Between 1986 and 2000, the Indian navy commissioned 14 submarines. In the 14 years since, it has added just onesubmarine (a nuclear-powered one leased from Russia). The next new submarine will not come before 2016. When the first batch of six Scorpene submarines is fully delivered by 2021, it will be two decades after they were ordered. And by the time the new batch of six submarines that has just been approved is delivered, the pre-2000 submarines will have been phased out of service. In 2030, therefore, India will have 12 diesel-electric submarines and perhaps two or three nuclear submarines, making for a total of 15, compared to the 24 that were deemed desirable in a plan approved in 1997. The tragic state of India's defence preparedness is more than evident in these numbers.
The principal problem has been that no submarines were ordered between the late 1980s and 2001, in part as a fall-out of defence acquisition scandals. A subsidiary problem has been delays in local manufacture. As a matter of fact, the home-made Arihant nuclear submarine, which was launched more than five years ago, is yet to start sea trials; so its commissioning is some way off. What is true of the navy's submarine fleet is true of the army and the air force, whether it is night-fighting capabilities or a proper air defence system. The air force's strength is barely two-thirds of the 40 squadrons it should have, even as the order for seven squadrons of Rafale multi-role fighters is still awaited.
The Modi government has been trying hard to play catch-up. Three months before the latest orders for Rs 80,000 crore worth of equipment, an order for Rs 21,000 crore worth of hardware had been approved - for supply ships, light helicopters, transport aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. Most of these were to be made in India, and the transport aircraft reserved for the private sector (a unique reversal of the usual reservation that is done for the public sector). The stress on indigenous manufacture fits well with the government's "Make in India" thrust, and a greater role for the private sector has been facilitated by raising the limit on foreign investment in the defence equipment sector from 26 per cent to 49 per cent. These initiatives are to be welcomed, and could help reduce delays in equipment delivery. However, it should be noted that all the equipment orders are decisions by the Defence Acquisitions Council. There is a lot of ground to be covered after this before firm orders are approved by the Cabinet, and the need now is for urgency in the selection process and negotiations that must follow.
The new government is also putting stress on something that its predecessor woke up to only belatedly - the need to improve border transport infrastructure, both road and rail. Because India's total defence spending is well short of the level (three per cent of its gross domestic product) recommended some years ago by the National Security Advisory Board, there are limits to how much can be done in double-quick time. What is clear, though, is that defence acquisitions will have to be at high speed for some time to come.
The principal problem has been that no submarines were ordered between the late 1980s and 2001, in part as a fall-out of defence acquisition scandals. A subsidiary problem has been delays in local manufacture. As a matter of fact, the home-made Arihant nuclear submarine, which was launched more than five years ago, is yet to start sea trials; so its commissioning is some way off. What is true of the navy's submarine fleet is true of the army and the air force, whether it is night-fighting capabilities or a proper air defence system. The air force's strength is barely two-thirds of the 40 squadrons it should have, even as the order for seven squadrons of Rafale multi-role fighters is still awaited.
The Modi government has been trying hard to play catch-up. Three months before the latest orders for Rs 80,000 crore worth of equipment, an order for Rs 21,000 crore worth of hardware had been approved - for supply ships, light helicopters, transport aircraft and anti-tank weaponry. Most of these were to be made in India, and the transport aircraft reserved for the private sector (a unique reversal of the usual reservation that is done for the public sector). The stress on indigenous manufacture fits well with the government's "Make in India" thrust, and a greater role for the private sector has been facilitated by raising the limit on foreign investment in the defence equipment sector from 26 per cent to 49 per cent. These initiatives are to be welcomed, and could help reduce delays in equipment delivery. However, it should be noted that all the equipment orders are decisions by the Defence Acquisitions Council. There is a lot of ground to be covered after this before firm orders are approved by the Cabinet, and the need now is for urgency in the selection process and negotiations that must follow.
The new government is also putting stress on something that its predecessor woke up to only belatedly - the need to improve border transport infrastructure, both road and rail. Because India's total defence spending is well short of the level (three per cent of its gross domestic product) recommended some years ago by the National Security Advisory Board, there are limits to how much can be done in double-quick time. What is clear, though, is that defence acquisitions will have to be at high speed for some time to come.
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