India must now match the offers from China, the US and Europe with an emissions-reduction plan that goes beyond what it has already offered
In a few weeks, the parties to the United Nations Climate Convention will meet in Lima, Peru, to prepare for their Paris meeting in 2015. This is the culmination of a process that began in Durban in 2011 with the aim of securing agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a level at which there is a two in three chance of restricting the average global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level.
The meeting will take place just about a month after theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its synthesis report, which summarised the outcome of its fifth assessment drafted by over 800 authors and reviewers from 85 countries. This assessment report is more categorical in asserting that the observed changes are not just a natural fluctuation but a consequence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. It is also more insistent on the need for immediate action.
The risks of climate change depend on cumulative emissions. The IPCC synthesis report presents a global carbon budget for containing the likely temperature increase to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. To meet this goal, cumulative emissions would have to be limited to 790gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) - of which we have used up 515 GtC, leaving us with 275 GtC. To stay within this budget, global emissions will have to come down by 40-70 per cent of the 2010 level by 2050 and to zero by the end of the century. The negotiations are about how what remains should be shared.
In 1992, when the convention was signed, the confrontation was not between North and South but between those who were sceptical about the reality of anthropogenic impact on climate change and those who were convinced that it was sufficiently proven. There was also a United States-Europeconfrontation on burden-sharing. The developing countries were not under any sort of pressure and their demand for common but differentiated responsibility was accepted.
Today, 20 years later, the situation is very different. Rapid growth and the heavy dependence on coal has pushed China into the number one position of emitters in the aggregate. Its per capita emissions are also now at 7.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide, comparable to Europe. They are now under pressure to join in the mitigation effort, and the first concrete result of this is the recently announced United States-China deal where the United States has committed to an absolute reduction in emissions of 26-28 per cent relative to 2005 level before 2025 and China has committed to peaking its emissions not later than 2030 and raising the contribution of non-carbon energy sources from the current 10 per cent to 20 per cent of primary energy supply.
The United States commitment does involve some additional effort on their side. But China got away easily. Its peaking commitment does not stop it from continuing to increase its emissions to 2030 when they may reach 10-12 tonnes per capita, more or less comparable to the United States. The doubling of non-carbon energy is a more serious commitment but readily achievable given the way China is pushing solar and wind energy.
In some ways, the most significant element in the deal is that the United States has accepted differentiation in the nature of the commitment between the two countries. Differentiation on the basis of capacity or developmental need maybe acceptable to the United States. Their problem is with differentiation based on culpability for past emissions.
The fact that the two countries that are quite prepared to be in a minority of one in multilateral negotiations have come up with something positive that they can put forward as the "intended nationally determined contributions" (INDC) will put pressure on others to come up with something credible. Europe has already raised its commitment to a 40 per cent reduction in emissions by 2030 relative to 1990 levels and raising the share of renewables to 27 per cent. Japan, no doubt, will also announce something soon.
This puts India in the cross hairs. We will have to come up with our offer on the mitigation front. Now that China has broken ranks, and South Africa and Brazil have always been more willing to accept some obligation, India will be under pressure to offer a credible contribution to the global effort to manage climate risks.
We need not fear this. We cannot make an offer on a peaking year. Our per capita emissions at 1.7 tonnes are way below China and there is no reason to equate us with them. However, we have a reasonable story to tell on energy efficiency. We can also offer commitments on renewables that are at least as substantial as China's or Europe's promise. The metric that we should push for is of carbon efficiency per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). The report of the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth has outlined a path that could give a 42 per cent improvement in carbon efficiency by 2030 at a cost of a little over $800 billion of investment. The merit of this offer is that it gives a basis for demanding equally precise commitments from the developed countries on finance and technology.
An offer to contribute to carbon emission mitigation through carbon efficiency gains need not involve a substantial growth penalty. In the medium term, it will rely on energy efficiency, which is desirable in any case, and renewables, which are fast becoming an attractive proposition in terms of costs. It will also strengthen the case for effective international action on adaptation support, which would be welcome given the substantial adaptation measures we will have to take even if the temperature increase is contained at two degrees Celsius.
Uncontrolled climate change will be hugely harmful to India, and it is in our national interest to do what it takes to get an effective climate agreement. A failure in Paris in 2015 is not in our national interest. We are justified in emphasising equity, and we should insist that it should be a factor in the assessment of the adequacy of the national offers that are put on the table, an assessment that should also take into account developmental needs and capacity. But we must now match the offers from China, the United States and Europe with an offer that looks beyond the 2020 carbon intensity goals that we promised at Copenhagen.
The meeting will take place just about a month after theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its synthesis report, which summarised the outcome of its fifth assessment drafted by over 800 authors and reviewers from 85 countries. This assessment report is more categorical in asserting that the observed changes are not just a natural fluctuation but a consequence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. It is also more insistent on the need for immediate action.
The risks of climate change depend on cumulative emissions. The IPCC synthesis report presents a global carbon budget for containing the likely temperature increase to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. To meet this goal, cumulative emissions would have to be limited to 790gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) - of which we have used up 515 GtC, leaving us with 275 GtC. To stay within this budget, global emissions will have to come down by 40-70 per cent of the 2010 level by 2050 and to zero by the end of the century. The negotiations are about how what remains should be shared.
In 1992, when the convention was signed, the confrontation was not between North and South but between those who were sceptical about the reality of anthropogenic impact on climate change and those who were convinced that it was sufficiently proven. There was also a United States-Europeconfrontation on burden-sharing. The developing countries were not under any sort of pressure and their demand for common but differentiated responsibility was accepted.
Today, 20 years later, the situation is very different. Rapid growth and the heavy dependence on coal has pushed China into the number one position of emitters in the aggregate. Its per capita emissions are also now at 7.2 tonnes of carbon dioxide, comparable to Europe. They are now under pressure to join in the mitigation effort, and the first concrete result of this is the recently announced United States-China deal where the United States has committed to an absolute reduction in emissions of 26-28 per cent relative to 2005 level before 2025 and China has committed to peaking its emissions not later than 2030 and raising the contribution of non-carbon energy sources from the current 10 per cent to 20 per cent of primary energy supply.
The United States commitment does involve some additional effort on their side. But China got away easily. Its peaking commitment does not stop it from continuing to increase its emissions to 2030 when they may reach 10-12 tonnes per capita, more or less comparable to the United States. The doubling of non-carbon energy is a more serious commitment but readily achievable given the way China is pushing solar and wind energy.
In some ways, the most significant element in the deal is that the United States has accepted differentiation in the nature of the commitment between the two countries. Differentiation on the basis of capacity or developmental need maybe acceptable to the United States. Their problem is with differentiation based on culpability for past emissions.
The fact that the two countries that are quite prepared to be in a minority of one in multilateral negotiations have come up with something positive that they can put forward as the "intended nationally determined contributions" (INDC) will put pressure on others to come up with something credible. Europe has already raised its commitment to a 40 per cent reduction in emissions by 2030 relative to 1990 levels and raising the share of renewables to 27 per cent. Japan, no doubt, will also announce something soon.
This puts India in the cross hairs. We will have to come up with our offer on the mitigation front. Now that China has broken ranks, and South Africa and Brazil have always been more willing to accept some obligation, India will be under pressure to offer a credible contribution to the global effort to manage climate risks.
We need not fear this. We cannot make an offer on a peaking year. Our per capita emissions at 1.7 tonnes are way below China and there is no reason to equate us with them. However, we have a reasonable story to tell on energy efficiency. We can also offer commitments on renewables that are at least as substantial as China's or Europe's promise. The metric that we should push for is of carbon efficiency per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). The report of the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth has outlined a path that could give a 42 per cent improvement in carbon efficiency by 2030 at a cost of a little over $800 billion of investment. The merit of this offer is that it gives a basis for demanding equally precise commitments from the developed countries on finance and technology.
An offer to contribute to carbon emission mitigation through carbon efficiency gains need not involve a substantial growth penalty. In the medium term, it will rely on energy efficiency, which is desirable in any case, and renewables, which are fast becoming an attractive proposition in terms of costs. It will also strengthen the case for effective international action on adaptation support, which would be welcome given the substantial adaptation measures we will have to take even if the temperature increase is contained at two degrees Celsius.
Uncontrolled climate change will be hugely harmful to India, and it is in our national interest to do what it takes to get an effective climate agreement. A failure in Paris in 2015 is not in our national interest. We are justified in emphasising equity, and we should insist that it should be a factor in the assessment of the adequacy of the national offers that are put on the table, an assessment that should also take into account developmental needs and capacity. But we must now match the offers from China, the United States and Europe with an offer that looks beyond the 2020 carbon intensity goals that we promised at Copenhagen.
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