Changing Team State

Jawaharlal Nehru hoped that his legacy would be 40 crore people capable of ruling themselves. As the unrealistic expectations from the first 100 days of the NDA calm down, I’d like to make the case that the government should take the long view and try to create a legacy that makes an impact: four lakh civil servants who are effective, accountable and bold. A more efficient and adventurous state would need radical changes to the policy on human capital architecture. Currently, this policy ensures that our non-elected senior policymakers are mostly permanent, close to retirement, and share thought worlds.

Legacies are complicated concepts and it’s probably useful to revisit two views of history. The first view, summed up by Thomas Carlyle, believes that the history of the world is the biography of great men. The second view, championed by Leo Tolstoy, believes that there is no such thing as great men, only great times. For me, the second view is too fatalistic, because leaders like Gandhi, Abraham Lincoln, Akbar and Ranjit Singh clearly bent the arc of history. But accomplishing great things is a team sport. The leaders mentioned above wouldn’t have accomplished what they did without what historian Doris Kearns Goodwin calls a team of rivals; Nehru, Sardar Patel and Abul Kalam Azad for Gandhi, Edward Bates, Salmon Chase and William Seward for Lincoln, Todar Mal, Man Singh, and Birbal for Akbar, Zorawar Singh, Hari Singh Nalwa and Fakeer Azizuddin for Ranjit Singh. Nehru’s legacy, redeemed not wholly or in full measure but very substantially, did lead to a nation that governs itself. But, according to biographer S. Gopal, Nehru regretted not being able to dismantle the administrative system set up by the British. It is a system for centralisation, control and suppressing innovation that is inappropriate for today’s wicked problems.

It is a system for centralisation, control and suppressing innovation that is inappropriate for today’s wicked problems.

It may be useful to learn from technology companies in Silicon Valley, the hub of using adventurous, innovative and curious human capital to solve wicked problems. Their first genius is realising that the team you choose is the company you create: an A team with a B opportunity is preferred over a B team with an A opportunity. Their second genius is a bias for youth: wicked problems need a fresh set of eyes not crushed by history or “how things are done”. The French statesman, Georges Clemenceau, once said that war was too important to be left to generals, and the third genius of the Silicon Valley companies is ensuring that hyper-intelligent engineers are complemented by narrative-creating marketers and tight-fisted financial controllers. Their final genius lies in leadership transition, as companies shift from the hormonal exuberance of adolescence to the cruising speed of adulthood. Founders step back, or are forced to step back, and are replaced by adult supervision. All four have interesting implications but first let’s look atthe case for less permanence, higher diversity and more youth. The rationale for a permanent civil service is that it ensures a non-politically aligned cadre with an institutional memory. But does the de jure square with the de facto? Are they really independent? Organisation memory is not only oversold — most civil servants don’t even meet their successors to hand over responsibility —  but its desirability is also questionable when you want radical change. Younger leaders would tackle timidity; longer tenures allow appointees to take more risk. Youth has more time to recover from mistakes and younger people are still idealistic. The case for diversity is best illustrated anecdotally — for instance, Nandan Nilekani got Aadhaar going because of his decades in technology. The research clearly shows that effective problem-solving synthesises diverse thought worlds. What does this entail? It needs combining the various administrative reform commission recommendations with the Seventh Pay Commission. Replacing today’s objective but ineffective performance management — 95 per cent are rated outstanding — with sharper and earlier differentiation. Figuring out how to give top jobs to 45-year-olds rather than 58-year-olds. Filling all posts above joint secretary level from a UPSC shortlist based on open advertisements. Emulating the lieutenant colonel threshold of the army, so that most civil servants retire early or peak as joint secretary equivalents if they are not shortlisted for moving up. Appointing 25 per cent of our ambassadors from outside the IFS and having direct political appointees make up 10 per cent of the secretaries. Reducing the number and size of Central ministries — two-thirds of IAS officers in Delhi work on state subjects. Barring career civil servants from regulatory posts for five years after retirement. Creating parliamentary oversight or confirmation for 40 key political appointments. Of course, all political appointees, like the Roman general, Cincinnatus, who was summoned from his farm to deal with an enemy attack but returned to the plough once his duty was done, would have tenures that were co-terminus with the government. All governors, political appointees, heads of IRDA, Sebi, Trai, NDMA, CCI, Cerc etc, would resign before a new government is sworn in. Does US policymaking really suffer when more than 4,000 people resign from public policy roles as a new president takes over in Washington? Not all resignations are accepted but it’s wonderful that they are offered. This government has a policy window — described by political scientist John Kingdon as that moment when the three streams, problems, policy and politics, converge. It also clearly believes, like Thomas Hobbes, that the state is an important antidote to nasty, brutish and short lives. Pundits are already speculating whether this government’s first term will be remembered as BJP1, NDA2 or UPA3. But it must pay no attention to the weather of the moment and remember that Hobbes named the state “Leviathan” after a biblical monster. And that re-election — and making history — lie in policy outcomes that need radical surgery to the architecture of India’s four lakh-strong non-elected policymaking Leviathan. -

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