India’s credible offer on climate change
India has sent a strong signal by announcing efforts to curb climate change
ndia has done well to send a strong signal that it will actively join global efforts to contain climate change despite its other development goals that require an increase in energy use.
In its voluntary commitment submitted ahead of the international negotiations on climate change in Paris, India has said it will, by 2030, seek to cut the emissions intensity of its gross domestic product by around a third, increase the share of non-fossil fuel based installed electricity capacity to 40% and create an additional carbon sink to absorb 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by increasing forest cover.
Since the current share of the non-fossil fuel electricity capacity is already 30%, the target of 40% appears very much achievable. The more ambitious, and perhaps unrealistic, goals had been announced soon after Narendra Modi came to power—to reach 100 gigawatts (GW) of solar power and 60GW of wind power by 2022. Two facts will put these targets in perspective. One, India’s current solar and wind installed capacity are about 4GW and 24GW, respectively. Two, Germany, the world leader in solar power, has a much more subdued goal—it aims to achieve 66GW of solar power by 2030.
Such aggressive framing of targets helps in a couple of ways. One, they help assert India’s seriousness in addressing a global crisis which it has done little to bring about. Second, such high targets are a clear signaling instrument to attract firms which can invest in India’s renewable energy. India will need the partnership, finance and technology of the private sector if it has to reach anywhere close to its declared targets. Global giants like SoftBank and Foxconn have come together with Bharti Enterprises to invest as much as $20 billion in solar projects in India. Many global green energy firms want to make hay while the sun shines in India, quite literally. All such enthusiasm notwithstanding, the targets are a tad too high to be met on the back of public subsidy in the absence of a clear market-based model.
The more important question is whether India should commit itself to such high targets. The burden of fighting climate change should primarily fall on developed countries not just because they are responsible for it in first place but also because they are equipped with the wherewithal—the finance and technology—to deal with the problem much more adequately. India has therefore, justifiably, insisted on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and transfer of capital and technology to meet its goal. Even holding India to the standards of China’s commitments is unfair. But pressure is invariably put on India immediately after China—the world’s biggest polluter—announces any significant domestic milestone. With China’s announcements, which have been widely appreciated, its emissions intensity will exceed India’s by about two-thirds in 2030. It is clear that India’s peak emissions intensity will never be close to what China or developed countries have been culpable of.
All the heat and fury of target-setting notwithstanding, little can be achieved without a coherent set of policy and financial instruments. China has announced a clear policy instrument in the form of cap-and-trade to achieve its emissions target. On the other hand, India has a potpourri of regulatory and fiscal measures with different government departments accountable for them. The hike in fuel taxes in the expedient environment of low crude oil prices has been sold as carbon tax. With little available out of the Green Climate Fund, providing subsidies for investment in renewables, in the long term, is impractical, inept and ill-advised.
The sum total of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by all the countries is, by all accounts, unlikely to keep the global temperatures below the targeted 2 degree Celsius rise. It could be far worse if China and developed nations fail to meet their share of obligations—not an unlikely prospect. This would require the international community to frame a legally binding arrangement in Paris, and India should insist on an appropriate differentiated accountability mechanism for the same. Otherwise, with more than 1,200 islands, a coastline of more than 7,000km, one of the world’s most disaster-prone landscape and two-thirds of the population dependent on agriculture fed by erratic monsoons, India will be left vulnerable to recklessness, followed by inaction, of richer countries.
India has sent a strong signal by announcing efforts to curb climate change
ndia has done well to send a strong signal that it will actively join global efforts to contain climate change despite its other development goals that require an increase in energy use.
In its voluntary commitment submitted ahead of the international negotiations on climate change in Paris, India has said it will, by 2030, seek to cut the emissions intensity of its gross domestic product by around a third, increase the share of non-fossil fuel based installed electricity capacity to 40% and create an additional carbon sink to absorb 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by increasing forest cover.
Since the current share of the non-fossil fuel electricity capacity is already 30%, the target of 40% appears very much achievable. The more ambitious, and perhaps unrealistic, goals had been announced soon after Narendra Modi came to power—to reach 100 gigawatts (GW) of solar power and 60GW of wind power by 2022. Two facts will put these targets in perspective. One, India’s current solar and wind installed capacity are about 4GW and 24GW, respectively. Two, Germany, the world leader in solar power, has a much more subdued goal—it aims to achieve 66GW of solar power by 2030.
Such aggressive framing of targets helps in a couple of ways. One, they help assert India’s seriousness in addressing a global crisis which it has done little to bring about. Second, such high targets are a clear signaling instrument to attract firms which can invest in India’s renewable energy. India will need the partnership, finance and technology of the private sector if it has to reach anywhere close to its declared targets. Global giants like SoftBank and Foxconn have come together with Bharti Enterprises to invest as much as $20 billion in solar projects in India. Many global green energy firms want to make hay while the sun shines in India, quite literally. All such enthusiasm notwithstanding, the targets are a tad too high to be met on the back of public subsidy in the absence of a clear market-based model.
The more important question is whether India should commit itself to such high targets. The burden of fighting climate change should primarily fall on developed countries not just because they are responsible for it in first place but also because they are equipped with the wherewithal—the finance and technology—to deal with the problem much more adequately. India has therefore, justifiably, insisted on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and transfer of capital and technology to meet its goal. Even holding India to the standards of China’s commitments is unfair. But pressure is invariably put on India immediately after China—the world’s biggest polluter—announces any significant domestic milestone. With China’s announcements, which have been widely appreciated, its emissions intensity will exceed India’s by about two-thirds in 2030. It is clear that India’s peak emissions intensity will never be close to what China or developed countries have been culpable of.
All the heat and fury of target-setting notwithstanding, little can be achieved without a coherent set of policy and financial instruments. China has announced a clear policy instrument in the form of cap-and-trade to achieve its emissions target. On the other hand, India has a potpourri of regulatory and fiscal measures with different government departments accountable for them. The hike in fuel taxes in the expedient environment of low crude oil prices has been sold as carbon tax. With little available out of the Green Climate Fund, providing subsidies for investment in renewables, in the long term, is impractical, inept and ill-advised.
The sum total of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by all the countries is, by all accounts, unlikely to keep the global temperatures below the targeted 2 degree Celsius rise. It could be far worse if China and developed nations fail to meet their share of obligations—not an unlikely prospect. This would require the international community to frame a legally binding arrangement in Paris, and India should insist on an appropriate differentiated accountability mechanism for the same. Otherwise, with more than 1,200 islands, a coastline of more than 7,000km, one of the world’s most disaster-prone landscape and two-thirds of the population dependent on agriculture fed by erratic monsoons, India will be left vulnerable to recklessness, followed by inaction, of richer countries.
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