking the deal.

According to insiders associated with the project, this intricate process is almost certain to be protracted, despite the inordinately high expectations of efficiency from the Narendra Modi government. They believe the carbine contract is unlikely to be sealed within the current financial year. However, once signed, weapon and ammunition deliveries are to be concluded within 18 months alongside the transfer of technology to the OFB to licence build the designated carbine.

In short, no Army unit will be equipped with a carbine till well into 2016.

The saga of the assault rifles is even starker.

A multi-service internal review in 2012 of the INSAS assault rifles revealed that they were made from four different kinds of metal, an amalgam almost guaranteed to impair their functioning in the extreme climates of Siachen and Rajasthan.

Surprisingly, the Indian Air Force was the most vociferous in castigating the DRDO over as many as 53 operational inefficiencies in the rifle that the country’s prime weapons development agency took nearly two decades to develop and at great cost.

Inexplicably, the DRDO insisted on the OFB developing the SS-109 round, an extended variant of the SS-109 NATO-standard cartridge for 5.56x39mm rifles aimed at achieving marginally longer range, a capability unnecessary for such a weapon system. This operational superfluity delayed the INSAS programme as it required the import of specialised and expensive German machinery and necessitated the “stop gap” import of millions of ammunition rounds from Israel.

The DRDO-designed and OFB-built rifle also cost several times more than AK-47 assault rifles of which around 100,000 were imported from Bulgaria in the early 1990s for less than $100 each as an “interim” measure at a time when the Kashmiri insurgency was its most virulent and Islamist militants better armed than Army troopers.

The MoD issued the tender for 66,000 5.56mm multi-calibre assault rifles in November 2011 to 43 overseas vendors, five of who responded early the following year.

The competing rifles, required to weigh no more than 3.6kg and to convert readily from 5.56x45mm to 7.62x39mm merely by switching the barrel and magazine for employment in counter-insurgency or conventional roles, include the Czech Republic’s CZ 805 BREN model, IWI’s ACE 1, Baretta’s ARX 160, Colt’s Combat Rifle and Sig Sauer’s SG551. The latter’s participation, however, remains uncertain. A transfer of technology to the OFB to locally build the selected rifle is part of the tender.

Meanwhile, field trials for the rifles are scheduled for early August, nearly 30 months after bids were submitted, as that is the extended time period it surprisingly takes the Army to conduct a paper evaluation of five systems.

But these too have already run into easily avoidable problems.

On security grounds, the rifle vendors are objecting to the Army’s choice of its firing range at Kleeth in the Akhnoor sector hugging the Line of Control (LoC) as the venue for the initial round of trials. A final decision on this is awaited. Thereafter, other trials will follow in diverse weather conditions in Leh, Rajasthan and high humidity areas, all regions where the assault rifles will eventually be employed.

Transforming the soldier

Acquiring these modular, multi-calibre suite of small arms is just part of the Army’s long-delayed Future-Infantry Soldier As a System (F-INSAS) programme envisaged in 2005, but interminably delayed.

The F-INSAS aims at deploying a fully networked infantry in varied terrain and in all-weather conditions with enhanced firepower and mobility for the digitised battlefield. It seeks to transform the infantry soldier into a self-contained fighting machine to enable him to operate across the entire spectrum of war, including nuclear and low intensity conflict, in a network-centric environment.

But senior military officers concede this programme stands delayed by six to seven years almost exclusively because of the Army’s inability in formulating qualitative requirements (QR) to acquire many of these ambitious capabilities.

Even deciding on a multi-purpose tool, akin to a Swiss knife, for example, has been delayed despite trials in 2011 featuring European and American vendors. Officers associated with F-INSAS said this, like other equipment acquisitions, was due to the Army’s rigid procedures, inefficiencies and inability to take timely decisions.

The Army continually blames the MoD for creating bureaucratic hurdles in its modernisation efforts, but fails in acknowledging its own shortcomings in drawing up realistic QRs, conducting timely trials and, above all, realistically determining its operational needs and working towards them economically.

Senior officers privately concede that the “uniforms” are largely responsible for the lack of modernisation, but manage to successfully deflect their own limitations sideways onto the MoD.

Gen. Singh’s tenure, like several other chiefs before him, exemplifies this. It is highlighted by their collective inability to even incrementally upgrade the Army’s war waging capacity be it night fighting capability for its armour fleet, modern artillery, light utility and attack helicopters or infantry combat vehicles, among others.

Controlling rising prices

Both macro policies like monetary tightening by the RBI as well as commodity-specific measures implemented by the government have to be used to deal with inflation

Onion prices more than doubled in the last two weeks and retail food inflation rose to 9.5 per cent in May as against 8.64 per cent in April, giving the new government more reason to worry. As the urban working class bears the brunt of the rising and fluctuating food prices, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley quickly announced measures to stem the price rise of onions. These included fixing a minimum export price (MEP) of U.S. $500 per MT, distributing onions through the Public Distribution System, and advising State governments to delist fruits and vegetable from the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act.

As much as these short-run measures are necessary, the problem is more deep-rooted. Several interrelated determinants such as low agricultural productivity and yield, global price changes, scarcity of resources such as land and water, domestic price policies such as Minimum Support Prices, and stocking and trade policies (both international and domestic) have played a role in the increase of prices.

With increase in income there has been a decline in intake of wheat and rice, but an increase in demand for foods of high value such as milk, fruits and vegetables, meat, egg and fish. The increase in income has been generalised with MNREGA substantially increasing rural wages. Also, supply constraints such as lack of proper storage and warehouse facilities, which have resulted in post-harvest losses to the tune of 30-60 per cent, have amplified the effects on prices, especially of perishable items. This is quite stark given the mammoth stocking of food grains, especially in light of changing preferences away from cereals. In the case of grains, the extravagant stocking policy works at cross purposes with limited movement of grains in the market.

A long-term view

Food price inflation in India clearly underscores the need for understanding the heterogeneities across food commodities. This knowledge could be important to inform macroeconomic policy. For example, the assumption in standard macroeconomic models — that changes in relative prices of food and fuel represent supply shocks — may not hold for many commodities as we see them right now. Further, with a persistent upward trend in inflation, taking a long-term view rather than focusing only on recent inflation episodes seems imperative. In all this, one thing that is reasonably clear is that it may not be sufficient to identify the sources for high prices at a broad level. Both macro policies like monetary tightening by the RBI as well as commodity-specific measures implemented by different branches of the government (trade policies and domestic interventions in food markets) have to be used to deal with inflation. The questions to ask are: Why have interest rate policies not been as effective as intended? Is food demand interest rate sensitive? Do food prices lead to generalised price changes leading to inflation as macroeconomists know it? Overall, combining both macro as well as micro perspectives may be crucial to design policies to rein in inflation. Inflation in India demands the need for a Jaitley-Rajan fellowship.

Remedial options

Faced with the current scenario, what are the remedial options? For one there seems to be little reason to not liquidate excessive wheat and rice stocks. In distributing released stocks, the government should think about an incentive overhaul along the lines of what was done in Chhattisgarh. The small State is a leading example of a well-functioning PDS system where leakages have been checked because of measures like colour coding of transport vehicles and raising the commission of PDS shopkeepers. Over time, there must be a gradual movement toward a cash transfer system. This depends on development of backend facilities such as bank outlets.

In food items with a high value, a case- by-case approach is needed. While onions could be facing a problem of excessive hoarding due to expectations of inflation, in commodities like milk the cost push might be playing a role. Dairy products such as oil cake and molasses are increasingly being diverted to alternative uses or markets. Milk has been the prime driver of inflation for many years and though its demand has been rising substantially (different estimates show that it is the food item with the highest income elasticity), there are supply side issues that need to explored for finding the right policy mix.

Given the current government’s paradigm of accepting short-term pains to incur long-term gains, it should seize this opportunity of high food prices. Investing in the private sector in cold chain or processing units needs to be encouraged. This will create rural jobs that are not farm-related, and create more efficient value chains, giving a better deal to farmers and consumers alike. Over the long run, streamlining wholesale markets under Agricultural Produce Market Committees, reducing limitations on private-sector procurement and storage, and checking on double taxation in interstate movement, need to be considered.

Finally, as a weak monsoon is being predicted, we must think of the long run. It is about time we gear up toward climate-smart agriculture (drought-resistant crops, conservation agriculture, etc.) to increase yields and income of farmers. This will increase farmers’ productivity while providing the much-needed price stability to consumers. The promise of acche din for consumers and the agricultural industry need not be a far cry.

Strategy for CSAT Preparation for IAS-2015,Samveg IAS DEHRADUN

                    Strategy for CSAT Preparation for IAS -2015

There are two category of students ,one who are very confident and have conceptual clarity in basic numeracy and analytical reasoning ( Really donot require any practice ,score in range of 160-190 in CSAT Paper),second those who even after lot of practice are not able to solve the questions related with math and reasoning.they know the formula but still doubt whether it is correct or not that shows their lack of practice and conceptual clarity.

For second category candidate,CSAT IS BIG  CHALLENGE,in the sense, failure to solve simple question has cumulative effect on  reading comprehension and decision making.They feel devastated because of  math and reasoning.

What is way out to over come this common problem? it can be managed by some planning and practice.

such candidate should attempt CSAT paper in following order.

1)Decision Making Question (simplest,no nagative marking,requires basic approach to life,integrity,initiatives,etc. )

2) English comprehension (not for hindi medium ,they should attempt it in last)

3) Reading Comprehension (only small para(200-300),with high accuracy,donot try to solve big para  at this moment)

4) Simple Reasoning question based on syllogism,satatement and conclusion/assumption,direction test,blood relation etc)

5) Simple basic numeracy question ( try to identify simple question)

6)Reading Comprehension (big para,with confidence that you have attempted sufficient question.it is not necessary that you have to answer all question.even if you do not understand one out of three question,do not bother,solve two question first)

7) Try to solve all real tough question of reasoning,math .

Note: No strategy is required for those who are strong enough in csat but strategy is all important to those  you are struggling to come over phobia of csat and to appear in mains exam.Order can be changed as per your expertise.they is no watertight division.

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