The decision to purchase 36 Rafale aircraft outright fromFrance has understandably created a stir. It apparently flies in the face of the "multi vendor, open tender, transparent" approach ongoing for close to 14 years in which this aircraft was first found suitable, then qualified as L1 (lowest tender) and then there were prolonged contract negotiations. The plan to buy 16 planes outright and build the remaining 110 in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) through transfer of technology has now collapsed; the latest decision will, inevitably, include an Option Clause for some more outright purchases as the ordered number is clearly not viable.
First, it is true that the negotiations dragged on for too long but not for any fault of HAL. The French manufacturer was refusing to adhere to the terms specified in the Request for Proposals (RFP) sent out to all vendors; it was also not prepared to guarantee performance of aircraft manufactured in India, once again a clear violation of the terms of the RFP. Second, this delay was already beginning to affect the force level of combat aircraft that the Air Forcewas slipping down to; as per its projections the reduced strength could have serious consequences on our fighting readiness and, thereby impact national security. Third, an idea was beginning to get mooted to jettison the Rafale deal and go in for additional Russian-origin SU 30MK1s, already being manufactured by HAL under licence and of which the Air Force had good numbers.
Let us look at some facts. First, the long-delayed LCA, planned replacement for the MiG-21, is now nearing operational status. Does anyone really believe that war or even limited hostilities with China or Pakistan are on the horizon in the immediate future? Provocations and assisted militancy, even insurgency could be a possibility - but outright war, requiring the urgent availability of versatile combat aircraft? So, the warnings put out that the country's security was in jeopardy were clearly hype. This notwithstanding, the falling strength of fighter aircraft is cause for concern and required corrective action.
But the serious issue is different. No military platform of any kind can be developed and built unless there is capability to design it; the ability to manufacture and procure different varieties of equipment often influences this first step but can only follow it. So, putting the drawings, hundreds of them, in place is the first essential prerequisite. If the Navy can happily turn out the most modern destroyers from its shipyards, the latest being Vishakhapatnam, launched last Monday, it is only because right from its earliest years, it has focused on developing design know-how and this has resulted in every ship being more combat worthy than its predecessor with increasing indigenous content both from the public and private sectors. Concurrently, it is necessary to give strong support to the building yards. The closest possible interface is needed between the buyer, the designer and the builder; and, if the four Navy shipyards today have more than 40 ships on order, it is because these three essential requirements are being met.
Interestingly, the Air Force had also embarked on this route early on, and aircraft like the HT-2, HPT-32 and HF-24 bear evidence to this urge. But thereafter the focus shifted to outright purchase with or without manufacture in India under licence - which generates skills in manufacturing techniques, but no benefits in acquiring design know-how.
While the Navy's design-and-build-in-India plans have moved strongly through focused attention those of the Air Force have not. It is true that we are still unable to produce much of the sophisticated equipment that modern fighter aircraft require but these can always be bought and integrated into the platform design. After all, even the latest warship being built at Mazagon DocksLtd in Mumbai has weapons and sensors from different sources including our own, all interfaced into a complete system.
Taking the shelter of national security to force the "outright purchase route" has been the easy way out and over the years, political leaderships of all hues have succumbed to this threat.
The sad reality is that the apparently transparent multi-vendor route for military purchases is wholly unsuited to the Indian way of doing business, literally. Experience shows that where we go the single-vendor governmental route, things move faster and with fewer complications. So, opaque as it may seem, until design capabilities are greatly enhanced, this Hobson's choice appears to be the only route to take.
All this may make for dismal reading. On the one hand, we want to manufacture modern military platforms in India; on the other, the essential capabilities required to do so either do not exist or are deficient.
Sadly, this is not something that can be set right overnight or just by shifting tack from public to private sector. The Army and the Air Force, which do not have in-house design structures, must involve themselves more closely with the know-how already created with DRDO and others, send more people abroad for training and, together, focus on building complex platforms. This process may take several years but there are no short cuts; it has taken the Navy five decades to get here. To think that private companies can start designing and building fighter aircraft when DRDO/HAL, with decades of experience cannot, is to live in a world of make-believe.
The Air Force must also involve itself more closely through greater control of HAL entities just as the Navy has been doing all along for its shipyards. This synergised Plan-Design-Order-Build approach is essential if the other two services are to get anywhere close to where the Navy has reached and, yes, it still has some miles to go.
First, it is true that the negotiations dragged on for too long but not for any fault of HAL. The French manufacturer was refusing to adhere to the terms specified in the Request for Proposals (RFP) sent out to all vendors; it was also not prepared to guarantee performance of aircraft manufactured in India, once again a clear violation of the terms of the RFP. Second, this delay was already beginning to affect the force level of combat aircraft that the Air Forcewas slipping down to; as per its projections the reduced strength could have serious consequences on our fighting readiness and, thereby impact national security. Third, an idea was beginning to get mooted to jettison the Rafale deal and go in for additional Russian-origin SU 30MK1s, already being manufactured by HAL under licence and of which the Air Force had good numbers.
Let us look at some facts. First, the long-delayed LCA, planned replacement for the MiG-21, is now nearing operational status. Does anyone really believe that war or even limited hostilities with China or Pakistan are on the horizon in the immediate future? Provocations and assisted militancy, even insurgency could be a possibility - but outright war, requiring the urgent availability of versatile combat aircraft? So, the warnings put out that the country's security was in jeopardy were clearly hype. This notwithstanding, the falling strength of fighter aircraft is cause for concern and required corrective action.
But the serious issue is different. No military platform of any kind can be developed and built unless there is capability to design it; the ability to manufacture and procure different varieties of equipment often influences this first step but can only follow it. So, putting the drawings, hundreds of them, in place is the first essential prerequisite. If the Navy can happily turn out the most modern destroyers from its shipyards, the latest being Vishakhapatnam, launched last Monday, it is only because right from its earliest years, it has focused on developing design know-how and this has resulted in every ship being more combat worthy than its predecessor with increasing indigenous content both from the public and private sectors. Concurrently, it is necessary to give strong support to the building yards. The closest possible interface is needed between the buyer, the designer and the builder; and, if the four Navy shipyards today have more than 40 ships on order, it is because these three essential requirements are being met.
Interestingly, the Air Force had also embarked on this route early on, and aircraft like the HT-2, HPT-32 and HF-24 bear evidence to this urge. But thereafter the focus shifted to outright purchase with or without manufacture in India under licence - which generates skills in manufacturing techniques, but no benefits in acquiring design know-how.
While the Navy's design-and-build-in-India plans have moved strongly through focused attention those of the Air Force have not. It is true that we are still unable to produce much of the sophisticated equipment that modern fighter aircraft require but these can always be bought and integrated into the platform design. After all, even the latest warship being built at Mazagon DocksLtd in Mumbai has weapons and sensors from different sources including our own, all interfaced into a complete system.
Taking the shelter of national security to force the "outright purchase route" has been the easy way out and over the years, political leaderships of all hues have succumbed to this threat.
The sad reality is that the apparently transparent multi-vendor route for military purchases is wholly unsuited to the Indian way of doing business, literally. Experience shows that where we go the single-vendor governmental route, things move faster and with fewer complications. So, opaque as it may seem, until design capabilities are greatly enhanced, this Hobson's choice appears to be the only route to take.
All this may make for dismal reading. On the one hand, we want to manufacture modern military platforms in India; on the other, the essential capabilities required to do so either do not exist or are deficient.
Sadly, this is not something that can be set right overnight or just by shifting tack from public to private sector. The Army and the Air Force, which do not have in-house design structures, must involve themselves more closely with the know-how already created with DRDO and others, send more people abroad for training and, together, focus on building complex platforms. This process may take several years but there are no short cuts; it has taken the Navy five decades to get here. To think that private companies can start designing and building fighter aircraft when DRDO/HAL, with decades of experience cannot, is to live in a world of make-believe.
The Air Force must also involve itself more closely through greater control of HAL entities just as the Navy has been doing all along for its shipyards. This synergised Plan-Design-Order-Build approach is essential if the other two services are to get anywhere close to where the Navy has reached and, yes, it still has some miles to go.
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