East vs West: Flashpoint Ukraine
The question many nations of the world are asking is whether the relatively brief period of the post-Cold War era is over. It would perhaps be premature to slot the Ukraine crisis as the beginning of a new version of an old division of the world. But beyond the shrill rhetoric emanating from Moscow, Washington and other world capitals, we are witnessing more than a conflict of interests. What is happening is the West’s denial of the right of the Russian Federation to safeguard its geopolitical interests.
What President Putin is trying to accomplish after annexing the Crimean peninsula following the West’s pre-emptive action in signing on Ukraine into the European Union at the cost of Russia is to ensure that a country of 45 million people in a vast area bordering on its flank is not absorbed into NATO. Moreover, half of this country consists of primary Russian-speakers and have deep cultural, religious and trade links with the Russian Federation.
Understandably, Russia is keen to prevent the complete encirclement of its motherland by a western military organisation. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weak leaders that took over the fragmented successor state, the US and West European nations trod all over Russia, breaking legions of promises, to co-opt the former constituents of the Soviet Union such as the Baltic states but also countries like Poland. The new attempt was to take in the land mass of Ukraine and Georgia, among others, to tighten the noose.
The Russian Federation sent its military into Georgia to carve out two areas of the country into independent states in 2008, a warning the West chose to ignore. In the long negotiations with former President Viktor Yenukovych, the European Union sought to co-opt Ukraine into the West through the European Union and later NATO. He balked at the prospect of putting his signature at the last minute because he was not prepared to face Russian wrath.
In any event, Moscow made his task easier by giving him a loan of $15-billion and a hefty discount on gas prices, the lifeline of Ukraine’s energy needs. This decision of the former President led to months of demonstration in Kiev’s Maidan, to be ostentatiously cheered by high-level representatives of the United States and West European countries ultimately leading to sniper shootings and an interim agreement among the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland in the presence of a Russian representative calling for a presidential election by the end of the year. But the demonstrators on the Maidan had tasted blood, tore the agreement before it was dry and proclaimed a revolution.
An interim government was formed, the imprisoned former leader Yulia Tymoshenko was released from confinement and addressed the crowds. To save himself from harm, Mr Yanukovych fled to Russia. The European Union quickly signed an agreement with the interim leaders, keeping some provisions in abeyance until the expedited presidential election would be held towards the end of May. All this was par for the course. But subsequent events, including bouts of rebellion in the eastern region the US is charging Russia with instigating, imply that the West will continue the encirclement of the Russian Federation at an unacceptable cost.
There is much talk in Western capitals on how Russia’s actions have re-energised a drooping NATO, how the West European nations must increase their defence budgets, on the permanent stationing of NATO troops on European soil, in addition to the increased air patrolling of NATO nations’ borders. The point of these moves is that the West has not accepted the fact that Moscow is fighting to safeguard its national interests as best it can after losing out to the West following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has spelled out his country’s demands. It wants a federal constitution for Ukraine, with the regions given a great measure of autonomy in administering their affairs, a guarantee for the official status of the Russian language and a constitutional provision that it would not enter NATO. In other words, Ukraine will remain non-aligned between the European Union and Russia while dealing and trading with both. Thus far, the US has rejected the idea of a new federal constitution.
Beyond the slated meetings among the US, Russia and other interested parties, the underlying problem is the West’s refusal to give weight to legitimate Russian strategic interests which is something akin to a hostile power signing on Mexico for its own geopolitical interests at Washington’s expense. Perhaps Washington and West European capitals wish to complete the diminution of the Russian Federation in the world. The argument over Russia’s form of government as opposed to the growing ranks of democracies does not wash because the West has frequently supped with the devil and continues to do so for reasons of state and geopolitical interests. The question here is not how evil and dictatorial President Putin is in running his country and its foreign policy but in how Russia conceives Western actions to be damaging to its core interests. At present Russia and the West are talking past, rather than to, each other. True, the West has tacitly accepted the reincorporation of Crimea, in view of its tangled history and it being the base of the important Russian Black Sea Fleet. But it is not prepared to go further in guaranteeing that Moscow’s legitimate concerns on Ukraine be accommodated.
No one wants a new hot war in Europe or anywhere else. The options the West is formulating revolve round increasingly stinging economic sanctions which would make life difficult for the Russian Federation. Such sanctions would come at a cost to West European nations, which receive a substantial portion of their gas and oil supplies from Russia, apart from London being a favourite place for Russian oligarchs to park their billions.
The alternatives seem to be between a new round of economic blood-letting before arriving at a compromise and a decision to seek a fair compromise for safeguarding Ukraine’s integrity while taking into account Moscow’s legitimate interests.
The question many nations of the world are asking is whether the relatively brief period of the post-Cold War era is over. It would perhaps be premature to slot the Ukraine crisis as the beginning of a new version of an old division of the world. But beyond the shrill rhetoric emanating from Moscow, Washington and other world capitals, we are witnessing more than a conflict of interests. What is happening is the West’s denial of the right of the Russian Federation to safeguard its geopolitical interests.
What President Putin is trying to accomplish after annexing the Crimean peninsula following the West’s pre-emptive action in signing on Ukraine into the European Union at the cost of Russia is to ensure that a country of 45 million people in a vast area bordering on its flank is not absorbed into NATO. Moreover, half of this country consists of primary Russian-speakers and have deep cultural, religious and trade links with the Russian Federation.
Understandably, Russia is keen to prevent the complete encirclement of its motherland by a western military organisation. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weak leaders that took over the fragmented successor state, the US and West European nations trod all over Russia, breaking legions of promises, to co-opt the former constituents of the Soviet Union such as the Baltic states but also countries like Poland. The new attempt was to take in the land mass of Ukraine and Georgia, among others, to tighten the noose.
The Russian Federation sent its military into Georgia to carve out two areas of the country into independent states in 2008, a warning the West chose to ignore. In the long negotiations with former President Viktor Yenukovych, the European Union sought to co-opt Ukraine into the West through the European Union and later NATO. He balked at the prospect of putting his signature at the last minute because he was not prepared to face Russian wrath.
In any event, Moscow made his task easier by giving him a loan of $15-billion and a hefty discount on gas prices, the lifeline of Ukraine’s energy needs. This decision of the former President led to months of demonstration in Kiev’s Maidan, to be ostentatiously cheered by high-level representatives of the United States and West European countries ultimately leading to sniper shootings and an interim agreement among the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland in the presence of a Russian representative calling for a presidential election by the end of the year. But the demonstrators on the Maidan had tasted blood, tore the agreement before it was dry and proclaimed a revolution.
An interim government was formed, the imprisoned former leader Yulia Tymoshenko was released from confinement and addressed the crowds. To save himself from harm, Mr Yanukovych fled to Russia. The European Union quickly signed an agreement with the interim leaders, keeping some provisions in abeyance until the expedited presidential election would be held towards the end of May. All this was par for the course. But subsequent events, including bouts of rebellion in the eastern region the US is charging Russia with instigating, imply that the West will continue the encirclement of the Russian Federation at an unacceptable cost.
There is much talk in Western capitals on how Russia’s actions have re-energised a drooping NATO, how the West European nations must increase their defence budgets, on the permanent stationing of NATO troops on European soil, in addition to the increased air patrolling of NATO nations’ borders. The point of these moves is that the West has not accepted the fact that Moscow is fighting to safeguard its national interests as best it can after losing out to the West following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has spelled out his country’s demands. It wants a federal constitution for Ukraine, with the regions given a great measure of autonomy in administering their affairs, a guarantee for the official status of the Russian language and a constitutional provision that it would not enter NATO. In other words, Ukraine will remain non-aligned between the European Union and Russia while dealing and trading with both. Thus far, the US has rejected the idea of a new federal constitution.
Beyond the slated meetings among the US, Russia and other interested parties, the underlying problem is the West’s refusal to give weight to legitimate Russian strategic interests which is something akin to a hostile power signing on Mexico for its own geopolitical interests at Washington’s expense. Perhaps Washington and West European capitals wish to complete the diminution of the Russian Federation in the world. The argument over Russia’s form of government as opposed to the growing ranks of democracies does not wash because the West has frequently supped with the devil and continues to do so for reasons of state and geopolitical interests. The question here is not how evil and dictatorial President Putin is in running his country and its foreign policy but in how Russia conceives Western actions to be damaging to its core interests. At present Russia and the West are talking past, rather than to, each other. True, the West has tacitly accepted the reincorporation of Crimea, in view of its tangled history and it being the base of the important Russian Black Sea Fleet. But it is not prepared to go further in guaranteeing that Moscow’s legitimate concerns on Ukraine be accommodated.
No one wants a new hot war in Europe or anywhere else. The options the West is formulating revolve round increasingly stinging economic sanctions which would make life difficult for the Russian Federation. Such sanctions would come at a cost to West European nations, which receive a substantial portion of their gas and oil supplies from Russia, apart from London being a favourite place for Russian oligarchs to park their billions.
The alternatives seem to be between a new round of economic blood-letting before arriving at a compromise and a decision to seek a fair compromise for safeguarding Ukraine’s integrity while taking into account Moscow’s legitimate interests.
No comments:
Post a Comment