The year 2015 began with clear indications of how the Narendra Modi Government intends to position itself in global affairs. The Prime Minister’s invitation to the Heads of SAARC Governments for his swearing-in was followed by intensive interaction in Yangon and Brisbane with regional and global leaders, during the East Asia and G-20 Summits. The focus was very clearly on sending out the message that India was determined to return to a high-growth path economically. It would play a proactive role not only in regional economic integration with its ASEAN neighbours and major economies like Japan and South Korea, but also in fashioning new security dynamics across the Indo-Pacific region. India’s security perimeter was no lager confined to the Indian Ocean rim, but extended across the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
While the Xi Jinping visit to India was marred by the Chinese military intrusion in Chumar, the message to Beijing was that while India would resist territorial incursions, it was ready for dialogue to end tensions, expand economic cooperation and widen interaction in forums like BRICS and G 20. But the event that received widespread global attention was the visit of President Obama on India's Republic Day. That visit clearly signalled that India was opening its doors to foreign investment, expanding the scope of bilateral cooperation in defence and seeking solutions constructively to issues of environment, energy, intellectual property rights and climate change. New Delhi recognises the reality that the US is going to remain the pre-eminent global power for at least the next two decades. At the same time, one has to recognise that differences in areas like Intellectual Property Rights, especially in pharmaceuticals and in climate change, posed difficult challenges. Moreover, the road ahead in nuclear power cooperation with the US is going to be bumpy. Legal challenges on issues of compensation appear inevitable. It also remains to be seen if American reactors can supply power at reasonable and competitive rates.
While India can be satisfied at signs that the US support for the Afghan armed forces will continue together with air support, American ambivalence on the Taliban will remain a matter of concern. India will have to now seek greater cooperation on the Afghanistan issue in interactions with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, including particularly China and Russia. The Americans clearly understand that India will not join the Western efforts to isolate and condemn Russia. The recent trilateral India-Russia-China ministerial meeting in Beijing has made it clear that India has serious concerns about the challenges China poses to its national security along its borders and by its nuclear, missile and military relationships with Pakistan and its assertiveness across the India Ocean littoral. Despite this, every effort will be made to address differences on the border issue seriously, while expanding trade, industrial and investment ties, equitably and realistically.
Unlike Pakistan, which reacted immaturely and churlishly to the Obama visit, the Chinese reacted with a measure of concern combined with realism. The Chinese were unquestionably unsettled by the readiness of the US and India to expand military ties, while enunciating a common vision for the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions, “from Africa to East Asia”. The references to the need to avoid the threat of use of force and abide by the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea clearly conveyed concerns over Chinese behaviour in its maritime disputes with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. It was also asserted that there would be strengthening of India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation. The Chinese responded by expressions of concern together with rolling out the red carpet for Mrs. SushmaSwaraj and welcoming a proposed visit by Mr Modi in May 2015. One can reasonably expect that at the very least, such a visit will lead to measures that ensure that border incursions like those which occurred in Depsang and Chumar in 2013-2014 are avoided.
It would be too much to expect China to proceed more cautiously in its policies of military, nuclear and missile technology and weapon transfers to Pakistan. China will also proceed ahead with enhancing support for its Maritime Silk Route, designed to surround India, across its entire coastal periphery. But recent developments in Sri Lanka and Myanmar should serve as a caution to the Mandarins in Beijing about getting overzealous on “strategic containment” of India. The recent agreements with the US, Japan and Vietnam should also serve as a signal to Beijing that a determined India can, at the very least, respond diplomatically to its moves in the Indian Ocean by counter-measures, leveraging its partnerships with China's immediate coastal neighbours and the USA. Following a categorical US commitment to back India for APEC membership, China has indicated that it will not be an obstacle on this score. The time has also perhaps come to informally sound out the US, Australia, Japan and ASEAN States like Vietnam and Singapore for exploring possibilities of India joining the Trans-Pacific partnership in course of time.
There are indications that Mr Modi will visit France, Germany and the UK this year, apart from a visit to Russia. With a number of its members afflicted by serious economic maladies, the European Union appears to be increasingly looking inwards. But its major powers do have the potential to contribute significantly to Mr Modi's “Make-in-India” programme and its defencemodernisation. The proposed visit to Israel has also to be looked at in this context. Missing from this schedule are possible visits to Gulf countries like Oman, Qatar, Iraq and, circumstances permitting, even Iran, especially if we are able to finalise long-term contracts for the import of LNG. There is now every indication that, like the prices of oil, the prices of LNG are also set to fall in the coming years as global shale gas production rises. Success on such an active foreign policy agenda will naturally depend on the government's success in getting its economic reforms agenda and legislation approved by Parliament.
While the Xi Jinping visit to India was marred by the Chinese military intrusion in Chumar, the message to Beijing was that while India would resist territorial incursions, it was ready for dialogue to end tensions, expand economic cooperation and widen interaction in forums like BRICS and G 20. But the event that received widespread global attention was the visit of President Obama on India's Republic Day. That visit clearly signalled that India was opening its doors to foreign investment, expanding the scope of bilateral cooperation in defence and seeking solutions constructively to issues of environment, energy, intellectual property rights and climate change. New Delhi recognises the reality that the US is going to remain the pre-eminent global power for at least the next two decades. At the same time, one has to recognise that differences in areas like Intellectual Property Rights, especially in pharmaceuticals and in climate change, posed difficult challenges. Moreover, the road ahead in nuclear power cooperation with the US is going to be bumpy. Legal challenges on issues of compensation appear inevitable. It also remains to be seen if American reactors can supply power at reasonable and competitive rates.
While India can be satisfied at signs that the US support for the Afghan armed forces will continue together with air support, American ambivalence on the Taliban will remain a matter of concern. India will have to now seek greater cooperation on the Afghanistan issue in interactions with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, including particularly China and Russia. The Americans clearly understand that India will not join the Western efforts to isolate and condemn Russia. The recent trilateral India-Russia-China ministerial meeting in Beijing has made it clear that India has serious concerns about the challenges China poses to its national security along its borders and by its nuclear, missile and military relationships with Pakistan and its assertiveness across the India Ocean littoral. Despite this, every effort will be made to address differences on the border issue seriously, while expanding trade, industrial and investment ties, equitably and realistically.
Unlike Pakistan, which reacted immaturely and churlishly to the Obama visit, the Chinese reacted with a measure of concern combined with realism. The Chinese were unquestionably unsettled by the readiness of the US and India to expand military ties, while enunciating a common vision for the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions, “from Africa to East Asia”. The references to the need to avoid the threat of use of force and abide by the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea clearly conveyed concerns over Chinese behaviour in its maritime disputes with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia. It was also asserted that there would be strengthening of India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation. The Chinese responded by expressions of concern together with rolling out the red carpet for Mrs. SushmaSwaraj and welcoming a proposed visit by Mr Modi in May 2015. One can reasonably expect that at the very least, such a visit will lead to measures that ensure that border incursions like those which occurred in Depsang and Chumar in 2013-2014 are avoided.
It would be too much to expect China to proceed more cautiously in its policies of military, nuclear and missile technology and weapon transfers to Pakistan. China will also proceed ahead with enhancing support for its Maritime Silk Route, designed to surround India, across its entire coastal periphery. But recent developments in Sri Lanka and Myanmar should serve as a caution to the Mandarins in Beijing about getting overzealous on “strategic containment” of India. The recent agreements with the US, Japan and Vietnam should also serve as a signal to Beijing that a determined India can, at the very least, respond diplomatically to its moves in the Indian Ocean by counter-measures, leveraging its partnerships with China's immediate coastal neighbours and the USA. Following a categorical US commitment to back India for APEC membership, China has indicated that it will not be an obstacle on this score. The time has also perhaps come to informally sound out the US, Australia, Japan and ASEAN States like Vietnam and Singapore for exploring possibilities of India joining the Trans-Pacific partnership in course of time.
There are indications that Mr Modi will visit France, Germany and the UK this year, apart from a visit to Russia. With a number of its members afflicted by serious economic maladies, the European Union appears to be increasingly looking inwards. But its major powers do have the potential to contribute significantly to Mr Modi's “Make-in-India” programme and its defencemodernisation. The proposed visit to Israel has also to be looked at in this context. Missing from this schedule are possible visits to Gulf countries like Oman, Qatar, Iraq and, circumstances permitting, even Iran, especially if we are able to finalise long-term contracts for the import of LNG. There is now every indication that, like the prices of oil, the prices of LNG are also set to fall in the coming years as global shale gas production rises. Success on such an active foreign policy agenda will naturally depend on the government's success in getting its economic reforms agenda and legislation approved by Parliament.
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